Russell v. Russell

Decision Date06 November 1981
Docket NumberNo. 96,96
Citation436 A.2d 524,50 Md.App. 185
PartiesMarion A. RUSSELL v. James T. RUSSELL, Sr.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Theodore P. Weiner, Leonardton, with whom were Weiner, Weiner & Weiner, P. A., Leonardton, on the brief, for appellant.

David F. Jenny, Leonardton, with whom was Walter B. Dorsey, Leonardton, on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before LOWE, COUCH and WEANT, JJ.

WEANT, Judge.

By decree dated 26 August 1980 the appellant Marion A. Russell was granted a divorce a vinculo matrimonii from the appellee James T. Russell, Sr., reserving "the issue of monetary award of the marital property." On 24 November 1980 the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County held a hearing to set a monetary award concerning marital property, specifically Mr. Russell's pension rights. By decree dated 29 December 1980 the court declared that Mr. Russell's pension rights were not marital property and hence not subject to award and disposition under section 3-6A-05 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Annotated Code. The court further ordered the sum of $50.00 per week alimony as permanent alimony. Mrs. Russell appeals from the award of alimony and the determination that Mr. Russell's pension is not marital property.

The marital property issue is discussed in the case of Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md.App. 392, 431 A.2d 1371 (1980). In that case, Judge Thompson, writing for this Court, held that "the right to receive retirement benefits under a private or public employees(') pension plan, whether or not vested, matured, or contributory, is property and that, if acquired during the marriage, it constitutes marital property within the meaning of § 3-6A-01(e)." d. at 399, 431 A.2d at 1375. Accordingly, we would ordinarily hold that Mr. Russell's pension is marital property.

However, in spite of his prior acquiescence, the appellee raises the argument that the parties improperly attempted to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the circuit court by agreeing that the time in which the court would determine which property was marital property would be extended beyond 90 days after the divorce decree. At issue is the following language of section 3-6A-05(a):

In granting an absolute divorce or annulment, or at any time within 90 days thereafter, if in its decree granting the divorce or annulment, the court has expressly reserved the power to do so, the court shall determine which property is marital property if the division of property is at issue. (Emphasis added).

The question then arises as to whether or not the court had jurisdiction to make any determination concerning marital property. It is perfectly obvious that had the trial judge made this determination at the time he granted the divorce his action would have been binding. Instead, the judge reserved the issue of marital property extending his jurisdiction for the ninety day period allowed in section 3-6A-05(a). However, having failed to designate the marital property within this time, the court lost jurisdiction and any determination thereafter concerning the appellee's pension rights were nugatory. The parties could not confer jurisdiction by consent where the...

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14 cases
  • Williams v. Williams
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 1 Septiembre 1986
    ...by the Court of Appeals, Brodak v. Brodak, 294 Md. 10, 447 A.2d 847 (1982), and by this Court on three occasions: Russell v. Russell, 50 Md.App. 185, 436 A.2d 524 (1981); Zorich v. Zorich, 63 Md.App. 710, 493 A.2d 1096 (1985); Ticer v. Ticer, 63 Md.App. 729, 493 A.2d 1105 When Russell was d......
  • Benkin v. Benkin
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 1 Septiembre 1986
    ...conclusion that the court considered these relevant factors in arriving at the amount of alimony to be awarded. Russell v. Russell, 50 Md.App. 185, 188-89, 436 A.2d 524 (1981) (holding that chancellor's failure to consider statutory factors controlling alimony award required The court may d......
  • Brodak v. Brodak
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 21 Julio 1982
    ...was not filed until the ninety-first day after the divorce decree. Hence, the husband contends, relying upon Russell v. Russell, 50 Md.App. 185, 436 A.2d 524 (1981), that the Circuit Court for Garrett County was without jurisdiction to make the award. We disagree and shall affirm on all iss......
  • Dobbyn v. Dobbyn
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 2 Marzo 1984
    ...in the decree an additional ninety days. Section 3-6A-05(a). Brodak v. Brodak, 294 Md. 10, 447 A.2d 847 (1982); Russell v. Russell, 50 Md.App. 185, 436 A.2d 524 (1981). On the basis of the rationale we have set forth, rather than having utilized the date the non-faulting party filed her bil......
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