Russell v. Gte Government Systems Corp.
| Citation | 232 F.Supp.2d 840 |
| Decision Date | 23 October 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. C-3-99-499.,C-3-99-499. |
| Parties | Edward D. RUSSELL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GTE GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Elaine S. Bernstein, Dayton, OH, Donald M. Desseyn, Mechanicsburg, PA, for plaintiff.
Robert Jennings Townsend, Roger Alan Weber, Taft Stettinius & Hollister-1, Cincinnati, OH, for defendant.
DECISION AND ENTRY OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. # 55); DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. # 60) SUSTAINED IN PART AND OVERRULED IN PART; CONFERENCE CALL SET
This litigation arises out of Plaintiff Edward Russell's employment with Defendant GTE Government Systems Corporation ("GTE Government") to work on a project known as the ATLAS Project in Feltwell, England, beginning on August 21, 1993.1 Plaintiff's original Complaint named three Defendants: GTE Corporation ("GTE"), GTE Government, and Karen Ulen ("Ulen"), Deputy Program Manager for the ATLAS program. As a result of the filing of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. # 32) on July 13, 2000, GTE Government is the sole remaining Defendant.
In his Second Amended Complaint, alleging subject matter jurisdiction by way of diversity of citizenship, Plaintiff has set forth six claims for relief, which can be divided into two groups. First, Russell has set forth four state law claims for breach of contract, based on Defendant's (1) failure to compensate him for his standby time (presumably between November of 1993 and May of 1996) (Count One); (2) failure to compensate him for his standby time between June of 19962 and September of 1998 (Count Two); (3) reduction of his field premium (Count Three); and (4) reduction of his housing allowance (Count Four). Second, Plaintiff has asserted two state law promissory estoppel claims, based on Defendant's failure to pay full joint travel regulation ("JTR") lodging and meals and incidental expenses ("M & IE") for Plaintiff, and one-half (50%) of his dependents' JTR and M & IE (Count Five), and its failure to abide by promises in the Field Assignment document3 (Count Six).
Pending before the Court are Motions for Summary Judgment, submitted by both Plaintiff (Doc. # 55) and Defendant (Doc. # 60). Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment on each of his claims. Defendant has argued that it, rather than Plaintiff, is entitled to summary judgment on Counts One, Two, Five, and Six, because Plaintiff cannot establish all of the elements of those claims. In addition, Defendant has sought summary judgment in its favor on all of Plaintiff's claims, due to various affirmative defenses. For the reasons assigned, Plaintiff's Motion is OVERRULED in its entirety, and Defendant's Motion is SUSTAINED in PART and OVERRULED in PART.
Plaintiff Edward Russell is a Systems Engineer with twenty-one (21) years of experience in the operation and maintenance of satellite communications equipment. In 1985, he was hired by Defendant GTE Government and, as part of his employment, he has worked at several overseas locations. From 1985 to 1990, he was employed in Japan as the Technical Director of Engineering at LadyLove Field. From 1992 to 1993, he was the Field Site Manager for the Phoenix Project in San Vito, Italy. From 1993 to 1998, he was the Systems Engineering Manager at the Royal Air Force Base in Feltwell, England.
Each time Plaintiff was deployed to an overseas site, he was given a Field Assignment document, which set forth the terms and compensation of his foreign assignment. These documents outlined, inter alia, the compensation for travel, field premium, housing allowance, personal effects moving allowance, tuition, authorized dependent visits, income tax, overtime, home leave, expense reports, time cards, a no fault clause, and the official termination date. Plaintiff alleges that these documents constituted employment contracts.
Prior to August 20, 1993, while Plaintiff was located in San Vito, Italy, he discussed with GTE Government employees the terms of his next field assignment, working on the Atlas Project in Feltwell, England. On April 8, 1994, Plaintiff signed a Field Assignment document, with an effective date of August 21, 1993 (estimated), to September 30, 1994 (estimated) (Pl.'s Depo. Vol. I, Ex. 8). According to that document, Plaintiff was to receive a field premium of 15%, and a daily housing allowance of $37.84. In addition, the Field Assignment document provided that Plaintiff indicates that this Field Assignment document reduced to writing the terms that had been discussed during the previous Summer. Plaintiff did not receive or sign any subsequent Field Assignment documents during his tenure in Feltwell.
In November of 1993, the Site Manager at Feltwell, Lee Grubb ("Grubb"), issued a beeper to Plaintiff. Plaintiff was instructed that he was to carry the beeper when he was not required to be physically at work. Grubb informed Plaintiff that he had to be available to respond to his beeper, even when he was not officially on the standby schedule. In January of 1995, Plaintiff was notified that his field premium would be reduced from 15% to 10%. On October 1, 1995, his housing allowance was likewise reduced, resulting in a decrease of approximately $12.00 per day.
In July of 1998, Plaintiff began to make plans to leave the Atlas Project, as the contract between GTE Government and the United States was due to expire on October 1, 1998. Plaintiff began to seek new employment, to begin on August 1, 1998. Plaintiff states that the Site Manager, Mr. Michael Vanover ("Vanover"), induced him to stay on site until the completion of the contract by promising him that he would receive full joint travel regulation ("JTR") lodging and meals and incidental expenses ("M & IE") for himself, as well as one half JTR and full M & IE for his four dependents. On August 24, 1998, Plaintiff was notified that he would be paid full JTR and M & IE for himself, but that he would receive only 50% M & IE and no compensation for JTR lodging for his dependents. On October 1, 1998, Plaintiff left both Feltwell, England, and GTE Government's employment.
Summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Of course, the moving party:
always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1156 (6th Cir. 1991)(The moving party has the "burden of showing that the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits in the record, construed favorably to the nonmoving party, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial.")(quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1536 (6th Cir.1987)). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Thus, "[o]nce the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact making it necessary to resolve the difference at trial." Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir.1995). Read together, Liberty Lobby and Celotex stand for the proposition that a party may move for summary judgment by demonstrating that the opposing party will not be able to produce sufficient evidence at trial to withstand a directed verdict motion (now known as a motion for judgment as a matter of law, Fed.R.Civ.P. 50). Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir.1989).
Once the burden of production has so shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not sufficient to "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see also Michigan Protection and Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 341 (6th Cir. 1994)("The plaintiff must present more than a scintilla of evidence in support of his position; the evidence must be such that a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff."). Rather, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the [unverified] pleadings" and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment shall be denied "[i]f there are ... `genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because...
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