Rush v. State
| Decision Date | 11 January 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 31, Sept. Term, 2007.,31, Sept. Term, 2007. |
| Citation | 939 A.2d 689,403 Md. 68 |
| Parties | Cindi Renee Katherine RUSH v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
David A. Martella (Barry H. Hefland, Rockville), on brief, for petitioner/cross-respondent.
Diane E. Keller, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen.), on brief, for respondent/cross-petitioner.
Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ALAN M. WILNER, (Retired, specially assigned) DALE R. CATHELL, (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.
The case sub judice presents this Court with the issue of whether a police detective's modification of the Miranda warnings to state that Petitioner could be appointed counsel "at some time" satisfied the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). This case also presents us with determining the scope of our appellate jurisdiction to consider a "cross-appeal" by a defendant when the State notes an interlocutory appeal from the grant of a motion to suppress under Section 12-302(c)(3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.1
Rush, the defendant below, filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, raising the following question for our review:
Did the Court of Special Appeals err in reversing the findings of the trial Court that an interrogating detective's modification of the Miranda warnings to suggest that she would be appointed counsel "at some time" improperly implied that the defendant could not have appointed counsel during her interrogation?
The State filed a Conditional Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari, presenting us with two additional questions:
1. Did the Court of Special Appeals lack jurisdiction to consider Rush's cross-appeal where the State noted an interlocutory appeal from the grant of a motion to suppress under Section 12-302(c)(3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article?
2. Assuming arguendo that an appellate court has jurisdiction to consider Rush's interlocutory cross-appeal, does the record in this case establish that Rush's statement to the police was voluntary and not the product of any improper inducement?2
We shall hold that the advisements, as modified, did satisfy the requirements of Miranda and although Rush did not have the right to cross-appeal, she did have the right, in the State's appeal, to defend the ruling of the trial court on alternative grounds.
On May 1, 2006, Petitioner, Cindi Renee Katherine Rush, was arrested by Corporal Chinn and other members of the Prince George's County Police Criminal Investigation Division on a warrant charging her with murder in the first degree of Patricia Caniglia. Rush was transported to the District III Station where she was interviewed by Detective Kerry Jernigan.3 The interview was digitally recorded, saved onto a DVD, and later transcribed. It began:
(emphasis added). Rush signed the Advice of Rights and Waiver Form, and during the interview made several inculpatory statements which she committed to writing.
She subsequently was indicted on one count of premeditated murder, two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon, two counts of conspiring to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon, two counts of using a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, and one count of first degree assault. Rush timely filed a motion to suppress in which she alleged that her statements were obtained by Detective Jernigan following advisements that did not meet the requirements of Miranda and that, in addition, the statements were obtained through threats and inducements and, therefore, were not voluntary. During the suppression hearing, Corporal Chinn and Detective Jernigan testified, after which Rush testified; Detective Jernigan related that he had modified the standard Miranda advisement regarding the appointment of counsel by adding the phrase "at some time at no cost" to indicate that
Rush contended that her inculpatory statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 436, 86 S.Ct. at 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d at 694,4 because Detective Jernigan's modification caused confusion as to whether she could have counsel present during the questioning. Additionally, Rush argued that her question to Detective Jernigan, "do I need a lawyer?," was a request for counsel that should have caused the detective to cease the questioning. Rush also argued that her inculpatory statements were not voluntary as they were obtained through threats and inducements.
Conversely, the State argued that Rush was not confused as to her Miranda rights, that she stated that she understood the advisements which were provided orally by Detective Jernigan and which she also read on the Advice of Rights and Waiver Form. The State also contended that Rush's...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Unger v. State
...of what may have been said by the trial judge in an opinion or with respect to alternative grounds. See, e.g., Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68, 103, 939 A.2d 689, 709 (2008) (“Although Rush could not file a ‘cross-appeal,’ she was entitled to raise the ... issue in the State's appeal, in order to......
-
Bost v. State
...on a motion to suppress evidence, we consider only the evidence contained in the record of the suppression hearing. Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68, 82-83, 939 A.2d 689, 697 (2008). We extend great deference to the hearing judge's findings of fact and those findings will not be disturbed unless c......
-
Gonzalez v. State
...We have held that this determination is made by looking to “the totality of the advisements, both oral and written.” Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68, 90, 939 A.2d 689, 702 (2008). While a defendant may waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, thus foregoing the protections ......
-
Hailes v. State
...§ 12–302(c)(4) (i) to apply to one situation, but not to the other. Thus, we are unpersuaded by Hailes's reliance on Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68, 98, 939 A.2d 689, 706 (2008) (“[W]e have narrowly construed any grant of appellate authority.”). Although, generally, a court narrowly construes a ......