Ruple v. Bob Peterson Logging Co.

• Decision Date: 19 April 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-440,83-440
• Citation: 209 Mont. 276,679 P.2d 1252,41 St.Rep. 704
• Parties: Fred J. RUPLE, Claimant and Appellant, v. BOB PETERSON LOGGING COMPANY, Employer, and Glacier General Assurance Company, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 1252

679 P.2d 1252

209 Mont. 276

Fred J. RUPLE, Claimant and Appellant, v. BOB PETERSON LOGGING COMPANY, Employer and Glacier General Assurance Company, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 83-440.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Feb. 2, 1984.

Decided April 19, 1984.

Terry N. Trieweiler, Whitefish, for claimant and appellant.

Larry E. Riley, Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, Missoula, for defendant and respondent.

GULBRANDSON, Justice.

Fred Ruple appeals from a judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court denying conversion of his future disability benefits into a lump sum payment. We affirm.

The essential facts of this case are not in dispute. Ruple was injured in 1977 during the course of his employment with Bob Peterson Logging Company. He was awarded weekly temporary total disability benefits on account of his injuries, but these were later reduced to partial disability benefits. After a trial before the Workers' Compensation Court in 1979, Ruple was awarded permanent total disability benefits. In 1981, a decision was made by the Administrator of the Workers' Compensation Division to reduce the claimant's weekly benefits on account of his being awarded Social Security disability benefits. This decision has effectively reduced his weekly workers' compensation benefits to $70.79.

In 1982, Ruple decided to seek a conversion of his weekly benefits into a lump sum payment. Ruple contends that a lump sum award will permit him to eliminate outstanding debts connected with his mobile home, truck and one personal expense loan and to purchase a lot for his mobile home so that he need not pay for rental space. By eliminating monthly loan repayment and rental expenses, Ruple maintains that his financial interests would be best served, and that this should entitle him to the lump-sum conversion.

The insurance company handling Ruple's benefits rejected his proposal, so he brought the matter before the Workers' Compensation Court in late 1982. Following a hearing and submission of briefs, the court denied conversion of his weekly benefits into a lump sum payment, finding no pressing need for granting such a proposal. Nevertheless, the court acknowledged the advantages of paying off the indebtedness on the truck and personal loans, and indicated that Ruple could petition the Workers' Compensation Division for a partial lump sum advance for the remaining balance on those debts. In the event the Division agreed to such an advance, Ruple's weekly benefits would be reduced accordingly.

Ruple appeals from the judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court, raising two issues:

(1) Whether it was proper to consider the income of Ruple's wife in determining his need for a lump sum award; and

(2) whether it was proper for the court to refuse the conversion of all of Ruple's disability benefits to a lump sum.

CONSIDERATION OF WIFE'S INCOME

During the hearing, it was determined that Ruple receives $492 per month in Social Security benefits and approximately $283 per month in workers' compensation benefits. Ruple's wife, a baker for a local school district, receives $950 per month over a ten-month school year, with a net income per month of approximately $640. In determining Ruple's claim for lump sum conversion, the court took the wife's income into consideration. Ruple argues that this was improper and that the proposed conversion should be evaluated solely in light of his income. We disagree.

It is true, as Ruple maintains, that the Montana law of husband and wife generally protects one spouse from liability for the debts of the other spouse. See sections 40-2-106 and 40-2-205, MCA. Nevertheless, both provisions recognize that expenses for necessities of the family are chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife. In this case, Ruple seeks a lump sum award in order to discharge debts and better provide for the necessities of food and lodging. Given this position, we cannot say that the general rule and not the exception embodied in the above-cited statutes applies here.

Moreover, we emphasize that examination of a claimant's needs requires the lower court to consider all of the assets plus needs and abilities of both spouses. To permit otherwise allows for an absurd treatment of the realities of a marital or family association. In the past we have considered both the favorable and unfavorable situations of a spouse in calculating the needs of a claimant. Compare, Bundtrock v. Duff Chevrolet (Mont.1982), 647 P.2d 856, 39 St.Rep. 1211 (consideration of spouse's income in conjunction with claimant's to determine need) with Polich v. Whalen's OK Tire Warehouse (Mont.1981), 634 P.2d 1162, 38 St.Rep. 1572 (consideration of wife's ill health in determining need for converting husband's disability benefits to lump sum award). In the immediate case, it was proper to consider the income of Ruple's wife in evaluating the best interests of the parties and the need for a lump sum benefit.

THE PROPRIETY OF A LUMP SUM AWARD

The standard for review of a workers' compensation decision respecting lump sum awards was carefully set forth in Krause v. Sears Roebuck & Co. (Mont.1982), 641 P.2d 458, 460-61, 39 St.Rep. 394, 397:

"The general rule is that disability payments under the Workers' Compensation Act are biweekly. They may, however, at the discretion of the Workers' Compensation Division...