Russell's Express, Inc. v. Bray's Garage, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 April 1920
• Citation: 94 Conn. 520,109 A. 722
• Parties: RUSSELL'S EXPRESS, Inc., v. BRAY'S GARAGE, Inc.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

109 A. 722

94 Conn. 520

RUSSELL'S EXPRESS, Inc., v. BRAY'S GARAGE, Inc.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 17, 1920

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Fairfield County; John J. Walsh Judge.

Action by Russell's Express, Incorporated, against Bray's Garage, Incorporated, to recover damages for the negligent performance of a contract to repair an automobile. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, from which judgment the defendant appeals. No error.

A motortruck of the plaintiff broke down in Bridgeport, and was towed to defendant's garage. Plaintiff was engaged in the trucking business in New York and one Russell, its president and treasurer, telephoned to the defendant to take down the motor. Defendant was a garage company in Bridgeport and was represented by one Bray. Russell and Bray examined the motor and found that a connecting rod had broken and cracked the lower part of the crank case. Bray represented himself as an automobile mechanic with a knowledge of welding, and he and Russell, who also was familiar with automobiles, agreed that a good job could be done upon the case by welding. Other repairs had to be made besides the welding. Russell asked Bray if he had a good welder in Bridgeport, and Bray replied he had as good as there was, whereupon Russell told him to go ahead and have it done. Russell knew the defendant did not itself do welding. The defendant proceeded with repairs, and sent the crank case to a competent welder the Cave Welding Company, for welding. After this was done, the defendant, in setting up the motor found the upper case cracked. The plaintiff instructed the defendant to have this case welded. This was done by the same welder. Upon its return the welded case was examined by the defendant and accepted. The motor was then set up. Russell came, and the defendant turned over the car to him, assuring him that the car was then in first-class condition; ready to make the trip to New York. Russell did not see the crank case after it was welded, relying entirely upon the defendant. There were two cracks, the larger nearly vertical, and the smaller crossing the larger diagonally. The larger crack was properly welded with iron, The smaller was not welded with iron, but was improperly, negligently, and carelessly welded with solder. The defendant's bill for repairs amounted to $250, in which was an item of $18.50 paid to the welder. On the way back to New York the soldered crack opened and let out the lubricating oil, the bearings became heated, in consequence of which further repairs had to be made, and the plaintiff lost the use of the car for ten days. The court came to the following conclusions:

1. The welding of said diagonal crack was done in a negligent, careless, and improper manner and was the direct cause of the disablement of the truck near Stamford and the subsequent loss to the defendant for the repairing of the same and the hiring of the substitute truck.

2. The plaintiff relied entirely upon the defendant to see that said repairs were properly done and had no dealings with any other person-and rendered judgment for the plaintiff to recover for the cost of repairs and loss of use up to the limit of the ad damnum, and the defendant appealed.

Thomas M. Cullinan, of Bridgeport, for appellant.

Matthew H. Kenealy, of Stamford, for appellee.

GAGER J.

The essential reason of appeal, stated in several ways, is that the defendant was not employed by the plaintiff to do the welding, but only to employ a competent welder for the plaintiff, so that the welder was, through the agency of the defendant, acting for the plaintiff as principal and not for the defendant, and therefore the defendant, having employed a competent welder, is not responsible for the results of negligent welding. The conclusion of the court was that-

" The plaintiff relied entirely upon the defendant to see that said repairs were properly done, and had no dealings with any other person."

We think this conclusion is not merely justified by the subordinate facts, but that it is clearly required. It appears that defendant conducted a general repair garage. It did not do welding, but had what it believed a competent welder, to whom welding jobs were turned over. When a garage takes a repair job, and the contrary does not appear, so far as the customer is concerned it undertakes for itself the whole job. Whether the garage does all the work is quite immaterial. Should the job require work to be done outside the capacity of its shop, as that of a carriage maker painter, glass cutter, the garage gets the work done on its own account, being equally responsible to the customer whether the work is done by its immediate employés or by specialists in the different lines of work required to be done. The garage company necessarily does all its work by employé s, and...