Rusk Farm Drainage Dist. v. Indus. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 10 February 1925
• Citation: 186 Wis. 232,202 N.W. 204
• Parties: RUSK FARM DRAINAGE DIST. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ET AL.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

186 Wis. 232

202 N.W. 204

RUSK FARM DRAINAGE DIST.

v.INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ET AL.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Feb. 10, 1925.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Dane County; E. Ray Stevens, Judge.

Action by the Rusk Farm Drainage District against the Industrial Commission and another, to set aside award of compensation made by Commission. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded, with instructions.Carow & Goodsitt, of Ladysmith, for appellant.

H. L. Ekern, Atty. Gen., and Mortimer Levitan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

OWEN, J.

This action was brought in the circuit court for Dane county to set aside an award of the Industrial Commission made in favor of an injured employé of the appellant, Rusk Farm Drainage District. The question presented is whether, prior to the enactment of chapter 437 of the Laws of 1923, a drainage district was an employer within the meaning of and subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Section 2394--4, Stats. 1921, defined employers who were subject to the provisions of the act as follows:

“(1) The state, and each county, city, town, village, and school district therein. (2) Every person, firm, and private corporation (including any public service corporation), who has any person in service under any contract of hire,” etc.

[1] The provisions of the act are made compulsory upon the municipalities enumerated in subsection 1. They are made elective as to employers enumerated in subsection 2. If a drainage district is included under subsection 1, then it is subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, because, as to the municipalities therein enumerated, it is compulsory. If included within subsection 2, it is equally subject to the provisions of the act, because it had not elected not to come under the act as required by section 2394--5. It certainly is not included in subsection 1, because it is not specifically mentioned therein, and there is nothing anywhere in the act to indicate a legislative intent to make any municipality subject to its provisions, except those specifically enumerated in subsection 1.

[2][3] Although it is provided by subsection 30, section 4971, Stats., that “the word ‘person’ shall extend and be applied to bodies corporate unless plainly inapplicable,” the inclusion of “private corporation” in said subsection 2 excludes by the strongest implication any legislative intent that the word “person,” as used in subsection 2, shall include a drainage district. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies to both subsection 1 and subsection 2. Subsection 1 manifestly includes all municipal corporations or bodies which it was intended to make subject to the provisions of the act. Plainly, subsection 2 relates to employers of labor who are not municipal or quasi municipal corporations. The act is so clear and explicit that it is not subject to construction. Construction may be resorted to only where ambiguity exists. It is impossible to discover any ambiguity in the statute with which we are dealing.

[4] It is argued by the Attorney General that an absurd situation would result if a drainage district were not subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, because in that case it would be deprived of the common-law defenses of assumption of...