Rushdan v. Gear
| Decision Date | 25 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | 1:16-cv-001017-BAM (PC) |
| Parties | SALADIN RUSHDAN, Plaintiff, v. R. GEAR, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF; ORDER THAT THIS DISMISSAL SHALL COUNT AS A STRIKE PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
(Doc. 11)
Plaintiff Saladin Rushdan, aka Robert Woods, ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's first amended complaint, filed on June 26, 2017, is currently before the Court for screening. (Doc. 11.) Plaintiff filed a consent to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (Doc. 9.)
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences." Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Plaintiff is currently housed at California State Prison, Los Angeles County at Lancaster. The events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred while Plaintiff was housed in Corcoran State Prison. Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) R. Gear, Trust Account Officer; (2) D.M. Singh, Business Manager; (3) F. Vasquez, Deputy Warden; (4) M.V. Sexton, Associate Warden; and (5) M. Voong, Chief of Appeals. (Doc. 11.) Plaintiff sues the individuals in their individual capacities.
In Claim I, Plaintiff alleges interference with court access. Plaintiff has been for decades diagnosed and treated for Keloids and complications. Plaintiff filed multiple civil rights lawsuits to get medical care, many of which ended up settling with provision of medical care. There was a violation of the settlement, and Plaintiff filed another lawsuit. Plaintiff filed a state court action for breach of contract and deliberate indifference and through normal procedures, submitted his in forma pauperis form for approval to the Prison Trust Account Office at Corcoran. Defendant Gear is the Trust Office Accounting Officer and is responsible for prisoner accounts. The Trust Officer refused to process Plaintiff's in forma pauperis form because Plaintiff listed his "real and legal name" first on the form and listed his prison commitment name as an AKA. On December3, 2014, the forms were rejected with notes telling Plaintiff that he must list his real name (Rushdan) as an AKA and put his prison commitment name (Woods) as the real name. On December 11, 2014, Plaintiff resubmitted the forms with an Informal Level 22-form, stating that both names are legible along with Plaintiff's prison number. Defendant Gear rejected Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application. Refusal to process the in forma pauperis form prejudiced Plaintiff's existing litigation and prevented Plaintiff from meeting the filing deadlines. As a result, Plaintiff's state complaint was rejected. Defendant Gear created a new policy since Plaintiff had never been denied court access before. Because he could not get his form processed, the state court never processed his lawsuit and rejected it.
Plaintiff filed a grievance against Defendant Gear. Defendant Singh is a business manager and agreed and concurred with Gear's discriminatory action on First Level Appeal. Defendant Singh wrongly upheld the new policy and failed to remedy the wrong. Defendant Singh failed to properly supervise his subordinate who committed a wrongful act. Defendant Sexton is the Associate Warden and upheld the Amended Second Level Response. Defendant Vasquez is Chief Deputy Warden and reviewed the appeal at the Second Level and concurred with the first level. Defendant Vasquez upheld the creation and continuance of such a policy and was grossly negligent in supervising the subordinates. Defendant Voong, third level appeals coordinator, refused to process the grievance.
In Claim II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Voong, refused to process Plaintiff's inmate grievance at the Third Level which unreasonably limited Plaintiff's right of access to the court, making exhaustion impossible. Failure to review his 602 effectively stopped Plaintiff from filing a state law complaint for breach of contract. Defendant Voong is the Chief Officer of Appeals who refused to answer Plaintiff's 602 grievance on the Third Level review. Defendant Voong has refused on more than on occasion to process Plaintiff's 602 grievances and failed to properly respond to the grievance. Plaintiff was delayed unreasonably from advancing his breach of contract state court action and had intended to file a federal civil case. Defendant Voong acted with gross negligence in supervising the subordinates.
In Claim III, Plaintiff alleges religious discrimination. Plaintiff is an African American Muslim. A sincere aspect of this faith is to alter one's name to reflect the faith. Plaintiff's former name of "Woods" does not conform to his faith. Plaintiff alleges that he changed his name in 1983 according to American Law, from "Woods" to his real name of Saladin Rushdan. There is no legitimate penological purpose for Plaintiff to list his legal name as an AKA. Plaintiff's both names were written on the in forma pauperis form along with his prison number to clearly identify Plaintiff. Defendant Gear displayed personal bigotry and racism because Plaintiff did not submit anything unreasonable. Plaintiff's free exercise has been threatened by requiring his prison name.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages of $250,000 against each defendant and punitive damages and to terminate all prison officials involved. (Doc. 11).
In general, Plaintiff may not hold a defendant liable solely based upon their supervisory positions. Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz, 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Supervisors may be held liable only if they "participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff names various individuals as Defendants who hold supervisory level positions for processing appeals: D.M. Singh, Business Manager; F. Vasquez, Deputy Warden; M.V. Sexton, Associate Warden; and M. Voong, Chief of Appeals.
Plaintiff was previously advised that a constitutional violation cannot be premised solely on the theory of respondeat superior, and Plaintiff must allege that the supervisory Defendants participated in or directed conduct associated with his claims. Plaintiff attempts to do so byalleging that each supervisor upheld Defendant Gear's denial of the in forma pauperis, created a policy, and were grossly negligent by failing to remedy Defendant Gear's denial of the informa pauperis form. Nonetheless, Plaintiff seeks liability against these supervisors for actions in the course of reviewing the grievance and related appeal. As explained below, liability under §1983 cannot be premised upon processing appeals. And, as explained more fully below, there is no constitutional violation and therefore the supervisors cannot be liable.
Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (1996); Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011); Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2009). To state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must show that he suffered an actual injury, which requires "actual prejudice to contemplated or existing litigation." Nevada Dept. of Corrections v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348) (internal quotation marks omitted); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (2002). Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of "a litigating opportunity yet to be gained" (forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried ...
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