Russell v. Parlee

• Decision Date: 20 December 1932
• Citation: 163 A. 404,115 Conn. 687
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: RUSSELL v. PARLEE.

163 A. 404

115 Conn. 687

RUSSELL v. PARLEE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

December 20, 1932

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Allyn L. Brown, Judge.

Action by Charles H. Russell against Lydia I. Parlee to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant and her reckless disregard of the rights of others.The case was tried to the jury, and there was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

No error.

Ralph O. Wells and William S. Locke, both of Hartford, for appellant.

Aaron Nassau, of Hartford (Francis P. Rohrmayer of Hartford, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY JJ.

BANKS J.

The plaintiff received personal injuries while riding in an automobile operated by the defendant.The complaint set up two causes of action, one based on negligence, and one based on heedless and reckless disregard of the rights of others under our so-called guest statute(General Statutes, § 1628).In answer to written interrogatories the jury found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover upon the ground of the defendant's negligence, but not upon the ground of her heedless and reckless disregard of the rights of others.The defendant appealed, assigning error in the denial of its motion to set aside the verdict and in the charge of the court.It appears to be conceded that the jury could reasonably have found that the defendant was negligence, and the two contentions made upon this appeal are: (1) That upon the evidence the jury could not reasonably have found (what they must necessarily have found in order to reach a verdict based on negligence) that the plaintiff was not a guest within the meaning of the guest statute; and (2) that the charge of the court, relative to the test to be applied in determining whether the plaintiff was a guest, was erroneous.

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts: The defendant owned a farm in Enfield which she had purchased from George Grant, who continued to live on the place under an arrangement by which he had his board and lodging without charge, in return for which he did whatever work was to be done upon the place.This included the cultivation of the garden, the money needed to buy seeds and supplies for which was furnished jointly by the defendant and Grant, and the produce of which afforded the sole source of supply of vegetables, etc., for the defendant's table, and was so utilized pursuant to the understanding and agreement between them.In the summer of 1931 Grant also did work upon another farm in Rockville known as the Worcester farm.He hired the plaintiff to assist him in the work both on the Worcester farm and that of the defendant, and on three occasions during the three weeks prior to the date of the accident the plaintiff had been engaged in cultivating corn and potatoes and the garden upon the defendant's place.These were being cultivated for the defendant's benefit.The plaintiff was not hired by the defendant, nor did the latter expressly authorize Grant to hire him.On June 4 1931, Grant and the plaintiff had been working on the Worcester farm, and the defendant at Grant's request drove there to bring him back to work upon her place.Upon her arrival she called to Grant become with her to work upon her farm, and he in turn called to the plaintiff, and they both get into the defendant's car.The defendant knew that the plaintiff was going to her place to help Grant cultivate the corn, potatoes, and garden there.The accident in which plaintiff was injured occurred upon their ride to the defendant's farm.

Whether the plaintiff was being transported as a " guest without payment for such transportation" was submitted by the court to the jury as a question of fact, with the correct instruction that in that event the plaintiff could not recover on the ground of mere negligence.The defendant contends that, upon the evidence, as to which there was little dispute, the plaintiff as a matter of law must be placed in that category, while the plaintiff claims that the jury could reasonably find that he was being transported for the mutual benefit of himself and the defendant, and consequently that his transportation was not gratuitous, and not within the terms of the guest statute.

In Kruy v. Smith,108 Conn. 628, 144 A. 304, the plaintiff was injured while being transported by the defendant in her car to the latter's residence, where she was engaged to work as a laundress.We held that the trial court was not justified in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff was a " guest" within the purview of the statute, and said (page 629 of 108 Conn., 144 A. 304, 305): " The Legislature when it used the word ‘ guest,’ did not intend to include persons who are being transported for the mutual benefit of both the passenger and the operator or owner of the car, and, in determining whether the transportation was for the mutual benefit of both, not merely the act of transportation must be considered, but also any contract or relationship between the parties to which it was an incident.Whether one is a ‘ guest’ must often resolve itself into a question of fact, to be determined by the jury under appropriate instructions from the...