Rush v. Atomic Elec. Co.

Decision Date30 May 1980
Citation384 So.2d 1067
PartiesChris C. RUSH, d/b/a Rush Building Company, Cincinnati Insurance Company and Nellie N. Rush v. ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation. 78-766.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Ralph Smith, Jr. of Starnes, Smith & Wilkes, Guntersville, Starnes & Starnes, Birmingham, for appellants.

H. Darden Williams for Williams, Williams & Norton, Anniston, for appellee.

SHORES, Justice.

This is a breach of contract case. Appellant Chris Rush, d/b/a Rush Building Company, entered into a contract with the Hospital Building Authority of the City of Jacksonville to construct a hospital. The electrical work was subcontracted to Atomic Electric Company, hereinafter referred to as Atomic, a corporation which had done other work for Rush in the past. Although the work was completed and accepted by the general contractor at final inspection, Atomic was never paid the full contract price. It brought this action against the Hospital Building Authority, the City of Jacksonville, Chris C. Rush, d/b/a Rush Building Company, and Rush Building Company, seeking to enforce a lien on the hospital and claiming damages in the amount of $87,572.20 under the electrical subcontract. Rush's bonding company, Cincinnati Insurance Company was later added as a defendant. Rush counterclaimed for $20,000.00, alleging that mismanagement on the part of Atomic had resulted in a four-month delay in completion, and that it was damaged thereby. Cincinnati Insurance Company cross-claimed against Rush under a blanket indemnity agreement, and filed a third-party complaint against Nellie Rush as a party to the indemnity agreement. After a trial without a jury, the trial court entered a judgment against Chris C. Rush, d/b/a Rush Building Company, and Cincinnati in favor of Atomic in the amount of $89,928.07, and in favor of Cincinnati Insurance Company against Chris and Nellie Rush in the same amount. The Rushes appeal.

Appellants raise but two issues on this appeal. They contend firstly that the judgment of the trial court was contrary to the great weight of the evidence. However, no ground for reversal is more carefully scrutinized or rigidly limited than one charging that the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence. Kilcrease v. Harris, 288 Ala. 245, 259 So.2d 797 (1972). Where, as here, the trial court has heard testimony ore tenus, a presumption exists as to the correctness of its findings of fact. St. Clair Industries, Inc. v. Harmon's Pipe & Fitting Co., 282 Ala. 466, 213 So.2d 201 (1968). The record reveals that the trial court's judgment was amply supported by the evidence; we, therefore, decline to disturb it.

Appellants also contend that the contract which is the basis of this...

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15 cases
  • Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • June 2, 2000
    ...arbitration provisions. This acceptance constitutes the Ards' acceptance of the arbitration provisions themselves. Rush v. Atomic Electric Co., 384 So.2d 1067 (Ala.1980). Second, the Ards have sued Southern Energy on the theory, among others, of express warranty. The only express warranty i......
  • Noland Health Services, Inc. v. Wright
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • May 4, 2007
    ...arbitration provisions. This acceptance constitutes the Ards' acceptance of the arbitration provisions themselves. Rush v. Atomic Electric Co., 384 So.2d 1067 (Ala.1980). Second, the Ards have sued Southern Energy on the theory, among others, of express warranty. The only express warranty i......
  • Lawler Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Tarver
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • May 16, 1986
    ...and by operating under that contract, may ratify and confirm it, even though his actual signature is not affixed. Rush v. Atomic Electric Co., 384 So.2d 1067 (Ala.1980). This evidence of Lawler's knowledge and involvement came from Wilkes's deposition, which was read to the jury. Although w......
  • Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Gregor
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • June 30, 2000
    ...arbitration provisions. This acceptance constitutes the Ards' acceptance of the arbitration provisions themselves. Rush v. Atomic Electric Co., 384 So.2d 1067 (Ala.1980). Second, the Ards have sued Southern Energy on the theory, among others, of express warranty. The only express warranty i......
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