Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc.
Citation | 748 A.2d 278,252 Conn. 596 |
Decision Date | 04 April 2000 |
Docket Number | (SC 16102) |
Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
Parties | ROBERT RUSSELL v. MYSTIC SEAPORT MUSEUM, INC., ET AL. |
McDonald, C. J., and Borden, Palmer, Sullivan and Callahan, JS. Amy M. Stone, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Richard T. Stabnick, with whom, on the brief, was Joseph E. Skelley, Jr., for the appellees (defendants).
The dispositive issues in this certified appeal require that we interpret General Statutes § 31-294c1 of the Workers' Compensation Act (act). First, we must determine whether, under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff, Robert Russell, filed a notice of claim for workers' compensation benefits sufficient to support a motion to preclude the named defendant,2 Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., from contesting liability. Specifically, we must determine whether the plaintiff supplied a date of injury in his notice of claim for a repetitive trauma injury sufficient to support a motion to preclude. Second, we must determine whether the defendant's notice contesting liability was sufficient to defeat the plaintiff's motion to preclude.3
The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the decision of the compensation review board (board). The board had determined that the workers' compensation commissioner (commissioner) properly had denied the plaintiffs motion to preclude the defendant from contesting liability. We conclude that the plaintiffs notice of claim was sufficient to support a motion to preclude, and that the defendant failed to file a notice contesting liability sufficient to defeat the plaintiffs motion to preclude. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. "The commissioner held a hearing on July 25, 1995 .... The plaintiff was, at all relevant times, an employee of the [named] defendant .... On May 2, 1991, the plaintiff was working as an engineer aboard the steamboat Sabino. On that day, the plaintiff was reassembling a valve that had been taken apart. To get a better grip on the valve assembly, he changed his position and then fell approximately four and one-half feet to the deck plating. As he fell, he hit his left elbow on a pipe, shoving his left arm behind his head and dislocating his shoulder. After he landed, the plaintiff reduced the dislocation himself.
Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 52 Conn. App. 255, 257-58, 730 A.2d 66 (1999). Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
The plaintiff then appealed from the board's decision to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court affirmed the board's decision, with one judge dissenting. We granted the plaintiffs petition for certification limited to the following two issues: (1) "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiff's notice of claim was insufficient to support a motion to preclude?"; and (2) "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiff had failed to establish that his injury was caused by repetitive trauma/activity that arose out of and during the course of employment?" Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 248 Conn. 918, 918-19, 734 A.2d 567 (1999).
We answer the first certified question in the negative. The defendant asserts, however, as an alternative ground for affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court, that it filed a notice contesting liability pursuant to § 31-294c (b); see footnote 1 of this opinion; and that that notice was sufficient to defeat the plaintiffs motion to preclude.
We conclude that the defendant's notice contesting liability was insufficient to defeat the plaintiffs motion to preclude. Therefore, we conclude that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the board's decision affirming the commissioner's denial of the plaintiffs motion to preclude. Having determined that the plaintiffs motion to preclude the defendant from contesting liability should have been granted, we need not consider the second certified issue.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fimiani v. Star Gallo Distributors, Inc., 248 Conn. 635, 641-42, 729 A.2d 212 (1999).
With regard to the first certified issue, there has been no prior judicial interpretation favoring the commissioner's or the board's interpretation of § 31-294c. Accordingly, our statutory analysis accords no deference to either such interpretation of § 31-294c. With regard to the defendant's alternative ground for affirmance, neither the commissioner nor the board reached the issue of whether the defendant's notice contesting liability was legally sufficient under § 31-294c (b). We also afford plenary review to this question of statutory interpretation.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Church Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 250 Conn. 297, 304, 735 A.2d 805 (1999). In another case of statutory interpretation involving consideration of whether a notice of claim was sufficient to support a motion to preclude under the act, we stated: "[W]e are mindful of the principles underlying Connecticut practice in [workers'] compensation cases: that the legislation is remedial in nature ... and that it should be broadly construed to accomplish its humanitarian purpose." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dubois v. General Dynamics Corp., 222 Conn. 62, 67, 607 A.2d 431 (1992).
We first consider whether the plaintiffs notice of claim complied with § 31-294c (a) in a manner sufficient to support a motion to preclude the defendant from contesting liability pursuant to § 31-294c (b). The Appellate Court opinion sets forth the following additional facts necessary to resolve this issue. 4 ...
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