Ruscavage v. Zuratt, Civ. A. No. 93-991.

• Decision Date: 16 July 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 93-991.
• Parties: Elizabeth H. RUSCAVAGE, Plaintiff, v. John ZURATT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

831 F. Supp. 417

Elizabeth H. RUSCAVAGE, Plaintiff, v. John ZURATT, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 93-991.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

July 16, 1993.

Edward E. Kopko, Pottsville, PA, for plaintiff.

Robert G. Hanna, Jr., Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman and Goggin, Philadelphia, PA, Robert G. Hanna, Jr., Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Norristown, PA, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

HUYETT, District Judge.

Plaintiff commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendant, a police officer with the Norwegian Township (Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania) Police Department, deprived her of her constitutional rights under color of state law. Following a nonjury trial, the Court concluded that Defendant issued a second traffic citation in bad faith for the purpose of retaliating against Plaintiff for exercising her constitutional right to plead not guilty and demand a hearing on a first traffic citation. The Court permanently enjoined Defendant from prosecuting Plaintiff pursuant to the second citation, awarded Plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount of $20,000, and concluded that Plaintiff was a prevailing party for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and was thus entitled to attorneys fees and expenses. Ruscavage v. Zuratt, 821 F.Supp. 1078 (E.D.Pa.1993).

Defendant moves to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), claiming that the compensatory damage award of $20,000 is excessive. Defendant claims that counsel for Plaintiff asked only for nominal damages in this matter. In addition, Defendant contends that Plaintiff already experienced some emotional distress as a result of the first citation and that there is no justification to award $20,000 to compensate her for her additional distress as a result of the second citation. Furthermore, Defendant notes that Plaintiff did not provide any medical testimony to support an award of damages. Finally, Defendant points to cases in which plaintiffs were awarded compensatory damages in amounts far less than $20,000 for injuries incurred as a result of unlawful arrests, detentions, and physical abuse, none of which occurred in this case.

The purpose of a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) is to "correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir.1985). Motions under Rule 59(e) should be granted sparingly because of the interests in finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources.

While Plaintiff correctly cites the standard in the Third Circuit for review of jury awards of damages — whether the "verdict is so grossly excessive as to shock the judicial conscience," Edynak v. Atlantic Shipbuilding, Inc. CIE. Chambon, 562 F.2d 215, 226 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034, 98 S.Ct. 767, 54 L.Ed.2d 781 (1978) — here the Court awarded the damages in the first instance. The Court had discretion to award damages to compensate Plaintiff for her injuries caused by Defendant's bad faith issuance of the second traffic citation and has discretion to review its award upon reconsideration of the evidence.

Defendant is incorrect when he states that Plaintiff requested only nominal damages at trial. Plaintiff in her complaint requested damages in excess of $100,000. When asked at trial what elements of damages he sought for his client, Plaintiff's counsel responded, correctly, that Plaintiff was entitled to at least nominal damages as a matter of law if the Court found a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, and also requested damages to compensate for Plaintiff's humiliation, embarrassment, and mental strain and anguish.

That point aside, upon reconsideration of the evidence in this case, and upon review of damage awards in other section 1983 cases involving similar injuries and factual circumstances, the Court believes that an award of $20,000 to compensate Plaintiff for the humiliation, embarrassment, mental strain and anguish, aggravation of her high blood pressure condition, nervousness, sleeplessness, and inability to concentrate on her work that she suffered as a result of the issuance of the second citation, while not excessive, is towards the upper end of the range of damages awarded to plaintiffs in cases with similar factual circumstances. Awards to plaintiffs to compensate them for embarrassment, humiliation, and physical discomfort span a broad range, with higher amounts awarded to plaintiffs...