Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., (SC 16102)
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Writing for the Court | SULLIVAN, J. |
| Citation | 748 A.2d 278,252 Conn. 596 |
| Parties | ROBERT RUSSELL v. MYSTIC SEAPORT MUSEUM, INC., ET AL. |
| Docket Number | (SC 16102) |
| Decision Date | 04 April 2000 |
252 Conn. 596
748 A.2d 278
v.
MYSTIC SEAPORT MUSEUM, INC., ET AL
(SC 16102)
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Argued December 3, 1999.
Officially released April 4, 2000.
McDonald, C. J., and Borden, Palmer, Sullivan and Callahan, JS.
Richard T. Stabnick, with whom, on the brief, was Joseph E. Skelley, Jr., for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion
SULLIVAN, J.
The dispositive issues in this certified appeal require that we interpret General Statutes § 31-294c1 of the Workers' Compensation Act (act). First,
The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. "The commissioner held a hearing on July 25, 1995 .... The plaintiff was, at all relevant times, an employee of the [named] defendant .... On May 2, 1991, the plaintiff was working as an engineer aboard the steamboat Sabino. On that day, the plaintiff was reassembling a valve that had been taken apart. To get a better grip on the valve assembly, he changed his position and then fell approximately four and one-half feet to the deck plating. As he fell, he hit his left elbow on a pipe, shoving his left arm behind his head and dislocating his shoulder. After he landed, the plaintiff reduced the dislocation himself.
"After the accident, the plaintiff submitted an employee incident report and continued working the rest of his shift. The plaintiff did not seek medical treatment or miss any time from work because of the injury. [The named defendant] completed an employer's first report of occupational injury or disease on May 8, 1991.
"The plaintiffs typical work day included ten to twelve hour shifts during which he was responsible for the regular maintenance of the Sabino and stoking the ship's coal burning boiler. Additionally, he spent approximately one half of his work day turning valves, including some above his head, requiring full extension of his arm.
"The plaintiff had suffered between twenty to thirty partial and full dislocations of his left shoulder between the time of the accident and October, 1994, some of
"The plaintiff first informed [the named defendant] that he wanted to file a workers' compensation claim for the May, 1991 fall in October, 1994. The plaintiff decided to have the corrective surgery on October 24, 1994. His last day at work prior to the surgery was October 21, 1994.
"The plaintiff filed a notice of claim, and the commissioner held a hearing on July 25, 1995. The commissioner denied his motion to preclude and determined that the plaintiff did not suffer a compensable injury. The plaintiff then appealed from the commissioner's decision to the board. The board affirmed the commissioner's decision in an opinion dated October 24, 1997." Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 52 Conn. App. 255, 257-58, 730 A.2d 66 (1999). Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
The plaintiff then appealed from the board's decision to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court affirmed the board's decision, with one judge dissenting. We granted the plaintiffs petition for certification limited to the following two issues: (1) "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the plaintiff's notice of claim
We answer the first certified question in the negative. The defendant asserts, however, as an alternative ground for affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court, that it filed a notice contesting liability pursuant to § 31-294c (b); see footnote 1 of this opinion; and that that notice was sufficient to defeat the plaintiffs motion to preclude.
We conclude that the defendant's notice contesting liability was insufficient to defeat the plaintiffs motion to preclude. Therefore, we conclude that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the board's decision affirming the commissioner's denial of the plaintiffs motion to preclude. Having determined that the plaintiffs motion to preclude the defendant from contesting liability should have been granted, we need not consider the second certified issue.
"As a threshold matter, we set forth the standard of review applicable to workers' compensation appeals.... It is well established that [a]lthough not dispositive, we accord great weight to the construction given to the workers' compensation statutes by the commissioner and review board.... A state agency is not entitled, however, to special deference when its determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny.... Duni v. United Technologies Corp., 239 Conn. 19, 24-25, 682 A.2d 99 (1996); Davis v. Norwich, 232 Conn. 311, 317, 654 A.2d 1221 (1995). Where ... [a workers' compensation] appeal involves an issue of statutory construction that has not
With regard to the first certified issue, there has been no prior judicial interpretation favoring the commissioner's or the board's interpretation of § 31-294c. Accordingly, our statutory analysis accords no deference to either such interpretation of § 31-294c. With regard to the defendant's alternative ground for affirmance, neither the commissioner nor the board reached the issue of whether the defendant's notice contesting liability was legally sufficient under § 31-294c (b). We also afford plenary review to this question of statutory interpretation.
"The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of this case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Church Homes, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 250 Conn. 297, 304, 735 A.2d 805 (1999). In another case of statutory interpretation involving consideration of whether a notice of claim was sufficient to support a motion to preclude under the act, we stated: "[W]e are mindful of the principles underlying Connecticut
I
We first consider whether the plaintiffs notice of claim complied with § 31-294c (a) in a manner sufficient to support a motion to preclude the defendant from contesting liability pursuant to § 31-294c (b). The Appellate Court opinion sets forth the following additional facts necessary to resolve this issue. "The plaintiff filed a notice of claim for a repetitive trauma injury occurring `prior to [September 23, 1994].'4 The notice was received by the [named] defendant on December 2, 1994. The notice of claim states: `Notice is hereby given that . . [the plaintiff], who while in the employ of Mystic Seaport Museum at Mystic prior to...
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Dominguez v. N.Y. Sports Club, AC 42089
...questions of law is plenary. See Jones v. Redding , 296 Conn. 352, 364, 995 A.2d 51 (2010) ; Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc ., 252 Conn. 596, 604, 748 A.2d 278 (2000).I On appeal, the defendant claims that the board improperly determined that the defendant was precluded from contesti......
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Finkle v. Carroll, 18976.
...n. 15, 81 A.3d 215 (2013); Dickinson v. Mullaney, 284 Conn. 673, 682 n. 4, 937 A.2d 667 (2007) ; Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 252 Conn. 596, 600 n. 3, 748 A.2d 278 (2000).8 The defendant also argues that the Appellate Court properly determined that Marciano, McDonnell and Bromley......
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Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 18201.
...that may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred.... Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 252 Conn. 596, 613, 748 A.2d 278 (2000). By contrast, the process of injury from a repetitive trauma is ongoing until [the last date of exposure] ... and,......
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State v. Sorabella, 17215.
...the broader legislative purpose of protecting children by targeting the market for child pornography; see State v. Ehlers, supra, 252 Conn. at 596, 750 A.2d 1079; whatever form that market may take under the circumstances. We therefore reject the defendant's Finally, the defendant claims th......
-
Dominguez v. N.Y. Sports Club, AC 42089
...questions of law is plenary. See Jones v. Redding , 296 Conn. 352, 364, 995 A.2d 51 (2010) ; Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc ., 252 Conn. 596, 604, 748 A.2d 278 (2000).I On appeal, the defendant claims that the board improperly determined that the defendant was precluded from contesti......
-
Finkle v. Carroll, 18976.
...n. 15, 81 A.3d 215 (2013); Dickinson v. Mullaney, 284 Conn. 673, 682 n. 4, 937 A.2d 667 (2007) ; Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 252 Conn. 596, 600 n. 3, 748 A.2d 278 (2000).8 The defendant also argues that the Appellate Court properly determined that Marciano, McDonnell and Bromley......
-
Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 18201.
...that may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred.... Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 252 Conn. 596, 613, 748 A.2d 278 (2000). By contrast, the process of injury from a repetitive trauma is ongoing until [the last date of exposure] ... and,......
-
State v. Sorabella, 17215.
...the broader legislative purpose of protecting children by targeting the market for child pornography; see State v. Ehlers, supra, 252 Conn. at 596, 750 A.2d 1079; whatever form that market may take under the circumstances. We therefore reject the defendant's Finally, the defendant claims th......