Russell v. Escobar

• Decision Date: 13 January 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 18-00660-BAJ-EWD
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana
• Parties: JAMES R. RUSSELL v. JOSE F. BONILLA ESCOBAR, ET AL.

JAMES R. RUSSELL
v.
JOSE F. BONILLA ESCOBAR, ET AL.

Civil Action No. 18-00660-BAJ-EWD

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana

January 13, 2022

RULING AND ORDER

JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Before the Court is Defendant United Specialty Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 118). The Motion is opposed. (Doc. 129). United filed a Reply Brief. (Doc. 133). For the reasons stated herein, United's Motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. ALLEGED FACTS

The instant dispute arises out of an alleged motor vehicle collision between Plaintiff and Jose F. Bonilla Escobar on May 17, 2017. (Doc. 63, ¶ 4-8; Doc. 143, p. 6). Plaintiff alleges that Escobar's truck, a 2006 Freightliner tractor-semitrailer, sideswiped Plaintiffs truck, a 2014 International tractor-semitrailer. (Doc. 63, ¶¶ 4-7). Plaintiff seeks damages resulting from this alleged accident. (Doc. 63).

Remaining Defendants in this matter include Freightline Express Corp., United Specialty Insurance Company, and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company.^[1] (See id.; Doc. 141). First, Plaintiff alleges that Freightline is Escobar's statutory employer and is therefore vicariously liable for Escobar's negligence at the

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time of the collision. (Doc. 63, ¶¶ 11-13). Second, Plaintiff alleges that United, as Freightline's insurer, must pay damages caused by Escobar's negligence. (Id. at ¶16-17). Plaintiff alleges that Escobar was covered by United's Policy issued to Freightline. (Id. at ¶ 17). Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Liberty, as Plaintiffs UM/UIM insurer, is liable to Plaintiff to the extent that remaining liability insurance limits are insufficient to compensate Plaintiff for his damages. (Id. at ¶ 19).

United now moves for summary judgment, arguing that its policy does not provide the coverage that Plaintiff seeks. (Doc. 118).

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff initially filed suit in the 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge. (Doc. 1-4). This matter was removed to the Court based on diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C, § 1332. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff twice sought leave to file Amended Complaints. (Doc. 39; Doc. 40; Doc. 62; Doc. 63). The Second Amended Complaint is now the operative pleading in this matter. (Doc. 63).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court may grant summary judgment only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on motions for summary judgment, courts are required to view all inferences drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., Alb U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Coleman v. Hous. Indep. School Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).

To survive summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party must do more than allege an issue of material fact: "Rule 56(e) . . . requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Auguster v. Vermilion Par. Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 402 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). "Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment." Ragas v. Tenn, Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted). A party that fails to present competent evidence opposing a motion for summary judgment risks dismissal on this basis alone. E.g., Broussard v. Oryx Energy Co., 110 F.Supp.2d 532, 536 (E.D. Tex. 2000) ("Plaintiff produced no genuine issue of material fact to prevent the granting of Defendant's Motion, and therefore, the Court could grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on this basis alone.").

III. DISCUSSION

A. Undisputed Facts

Escobar owned the truck he was driving and the trailer he was pulling at the time of the alleged accident.^[2] (Doc. 118-5, ¶ 1). Escobar leased the truck and trailer

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to Freightline. (Id. at ¶ 2). United issued a commercial auto policy to Freightline ("United Policy"), with coverage effective dates of March 6, 2017, through March 6, 2018. (Id. at ¶ 3). Under the United Policy, United agreed to:

[P]ay all sums an "insured" legally must pay as damages because of "bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance applies caused by an "accident" and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered "auto."

(Id. at ¶ 4).

The United Policy limited liability coverage to "Covered Autos" designated by Symbol "67," defined as:

Only those "autos" described in Item Three of the Declarations for which charge is shown (and for Covered Auto Liability Coverage any "trailers" you don't own while attached to any power unit described in Item Three).

(Id. at ¶ 5). There are three "Covered Autos" scheduled on the United Policy, none of which were involved in the alleged accident, (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7). Escobar's truck was not scheduled on the United Policy on the date of the alleged accident. (Id. at ¶ 7).

B. Analysis

United argues that summary judgment is warranted in its favor because the United Policy does not provide coverage for any of Plaintiffs claims. (Doc. 118, p. 1).

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Specifically, United asserts that its Policy does not provide coverage because Escobar's truck was not scheduled as a "Covered Auto." (Doc. 118-6, p. 1). United asks the Court to apply the clear and unambiguous language of the Policy to find that the United Policy only provides coverage to "Covered Autos." (Id. at p. 4).

Plaintiff responds that because Escobar was a named insured under the United Policy, the fact that he was operating an unscheduled auto is of "no consequence" to the question of coverage under the MCS-90 Endorsement included in the United Policy. (Doc. 129, p. 8). Plaintiff argues that the MCS-90 Endorsement requires United to pay "any final judgment recovered against the insured for public liability resulting from negligence in the operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles subject to the financial responsibility requirements of Sections 29 and 30 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, regardless of whether or not each motor vehicle is specifically described in the policy . . ." (Id. at p. 7). In short, Plaintiff relies on the applicability of the MCS-90 Endorsement included in the United Policy to seek payment from United.

"The MCS-90 [endorsement] is a federally mandated policy endorsement required to ensure a motor carrier's compliance with federal minimum levels of financial responsibility for the transportation of property by a motor carrier within the United States." Cutrer v. TWT Transp., L.L.C., 485 F.Supp.3d 677, 683-84 (M.D. La. 2020) (citing Canal Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 625 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2010)). The MCS-90 endorsement must be attached to any liability policy issued to for-hire motor carriers operating motor vehicles transporting property in interstate commerce.

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Coleman, 625 F.3d at 247 (citing 49 C.F.R. §§ 387.3, 387.7). The endorsement creates a suretyship, which obligates an insurer to pay certain judgments against the insured arising from interstate commerce activities, even though the insurance contract would have otherwise excluded coverage. Coleman, 625 F.3d at 247 (internal citations omitted). Whether the MCS-90 endorsement covers a given accident is a matter of federal law. Cutrer, 485 F.Supp.3d at 684 (citing Coleman, 625 F.3d at 244).

To determine the scope of coverage provided by the MCS-90, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit directs the Court to first look to the plain language of the...