Ruple v. Bindley

• Decision Date: 27 October 1879
• Parties: Ruple, to use of Lewis, <I>versus</I> Bindley.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

91 Pa. 296

Ruple, to use of Lewis, versus Bindley.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 13, 1879.

October 27, 1879.

October 13th 1879.

Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON, TRUNKEY and STERRETT, JJ. GREEN, J., absent

Error to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 1, of Allegheny county: Of October and November Term 1879, No. 168.

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Barton & Sons, for plaintiff in error.—This case is ruled by Caldwell v. Hartupee, 20 P. F. Smith 74. If one man delivers goods to another upon the request of a third party, and upon the promise to pay for the same at a particular time, or upon the happening of a certain event, when the conditions are performed by both, he is bound by his promise. It is not a promise to pay the debt of another, but a debt created upon the faith and strength of the promise.

Chris. Magee, for defendant in error.—In Caldwell v. Hartupee, supra, the money had been earned or was due and coming to Hartupee before the order was given, and therefore in that case the court held that Hartupee had a right to assign it, and that an order given by him with notice of the order, was an equitable assignment that would take the money.

The third specification of error simply asserts that if Bindley promised Lewis that he would pay the order when Ruple finished the stairs, and Ruple did so, that then Bindley must pay the debt which he owed Ruple to Lewis, as the assignee of the claim, and that question is not affected by the fact of money and material being advanced by Lewis to Ruple on the strength of the promise.

In Jermyn v. Moffit, 25 P. F. Smith 400, this court held "that an assignment of wages not yet earned, although followed by notice of the assignment, is insufficient to make a valid transfer of the debt without acceptance."

Mr. Justice TRUNKEY delivered the opinion of the court, October 27th 1879.

The evidence was amply sufficient to warrant a jury in finding that Ruple contracted to build a flight of stairs for Bindley for $133, Bindley to first pay out of said sum $28.15 which Ruple owed to England & Bindley; that the order for $104.85 was given for the balance of the contract price, in consideration that Lewis would furnish Ruple with material and money to enable him to do the work, and they were so furnished; that Bindley had notice of the order about the time the work was commenced and before he had paid anything to Ruple; and that Bindley paid $82 to Boyd on an order given after said notice, and to Ruple the balance of the contract price. The jury were instructed that there was nothing in the evidence to justify the plaintiff's recovery. If it were material to the plaintiff's case that Bindley agreed to pay the order, on completion of the work, though he refused a written acceptance, the conflicting testimony on this question should have been submitted.

An assignment, for a valuable consideration, of demands having at the time no actual existence, but which rest in expectancy only, is valid in equity as an agreement, and takes effect as an assignment, when the demands intended to be assigned are subsequently brought into existence: Field v. City of New York, 6 N. Y. 179; East Lewisburg Lumber & Manuf. Co. v. Marsh, Dunkel et al., ante, p. 96. In Field v. The City, it was held that assignments of parts of a demand to different persons, to secure payments to them of specific sums, in succession, are good and will be enforced in equity. Whether...