Rush v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 12 May 1947
• Docket Number: 39851
• Citation: Rush v. Thompson, 202 S.W.2d 800, 356 Mo. 568 (Mo. 1947)
• Parties: Leonard R. Rush v. Frank A. Thompson, Trustee of and for St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, a Corporation, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

202 S.W.2d 800

356 Mo. 568

Leonard R. Rush v. Frank A. Thompson, Trustee of and for St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, a Corporation, Appellant

No. 39851

Supreme Court of Missouri

May 12, 1947

Rehearing Denied June 9, 1947.

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court; Hon. Paul A. Buzard Judge.

Affirmed.

M G. Roberts, E. G. Nahler, Thos. E. Deacy and Milligan, Kimberly & Deacy for appellant.

(1) Plaintiff did not make a submissible case under the common law; there was no evidence of specific negligence, and the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was not applicable. Stoutimore v. Santa Fe, 338 Mo. 463, 92 S.W.2d 658; Cantley v. M.K. & T.R. Co., 353 Mo. 605, 183 S.W.2d 123; Roddy v. Mo. Pac., 104 Mo. 234, 15 S.W. 1112; Markley v. K. C. Southern, 338 Mo. 436, 90 S.W.2d 409; Strayer v. Quincy, Ohio & K.C. Ry. Co., 170 Mo.App. 514, 156 S.W. 732. (2) The plaintiff did not make a submissible case and was not entitled to recover under the Federal Safety Appliance Act, or by reason of any alleged violation thereof. Defendant and his predecessor trustees were not acting as common carriers in performing switching operations for the government at Fort Leonard Wood or in furnishing freight and troop train service for the government over the government railroad from Bundy Junction to Fort Leonard Wood. Sec. 1, secs. 18-20, Title 49, U.S.C.A.; State ex rel. Anderson v. Witthaus, 340 Mo. 1004, 102 S.W.2d 99; Pennsylvania R. Co., v. Pitts. L. & W.R. Co., 83 F.2d 861. (3) Defendant was not, as a common carrier, hauling, or permitting to be hauled or used, on its line, Wabash car No. 34174, at the time of plaintiff's injury, and said car was not subject to the provisions of Sections 1 to 16 of said act. Sec. 11, Title 45, U.S.C.A.; Linstead v. Chesapeake & O.R. Co., 276 U.S. 27, 48 S.Ct. 241; Brady v. Wabash, 329 Mo. 1123, 49 S.W.2d 24; Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Hoover, 297 F. 919; Cherry v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 30 F.2d 487; Docheney v. Pa. R. Co., 60 F.2d 808; Stevenson v. Lake Terminal R. Co., 42 F.2d 357; New York C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Kelly, 70 F.2d 548; Flack v. A.T. & S.F.R. Co., 285 Mo. 28, 224 S.W. 415. (4) Plaintiff was not one of the class of persons for whose protection the Federal Safety Appliance Act was enacted. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Conarty, 238 U.S. 243, 35 S.Ct. 785; Spotts v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 102 F.2d 160; Stevenson v. Lake Terminal R. Co., 42 F.2d 357; Semensky v. Pa. R. Co., 41 A.2d 217. (5) The evidence was insufficient to establish that Wabash car No. 34174 was not equipped with an efficient hand brake. Giesking v. Litchfield & Madison R. Co., 339 Mo. 1, 94 S.W.2d 375, s.c. 344 Mo. 672, 127 S.W.2d 700. (6) The court erred in refusing to give to the jury, as requested by the defendant, defendant's Instruction 16. Borgstede v. Waldbauer, 337 Mo. 1205, 88 S.W.2d 373; Johnson v. Hurck Delivery Service, 353 Mo. 1207, 187 S.W.2d 200; Rule 3.21, Supreme Court of Missouri: Sec. 105 of the General Code for Civil Procedure. (7) The court erred in refusing to give to the jury, as requested by the defendant, defendant's Instruction 11. Tipton v. Santa Fe, 298 U.S. 141, 56 S.Ct. 715; Also authorities cited under point (2). (8) The verdict of the jury and judgment of the jury was and is excessive. Taylor v. Lumaghi Coal Co., 352 Mo. 1212, 181 S.W.2d 536; Turner v. Central Hardware Co., 353 Mo. 1182, 186 S.W.2d 603. (9) The alleged inefficiency of the hand brake was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury and the proximate cause thereof was the intervening negligence of his fellow employees. Lang v. N.Y. Central R. Co., 225 U.S. 451, 41 S.Ct. 381; Davis v. Hand, 290 F. 73; Reetz v. Chicago & E.R. Co., 46 F.2d 50.

Ben W. Swofford, Robert L. Jackson, Ronald Shankland and Swofford, Jackson & Shankland for respondent.

(1) Plaintiff's case was tried and submitted upon the theory of a violation of the Safety Appliance Act and not upon common law negligence. 45 United States Code Annotated, Sec. 11; Brady v. Terminal R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 303 U.S. 10, 58 S.Ct. 426; Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 63 S.Ct. 347; Cantley v. M.-K.-T.R. Co., 183 S.W.2d 123. (2) The Safety Appliance Act was and is applicable to the case at bar and proper proof of a violation by the defendant of the terms and provisions thereof entitled plaintiff to recover. The defendant at all times involved in this case was acting as a common interstate carrier and was amenable to the terms and provisions of the Safety Appliance Act. State v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 212 Mo. 658, 111 S.W. 500; Spaw v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 198 Mo.App. 552, 201 S.W. 927; United States v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 249 U.S. 296, 39 S.Ct. 283; McCabe v. Boston Terminal Co., 22 N.E.2d 33; Cott v. Erie R. Co., 231 N.Y. 67, 131 N.E. 737; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Pittsburgh, L. & W.R. Co., 83 F.2d 861; State ex rel. Anderson v. Witthaus. 340 Mo. 1004, 102 S.W.2d 99. (3) Under the decisions of both State and Federal Courts the Wabash car no. 34174 involved in this case was being "hauled or permitted to be hauled or used" upon defendant's line within the meaning of the Safety Appliance Act. Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 32 S.Ct. 2, 56 L.Ed. 72; Brady v. Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis, 303 U.S. 10, 58 S.Ct. 426; United States v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry Co., 184 F. 28; Brady v. Wabash, 329 Mo. 1123, 49 S.W.2d 24; Fort Street Union Depot Co. v. Hillen, 119 F.2d 307; Gray v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 197 F. 874; Cusson v. C.P.R. Co., 115 F.2d 430; Chicago, G.W.R. Co. v. Schendel, 267 U.S. 287, 45 S.Ct. 303; Philadelphia & R.R. Co. v. U.S., 191 F. 1; United States v. Erie R. Co., 237 U.S. 402, 35 S.Ct. 621; Hood v. B. & O., 302 Mo. 609, 259 S.W. 471; Maxwell v. Kurn, 185 S.W.2d 9; Docheney v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 60 F.2d 808; Stevenson v. Lake Terminal R. Co., 42 F.2d 357; Linstead v. Chesapeake & O.R. Co., 276 U.S. 28, 48 S.Ct. 241, 72 L.Ed. 453; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Hooven, 297 F. 919; Sherry v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 30 F.2d 487; New York C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Kelly, 70 F.2d 548; Flack v. A.T. & S.F.R. Co., 285 Mo. 28, 224 S.W. 415 (4) The Safety Appliance Act has been held to afford protection not only to employees of a railroad or the passengers riding thereon, but also to members of the public, including the plaintiff. Brady v. Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis, 303 U.S. 10, 58 S.Ct. 426; Fairport, P. & E.R. Co. v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589, 54 S.Ct. 826, 78 L.Ed. 1446; St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Conarty, 238 U.S. 243, 35 S.Ct. 785, 59 L.Ed. 1290; Spotts v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 102 F.2d 160; Stevenson v. Lake Terminal R. Co., 42 F.2d 357; Semensky v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 156 Pa. Sup. 555, 41 A.2d 217. (5) A submissible case was made under section 11 of the Safety Appliance Act charging the defendant with the failure to equip the Wabash car with efficient handbrakes because it was shown that defendant furnished the car, that the handbrake was used in its customary and usual manner, and that it failed to properly and efficiently function. Didinger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 39 F.2d 798; Colwell v. St. Louis-S. F.R. Co., 335 Mo. 494, 73 S.W.2d 222; Wild v. Pitcairn, 347 Mo. 915, 149 S.W.2d 800; Sallee v. St. Louis-S. F.R. Co., 12 S.W.2d 476; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Howell, 6 F.2d 784, (C.C.A. 2). (6) The court did not err in refusing to give defendant's Instruction 16 since that instruction was clearly erroneous, stated abstract propositions of law, and hypothesized and required no finding from the jury of defensive facts. Macklin v. Fogel Construction Co., 326 Mo. 38, 31 S.W.2d 14; Thompson v. St. Joseph Ry., L., H. & P. Co., 345 Mo. 31, 131 S.W.2d 574; Long v. Mild, 347 Mo. 1002, 149 S.W.2d 853. (7) The trial court did not err in refusing defendant's Instruction No. 11 because the same was repetitions, conflicting and misleading. Wolfson v. Cohen, 55 S.W.2d 677; Oliver v. Morgan, 73 S.W.2d 993; Sutton v. Anderson, 326 Mo. 304, 31 S.W.2d 1026. (8) The verdict was not excessive. Scheidegger v. Thompson, 174 S.W.2d 216; Beall v. Kansas City Ry. Co., 228 S.W. 834; Coffman v. Shell Petroleum Co., 228 Mo.App. 727, 71 S.W.2d 97; Brady v. Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis, 344 Mo. 502, 127 S.W.2d 1; DeMoulin v. Roetheli, 189 S.W.2d 562; Dell v. J.A. Schaefer Construction Co., 29 S.W.2d 76; Wack v. F.E. Schoenberg Mfg. Co., 331 Mo. 197, 53 S.W.2d 28; Hoff v. Wabash R. Co., 254 S.W. 874; Cole v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 340 Mo. 277, 100 S.W.2d 311. (9) The evidence in this case conclusively showed that the failure and inefficiency of the handbrake on Wabash car No. 34174 was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Spokane & Inland Empire R. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U.S. 497, 36 S.Ct. 683, 60 L.Ed. 1125; Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. v. Auchenbach, 16 F.2d 550; Cusson v. Chicago P.R. Co., 115 F.2d 430; Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co. v. Goneau, 269 U.S. 406, 46 S.Ct. 129, 70 L.Ed. 335; Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U.S. 239, 44 S.Ct. 64, 68 L.Ed. 284; Keenan v. Director of Railroads, 285 F. 286; Kimberling v. Wabash Ry. Co., 337 Mo. 702, 85 S.W.2d 736; Truesdale v. Wheelock, 335 Mo. 924, 74 S.W.2d 585.

OPINION

Bohling, C.

Frank A. Thompson, Trustee of and for St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, a corporation, prosecutes this appeal from a judgment awarding Leonard R. Rush $ 15,000 damages for personal injuries. Plaintiff predicated defendant's liability upon the ground his injuries were proximately caused by reason of a car used upon defendant's line being equipped with inefficient hand brakes, in violation of Title 45, Chapter I, Sec. 11, U.S.C.A., the Safety Appliance Act. Defendant contends (1) plaintiff failed to make a submissible case in that plaintiff did not make a case of common law negligence and defendant was not liable under the Act because not...