Ruprecht v. Ruprecht

• Decision Date: 13 March 1959
• Docket Number: No. 37526,37526
• Citation: 255 Minn. 80,96 N.W.2d 14
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: Agnes Lorraine RUPRECHT, Appellant, v. Frank Elmer RUPRECHT, Respondent.

Page 14

96 N.W.2d 14

255 Minn. 80

Agnes Lorraine RUPRECHT, Appellant, v. Frank Elmer RUPRECHT, Respondent.

No. 37526.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 13, 1959.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where parties to divorce proceeding fully submitted to the trial of the issues involved and the court pursuant thereto clearly specified the relief granted by duly filing its final decision directing that judgment of divorce be entered, the judicial act was complete; all that remained to be done was for the clerk to enter the judgment in the judgment book as directed; the clerk thereafter could enter judgment without any special order of the court to that effect and without notice to the other party.

2. The best rule for determining whether an order is final is whether the decision in question is a final determination of the entire proceedings before the court. The decision to be final must be a final declaration of the court announcing the legal consequences of all the facts found upon the trial.

3. The dismissal of plaintiff's action, filed after the filing of the court's decision, was untimely and without any effect.

4. The matter of awarding permanent alimony and support money rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and in the disposition of property acquired during coverture the court may upon statutory authority make such disposition as shall appear just and equitable, having regard to the nature and determination of the issues in the case.

5. In order to effect a division or award of property, real or personal, as provided by M.S.A. §§ 518.58 and 518.59, the court may order any such property sold or he may order a partition as to the real estate. § 518.65. In effecting such division the court is entitled to take into consideration all matters disclosed by the evidence, including the financial circumstances of the parties and their accumulated debts and liabilities.

6. An award of alimony and support money, together with such adjudication of property rights of the parties will be overturned on appeal only when, in the light of the evidence as a whole, the trial court has abused its discretion even though this court might find the facts to be different if it had the factfinding function. In awarding alimony, the needs of the wife as well as the income of the husband are to be taken into consideration. The trial court's award of alimony and support money in the instant case is sustained by the evidence.

7. Plaintiff is not without remedy in the future. If by reason of changed circumstances the plaintiff should wish to petition for a reconsideration of her present alimony award or the award of support money for her daughter, she is at liberty to do so, addressing her petition to the sound discretion of the trial court.

8. In making an adjustment or division of the property of the parties between them in an action for divorce, the provisions of the constitution and statutes relating to homestead exemptions have no more application than they would have in an ordinary suit for partition. It is clear that the division of property in divorce proceedings in this state is regulated solely by statute and the applicable decision law.

Firestone & Firestone, St. Paul, for appellant.

Bouthilet, Daubney & Swenson, St. Paul, for respondent.

NELSON, Justice.

In the divorce action here involved plaintiff originally sought separate maintenance and an order awarding her the household goods and homestead of the parties and the custody of their youngest child. The parties were married August 12, 1933. When the action was instituted plaintiff and defendant were 48 and 49 years of age respectively. There were two children born of the marriage--Gary Frank Ruprecht, son, born May 17, 1938, and Gail Agnes Ruprecht, daughter, born September 8, 1943. Defendant duly filed an answer and cross-complaint seeking an absolute divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment, the care and custody of the two children, and an order of the court for the sale of the home of the parties and disposition of the proceeds, together with the household goods and furnishings, as the court might deem just and proper.

The matter was tried without a jury. At the opening of the trial, plaintiff moved to amend her prayer for relief to include a demand for an absolute divorce. Defendant's counsel admitted in open court having notice thereof and agreed to the amendment. It was stated that the parties wished only to litigate the questions of alimony, support money, and property division. Plaintiff's counsel advised the court that it would be the purpose of the plaintiff to prove the essential facts of the divorce on the same basis as a default divorce, to which there was no objection and to which the court assented.

It is indicated by the record that this was the third action of a similar nature, the first two having been terminated by reconciliation and dismissal. Plaintiff and defendant were present throughout the trial, and both were afforded a full opportunity to testify in their own behalf and to cross-examine. After proof of the essential facts in support of plaintiff's allegation that she was entitled to an absolute divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment, the testimony was directed to the question of alimony, support money, and property division. The matter of the property, debts, and liabilities of the parties was fully gone into. The only property of any consequence owned by the parties was the homestead which they owned in joint tenancy and which was valued at $20,000. They also owned furniture and household effects and a 1948 Cadillac automobile. Defendant testified that the Cadillac was valued at $150 and that he still owed money in connection with its initial acquisition in the sum of $840. The homestead property had been acquired in 1940. It was mortgaged from the time of acquisition and had been twice refinanced. It was at the time of trial subject to a first mortgage in the amount of $11,178.04, upon which indebtedness payments of $101 were requird monthly.

The record indicates that the wife had contributed $1,300 to the purchase of a Buick automobile in 1941, the amount being advanced by her father; that the household goods, furnishings, and effects, as well as the homestead, had been financed out of the earnings of the defendant; and that his earnings at the time of trial were $10,400 as his annual salary, netting him monthly take-home pay of $671.03, after deductions for withholding taxes, social security, retirement, and hospitalization. Other liabilities which defendant had become obligated to pay were found by the court to be $520.06 for medical and dental services; $1,684.93 in Minnesota income tax arrearages, upon which he is now paying $50 per month; $1,535 for attorneys' fees and expenses incurred on the part of the plaintiff; $500 for attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in the present action on his own behalf; and other debts totaling $1,971.88. All debts and liabilities totaled the sum of $6,211.87.

Defendant took the position that the parties had a joint obligation with reference to the liquidation of the debts and that the creditors would have to be satisfied in order to assure him the opportunity to continue his present employment as assistant merchandise manager of the St. Paul Mail Order House of Montgomery Ward & Company, where he has been employed for the past 35 years. It appears that defendant has twice recently been subject to garnishment proceedings, and he insists that the only way that he can meet the payments of alimony and support money ordered by the court is to sell the homestead property held in joint tenancy to liquidate the mortgage indebtedness from the sale proceeds as well as the other liabilities.

The record indicates that the son, who is now 20 years of age, has chosen to live with his father, who has undertaken his support but without any stated amount therefor ordered by the court. While the plaintiff complains that the alimony and the money awarded to her for the support of her daughter will not be ample to support her upon the plane that she has been accustomed to, the record indicates that she was at the time of the marriage employed with earnings at that time equal to if not in excess of those earned by her husband. It is true that since their marriage she has not worked but has given her time to homemaking and housekeeping. It is our view in considering the record as a whole that the court has expressly taken into consideration the financial situation of the parties, especially that of the defendant, bordering upon insolvency, its probable impact upon his employment, the carrying charges involved, the age of the parties, and defendant's reasonable ability to pay. The court by statute, as well as under our decisions, is authorized to decree to the wife such alimony and to the children such support money as it may deem just and reasonable, taking into account the ability of the husband, the character and situation of the parties, and all other circumstances presently involved. To that extent the trial court has clearly been granted the right to exercise its authority and discretionary power. The determination of the awards and fixing the amounts thereof always rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. The court undoubtedly did not overlook the fact that the trial court retains jurisdiction at all times to revise and alter the decree with respect to the amount of alimony and support money to be paid. Should the future needs of the plaintiff, in the light of all the circumstances of the case, require or justify a revision, the broad powers of the court in that respect furnish ample protection. See, Louden v. Louden, 221 Minn. 338, 22 N.W.2d 164.

The court below found plaintiff entitled to a decree awarding her an absolute divorce and the custody of their youngest child, subject to the right of reasonable visitation by defendant. The son was given...