Rushing v. Se. La. Univ.
| Decision Date | 29 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2020 CA 0669,2020 CA 0672 |
| Parties | DR. STEVEN RUSHING v. SOUTHEASTERN LOUISIANA UNIVERSITY, ET AL. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appellant, Dr. Steven Rushing, filed these appeals contesting the trial court's finding in favor of Defendants1 and dismissing his claims with prejudice. Dr. Rushing filed a motion to consolidate the appeals, which this court granted. For the following reasons, we dismiss the appeals.
On November 26, 2018, Dr. Rushing, a Southeastern Louisiana University (SLU) professor and member of the SLU Faculty Senate, filed a Petition to Enforce Louisiana Open Meetings Law and for Civil Penalties, Attorney's Fees and Costs.2 Named as defendants were SLU; Tara S. Dupre; SLU Faculty Senate Executive Committee Members, Erin Watson Horzelsk,; John Yeargain, Jerry Parker, Elizabeth Sanders, Ed Nelson, and Gerlinde Beckers; the SLU Faculty Senate and its members; "[u]nidentified faculty and staff whose complaints were forwarded to the [SLU] Human Resources Department;" and the SLU Workplace Violence Committee. Dr. Rushing sought declaratory judgments that the Louisiana Open Meetings Law pertained to defendants and to void actions taken at certain meetings, writs of mandamus, injunctive relief, civil penalties, costs, and attorney's fees. SLU, Tara Dupre, Erin Horzelski, John Yeargain, Jerry Parker, Elizabeth Sanders, Ed Nelson, and Gerlinde Beckers filed exceptions raising the objections of improper cumulation and/or joinder, vagueness or ambiguity, and nonconformity of the petition. After a hearing, the trial court sustained the exceptions, and, on July 1, 2019, signed a judgment dismissing all of Dr. Rushing's tort claims without prejudice.3 Prior to the trial court signing the July 1, 2019 judgment, Dr. Rushingfiled an amended petition on June 27, 2019, naming as defendants SLU, the same individual defendants,4 the SLU Faculty Senate, and the SLU Faculty Senate Executive Committee. Dr. Rushing again sought writs of mandamus, declaratory judgments, injunctive relief, civil penalties, costs, and attorney's fees. On September 23, 2019, the trial court conducted a hearing solely on the threshold issue of whether the SLU Faculty Senate was a public body pursuant to La. R.S. 42:4.2(A), and thereby, its meetings were subject to the Louisiana Open Meetings Law. On September 24, 2019, the trial court signed a judgment finding that the SLU Faculty Senate was a public body, and thereby, its meetings were subject to Louisiana Open Meetings Law.
On November 4, 2019, the trial court conducted the trial to determine if the SLU Faculty Senate and SLU Faculty Executive Committee5 violated the Louisiana Open Meetings Law. On November 26, 2019, the trial court issued written reasons, which first addressed the claims Dr. Rushing raised in his original petition. The trial court denied Dr. Rushing's request to void any action taken at any of the meetings at issue, declined to assess civil penalties, and denied his requests for a writ of mandamus, injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and costs. The trial court also addressed the amended petition, which alleged subsequent violations of the Louisiana Open Meetings Law at meeting dates between November 7, 2018, and April 24, 2019. The trial court found that the amended petition was not timely filed in accordance with La. R.S. 42:24, and that any claims arising from these meetingdates were perempted. The trial court reasoned that any claims arising from the meeting dates between November 7, 2018, and April 24, 2019, were dismissed.
Dr. Rushing filed a motion for devolutive appeal from the trial court's written reasons, which the trial court granted on January 13, 2020. When the order of appeal was filed with this court, it was assigned docket number 2020 CA 0672. Subsequent to the entry of the order for appeal from the November 26, 2019 written reasons, Dr. Rushing submitted a judgment to the trial court, which the trial court signed on January 20, 2020, reflecting its ruling. The judgment was entered in favor of "Defendants" and against Dr. Rushing, dismissing all his claims with prejudice. Dr. Rushing also filed a motion for devolutive appeal from the January 20, 2020 judgment, which the trial court granted on February 3, 2020. The latter appeal was assigned docket number 2020 CA 0669 with this court. After Dr. Rushing filed both appeals, he filed a motion to consolidate, which this court granted on November 19, 2020.
As an appellate court, we have the duty to examine our subject matter jurisdiction and to determine sua sponte whether such subject matter jurisdiction exists, even when the issue is not raised by the litigants. See Advanced Leveling & Concrete Solutions v. Lathan Company, Inc., 2017-1250 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/20/18), 268 So. 3d 1044, 1046 (en banc). This court's appellate jurisdiction extends only to "final judgments." See La. C.C.P. art. 2083(A); Marrero v. I. Manheim Auctions, Inc., 2019-0365 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/19/19), 291 So. 3d 236, 238. A valid judgment must be precise, definite, and certain. Laird v. St. Tammany Parish Safe Harbor, 2002-0045 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/20/02), 836 So. 2d 364, 365. For a judgment to be a final judgment, it must contain appropriate decretal language. Matter of Succession of Weber, 2018-1337 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/29/19), 276 So. 3d 1021, 1026. For the language to be considered decretal, it must name the party infavor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied. Id. at 1026-27. These determinations should be evident from the language of the judgment without reference to other documents in the record. Advanced Leveling, 268 So. 3d at 1046. In a case with multiple parties, the failure to name the plaintiff(s) or defendant(s) for or against whom the judgment is rendered makes the judgment fatally defective, since it cannot be discerned from the face of the judgment for or against whom the judgment may be enforced. See Marrero, 291 So. 3d at 239.
This court issued a rule to show cause on August 28, 2020, asking the parties to explain why the appeal from the written reasons should not be dismissed. See La. C.C.P. art. 1918; Wooley v. Lucksinger, 2009-0571 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So. 3d 507, 572 (). SLU, Tara Dupre, Erin Horzelski, John Yeargain, Jerry Parker, Elizabeth Sanders, Ed Nelson, and Gerlinde Beckers responded, asserting Dr. Rushing's appeal should indeed be dismissed. Dr. Rushing responded, asserting that the written reasons contain sufficient decretal language to constitute a final judgment. We disagree. The written reasons do not name the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered or the party against whom the ruling is ordered. There are multiple defendants in the present case. The only defendants mentioned by name in the written reasons are the SLU Faculty Senate and the SLU Executive Committee. The trial court stated it was not assessing civil penalties against "the Defendants," but we cannot ascertain as to which defendants the trial court is referencing. While the written reasons contain the statement, "For these reasons, any claims regarding the meeting dates from November 7, 2018-April 24, 2019 are dismissed," the written reasons do not indicate that the lawsuit is dismissed in its entirety or that all of Dr. Rushing's claims aredismissed as to all defendants.6 Although the relief sought by Dr. Rushing is denied, the written reasons do not contain appropriate decretal language, ascertainable from the four corners of the document. See Succession of Simms, 2019-0936 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/21/20), 297 So. 3d 110, 115. A judgment that does not contain appropriate decretal language cannot be considered as a final judgment for the purpose of an appeal, and this court lacks jurisdiction to review such a judgment. See Johnson v. Mount Pilgrim Baptist Church, 2005-0337 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/24/06), 934 So.2d 66, 67. Dr. Rushing has failed to show that the written reasons are a valid final judgment.
Dr. Rushing contends that the defect of appealing prematurely from the written reasons was cured once the final judgment was signed on January 20, 2020. "[O]nce the final judgment has been signed, any previously existing defect has been cured, and there is no useful purpose in dismissing the otherwise valid appeal." Overmier v. Traylor, 475 So. 2d 1094, 1094-95 (La. 1985) (per curiam) (); see Chauvin v. Chauvin, 2010-1055 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/29/10), 49 So. 3d 565, 568 n.1 (); City of Denham Springs v. Perkins, 2008-1937 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/27/09), 10 So. 3d 311, 317 n.5, writ denied, 2009-0871 (La. 5/13/09), 8 So. 3d 568. For the principle of Overmier to apply, the January 20, 2020 judgment must be a valid final judgment. See Fowlkes v. Fowlkes, 2018-1563 (La. App. 1st Cir. ...
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