Russell v. Crenshaw, 3 Div. 283
| Decision Date | 12 September 1968 |
| Docket Number | 3 Div. 283 |
| Citation | 283 Ala. 59,214 So.2d 333 |
| Parties | S. Tyre RUSSELL v. J. L. CRENSHAW. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Goodwyn, Smith & Bowman, Montgomery, for appellant.
Crenshaw & Waller, Montgomery, for appellee.
This appeal is from a decree of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, in Equity. The appellant, S. Tyre Russell, filed a bill seeking an ex parte temporary injunction against J. L. Crenshaw et al. from further proceeding with the foreclosure sale of certain real estate situated in Montgomery County and praying that upon hearing the cause, the court would order an accounting between appellant and Crenshaw and determine that the indebtedness secured by an equitable mortgage lien now held by Crenshaw has been paid in full.
This equitable mortgage lien was originally held by the Peoples Bank & Trust Company of Montgomery, Alabama, and was transferred to Crenshaw by the bank.
In the interest of brevity, we refer to our recent decision in the case of Russell v. Russell, 270 Ala. 662, 120 So.2d 733, for an additional statement of facts bearing upon the equitable mortgage lien as well as other matters herein involved.
The basis of appellant's claim stems from a writing signed by Crenshaw and alleged by Russell to be a release of all indebtedness between himself and Crenshaw. The writing, which we here attempt to reproduce as fairly as possible, is as follows:
'Montgomery, Alabama
'Received $1700.00 to pay balance on accounts in full, and all claims by me against S. T. Russell.
Signed,
/s/ J. L. Crenshaw
'Witness:
/s/ Ethel W. Garrett
Notary Public'
Although the signature appearing in the writing is admittedly that of respondent, the writing has been materially altered as it appears on its face in that a comma was written over a period following the word 'full,' and the words 'and all claims by me against S. T. Russell' were added at a later time.
A motion to strike the bill and a demurrer to the bill were interposed and both overruled by the trial court.
The respondent answered by denying the allegations of the bill and specifically denying that he had been paid in full or in part the indebtedness of $25,750, with interest, secured by the equitable mortgage lien now owned by him. Respondent also alleged that appellant was further indebted to him for an additional amount of $10,511, of which $8800 was paid by respondent to appellant's wife as surety on a supersedeas appeal bond for the appellant in his divorce suit, and the balance being the amount which respondent paid for Russell as costs of appeal in the divorce case of Russell v. Russell, supra.
For answer to the allegation that the writing here involved was a release of all indebtedness of the appellant to Crenshaw, the respondent alleged that the writing was merely a receipt showing appellant's reimbursement to Crenshaw for paying the court costs in Russell's divorce case appealed to this Court in which Russell was the loser.
The respondent filed a cross bill praying that the court ascertain the amounts due from the complainant to the respondent and render appropriate relief.
The complainant's motion for a jury trial filed subsequently to the bill, as well as his motion for consolidation of this cause with pending Cause No. 36565, and the motion for rehearing based on purported newly-discovered evidence, were all considered and refused.
The testimony was heard ore tenus by the trial court and the decree rendered for respondent Crenshaw. It is from that decree that this appeal is taken.
All the evidence considered, there is ample evidence which substantially supports the trial court's findings. In particular, we point out Mr. Crenshaw's testimony that Russell paid him interest on the debt of some $27,000 on two occasions following the signing of the alleged release, which, if believed by the trial court as it must have been, established beyond question Russell's recognition of continuing existing indebtedness to Crenshaw, as well as Russell's complete...
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Valley Heating, Cooling & Elec. Co. v. Alabama Gas Corp., 6 Div. 754
...283 Ala. 171, 214 So.2d 913. Assignment of error 4 is not argued in brief and is thereby waived. Supreme Court Rule 9; Russell v. Crenshaw, 283 Ala. 59, 214 So.2d 333. Assignment 5 charges that the court erred in denying the application for temporary injunction. We have approved a like assi......
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Averyt v. Doyle
...the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed in the absence of a gross abuse of that discretion. Russell v. Crenshaw, 283 Ala. 59, 214 So.2d 333 (1968). The order of the circuit court is due to be AFFIRMED. BRADLEY and HOLMES, JJ., concur. ...
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Hinton v. Nelson
...trial court. When such sound discretion is exercised to deny an application, that action is not reviewable on appeal. Russell v. Crenshaw, 283 Ala. 59, 214 So.2d 333; Withers v. Burton, 268 Ala. 365, 106 So.2d 876. See also ARCP 59(a) and comments. This decision is rendered under authority ......