Russell v. Board of County Com'rs, Carter County

• Citation: 952 P.2d 492,1997 OK 80
• Decision Date: 24 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 86358,86358
• Parties: 13 IER Cases 50, 1997 OK 80 Earl RUSSELL, Gary Watson, Gary Smith, Mack Word, Steven Henson, Ruben Garcia, Kenneth Turner, Greg Theobald, Wayne Magee and Bryan Burton, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, CARTER COUNTY, State of Oklahoma, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Page 492

952 P.2d 492

13 IER Cases 50, 1997 OK 80

Earl RUSSELL, Gary Watson, Gary Smith, Mack Word, Steven

Henson, Ruben Garcia, Kenneth Turner, Greg

Theobald, Wayne Magee and Bryan Burton, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, CARTER COUNTY, State of

Oklahoma, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 86358.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

June 24, 1997.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 18, 1998.

Ronald E. Worthen, Ardmore, for Appellants.

Rodney C. Ramsey, Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, Oklahoma City, for Appellee.

OPALA, Justice.

¶1 The dispositive issue on certiorari is whether there was error in entering summary judgment for the county. We answer in the affirmative.

I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION

¶2 Ten deputy sheriffs of Carter County [deputies, deputy sheriffs or plaintiffs] commenced a breach-of-employment-contract action against the Board of County Commissioners [Board, county or commissioners] to recover overtime pay alleged to be due them under an at-will employment arrangement with the county. The deputies pressed for summary relief, arguing that the commissioners (a) established uniform personnel policies for county employees, (b) published the policies in a handbook which embodied the Board's practice of paying overtime to county employees, and (c) distributed the manual to county employees. They are entitled to the overtime benefits sought, the deputies argue, because (a) the handbook states that law enforcement (and other county) personnel are to be paid overtime compensation, (b) deputy sheriffs are law enforcement officers, and (c) under the terms of the manual, other sheriff employees receive overtime and holiday pay. The written policy, the deputies urge, became a part of their at-will employment contract, which the county has breached by its refusal to provide the overtime compensation pressed for payment.

¶3 The Board also sought victory by summary adjudication process, arguing that the handbook did not constitute a contract. Even if some language in the manual could create contractual obligations, the Board urges, material fact issues exist as to whether (a) the handbook rises to the level of a contract and (b) its overtime provisions apply to these deputy sheriffs. Noting the deputy sheriffs' claim to overtime pay was not founded on the Fair Labor Standards Act [FLSA or Act], ¹ the Board theorized that the deputies' strategy was most likely ascribable to federal jurisprudence (Nichols v. Hurley ), ² which teaches that because deputy sheriffs fall within the FLSA's personal staff exemption, they stand excluded from the Act's overtime pay provisions.

¶4 Rejecting the Board's interpretation of Nichols, although not disputing the notion ¶5 The trial court gave summary judgment to the Board, and the deputies appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals [COCA] reversed. Although agreeing that the Board's overtime policy does not create or constitute a contractual right to overtime, the COCA opinion treats that issue as nondispositive of the deputies' right to recover. The COCA (a) notes that the Board does not treat equally "all county employees who work overtime, as defined by federal fair labor standards for their particular employment," for the allowance of overtime benefits, ³ (b) opines that the Board may discriminate for overtime pay only if a reasonable basis exists for allowing some county employees to receive overtime compensation and denying the same benefit to others, and (c) remands the cause for the trial court's decision on whether there is a rational basis for treating these deputies differently for overtime pay from other county employees. It is somewhat unclear whether the COCA (a) remanded the cause for consideration of both a FLSA claim and a federal-law claim based on equal protection or (b) intended the equal protection issue to assist the deputies in asserting a claim based directly on the manual. The Board seeks our review by certiorari.

                their claim was based solely on contract, the deputy sheriffs point out the circumstances of this case are substantially different from those in Nichols.   They note that here (a) the overtime policy was adopted by a statutorily authorized personnel board, (b) the deputies are further removed from the sheriff's direct supervision than those in Nichols, and (c) the size of the staff that consists of deputies, jailers and technicians is not determined solely by the sheriff's discretion, but must be approved by the county excise board.  Moreover, they urge, Nichols rests on a federal-court interpretation of Oklahoma statutes, which this court is not bound to follow
                

¶6 The COCA treated the deputies' contractual theory with a conclusory rejection, ⁴ giving prominence to the FLSA-and-equal-protection aspect of the claim. Because the COCA viewed as nondispositive the errors urged under the contractual theory, all of them went unaddressed. We must hence treat them as undecided in the Hough v. Leonard ⁵ sense. Hough teaches that the party victorious in the COCA is entitled to our sua sponte review of all issues which, though properly preserved and briefed on appeal, were not addressed by the appellate court. ⁶

II STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 The focus in summary process is not on facts a plaintiff might be able to prove at trial (i.e., the legal sufficiency of evidence that could be adduced) but rather on whether the evidentiary materials as a whole (a) show undisputed facts on some or all material issues and (b) will support but a single inference in favor of a successful movant's quest for relief. ⁷ Summary adjudication

process--a special pretrial procedural track to be conducted with the aid of acceptable probative substitutes ⁸--is a search for undisputed material facts that may be applied, sans forensic combat, in the judicial decision-making process. It is a method for identifying and isolating non-triable fact issues, not a device for defeating the opponent's right to trial by jury. Only that evidentiary material which entirely eliminates from trial some or all fact issues may afford legitimate support for nisi prius resort to summary process.

III ¶8 IN A PUBLIC-LAW CASE, THE REVIEWING COURT CAN GRANT CORRECTIVE RELIEF SUA SPONTE ON A THEORY NOT RAISED BELOW

¶9 The Board argues that the summary judgment should not be reversed on a claim--one for violation of the FLSA--that was not pressed in the trial court and is unsupported by the record.

¶10 When resolving a public-law controversy, the reviewing court is generally free to grant corrective relief upon any applicable legal theory dispositive of the case. Appellate freedom to raise and settle public-law issues sua sponte is circumscribed not by arguments tendered by the parties but rather by the record brought for review. ⁹

¶11 We cannot decide today, as explained in Part IV infra, either as a matter of law or on this record, that the FLSA is applicable to the deputy sheriffs' claim for uncompensated overtime and holiday work.

IV THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

¶12 The deputy sheriffs neither pleaded below nor urged on appeal that the FLSA's overtime provisions are applicable to their compensation claim. If the COCA intended to inject that issue sua sponte (by its reference to the fair labor standards), its holding is plain error. This is so because a FLSA-based claim is not only sans record support, but its infusion on appeal would transform the deputies' contractual claim into a different demand rather than merely supply a new theory for recovery. Moreover, the COCA's opinion did not pause to consider the timeliness of a FLSA claim. Because we hold today in Part V infra that summary judgment cannot stand on other grounds and there is a possibility of a postremand amendment to the pleadings, ¹⁰ we must ¶13 The FLSA requires employers to pay their employees for overtime at a rate of one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour in excess of the normal work week. ¹¹ The Act's enforcement provisions ¹² create a private right of action for any violation of the maximum hours and overtime pay provisions. ¹³ Concurrent jurisdiction over FLSA-generated controversies stands conferred on both state and federal courts. ¹⁴ The FLSA applies to employees of state and local governments. ¹⁵ An employee who brings an action for unpaid overtime compensation under the FLSA has the burden of proving that work was performed in excess of 40 hours for which no compensation was given. ¹⁶ A showing must be made of (a) the amount and extent of overtime work as a matter of just and reasonable inference and (b) the employer's knowledge of the uncompensated time. ¹⁷ A FLSA claim ¶14 The FLSA provides for several exemptions from its overtime protections: (a) law enforcement organizations which employ fewer than five persons, ¹⁹ (b) employees of governmental subdivisions who are not covered by civil service laws and are on the personal staff of a publicly elected officer ²⁰ and (c) persons who are employed in a bona fide executive, administrative or professional capacity. ²¹ Because the Act establishes a presumption of coverage, ²² exemptions are construed narrowly against the employer. ²³ A claim to a FLSA exemption is an affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of showing that its employees fit "plainly and unmistakably within [the exemption's] terms and spirit." ²⁴

discuss and give guidance on the FLSA's impact, if any, upon this lawsuit must be commenced within two years after it has accrued, unless the action arises out of a "willful" violation--in which case it must be commenced within three years after accrual. ¹⁸

¶15 Nichols ²⁵ does not, as the County urges, hold that deputy sheriffs are members of the sheriff's personal staff and hence exempts them, as a matter of law, from FLSA's overtime protection. The inquiry into an employee's exempt status under the FLSA remains "intensely fact bound and case specific." ²⁶ In Nichols several former deputy sheriffs in two...