Russell v. Salve Regina College

• Decision Date: 17 November 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 85-0628-S.
• Citation: 649 F. Supp. 391
• Parties: Sharon L. RUSSELL, Plaintiff, v. SALVE REGINA COLLEGE; Catherine E. Graziano, individually and in her capacity as a faculty member and as Dean of the Salve Regina College nursing department; Joan Chapdelaine, individually and in her capacity as a faculty member and clinical agency coordinator for the nursing department at Salve Regina College; Mary Lavin, individually and in her capacity as a faculty member at Salve Regina College; Maureen Hynes, individually and in her capacity as a faculty member at Salve Regina College; Barbara Dean, individually and in her capacity as a faculty member at Salve Regina College; Joann Mullaney, individually and in her capacity as a faculty member at Salve Regina College; and Sheila Megley, individually and in her capacity as a faculty member at Salve Regina College, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

649 F. Supp. 391

Sharon L. RUSSELL, Plaintiff, v. SALVE REGINA COLLEGE; Catherine E. Graziano, individually and in her capacity as a faculty member and as Dean of the Salve Regina College nursing department; Joan Chapdelaine, individually and in her capacity as a faculty member and clinical agency coordinator for the nursing department at Salve Regina College; Mary Lavin, individually and in her capacity as a faculty member at Salve Regina College; Maureen Hynes, individually and in her capacity as a faculty member at Salve Regina College; Barbara Dean, individually and in her capacity as a faculty member at Salve Regina College; Joann Mullaney, individually and in her capacity as a faculty member at Salve Regina College; and Sheila Megley, individually and in her capacity as a faculty member at Salve Regina College, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 85-0628-S.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

November 17, 1986.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Hogan & Hogan, Edward T. Hogan and Donald J. Packer, East Providence, R.I., for plaintiff.

Tillinghast, Collins & Graham, Steven E. Snow, Douglas A. Giron and Paul M. Sanford, Providence, R.I., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

SELYA, District Judge.

This case, brought under diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a),¹ raises a host of intriguing federal and state law questions in an exotic factual context. Briefly put, the plaintiff, Sharon Russell, a citizen and resident of East Hartford, Connecticut, was expelled from Salve Regina College ("Salve" or "College") because of her unwillingness and/or inability to control an extreme chronic weight problem. She now sues for damages. The defendants include the College and some seven Salve officials. The identity of each individual defendant and the relationship of each to the College is recounted with fidelity in the case caption, see ante, and it would be pleonastic to restate that data anew. The case turns on the scope of the College's unilateral authority to dismiss a student and on the manner in which the expulsion was effected in this instance.

The plaintiff's amended complaint contains some eight distinct statements of claim. The defendants have moved for summary judgment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), as to each and all of Russell's initiatives. The matter has been plethorically briefed and vigorously argued. The applicable legal standard is by now firmly embedded in federal jurisprudence; in the interests of expedition, the court merely reiterates what it said at an earlier date in Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 563 F.Supp. 1283, 1285 (D.R.I.1983), aff'd, 727 F.2d 27 (1st Cir.1984):

It is well settled that summary judgment can be granted only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and where the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Emery v. Merrimack Valley Wood Products, Inc., 701 F.2d 985, 986 (1st Cir.1983); Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 1495, 47 L.Ed.2d 754 (1976); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 553 F.Supp. 1220, 1226 (D.R.I.1982); Milene Music, Inc. v. Gotauco, 551 F.Supp. 1288, 1292 (D.R.I. 1982). In determining whether these conditions have been met, the Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, Emery v. Merrimack Valley Wood Products, Inc., 701 F.2d at 986; John Sanderson & Co. (WOOL) Pty. Ltd. v. Ludlow Jute Co., 569 F.2d 696, 698 (1st Cir.1978), indulging all inferences favorable to that party. Santoni v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 677 F.2d 174, 177 (1st Cir.1982); O'Neill v. Dell Publishing Co., 630 F.2d 685, 686 (1st Cir. 1980).

With this preface, the court proceeds to narrate the undisputed facts,² to frame the issues more precisely, and to set forth its findings and conclusions.

I. BACKGROUND

Salve is a religiously affiliated college located in Newport, Rhode Island, administered by the Sisters of Mercy of the Roman Catholic Church. Russell was admitted to the College by early decision in the winter of 1981-82. She began her studies in September 1982. Russell's interest in a nursing career antedated her matriculation: she had applied only to colleges with nursing programs and had expressed her intention to pursue such a course of study both in her original application to Salve and in her admissions interview. She commenced her academic endeavors at the College with the avowed intention of gaining admittance to Salve's program of nursing education.³

During her inaugural year at the College, there is rather fragile evidence that Russell sought some treatment for obesity. At various times during that school year, her 5'6" frame recorded weights between 306 and 315 pounds according to data on file at the College's health services unit. It is plain that, although she achieved no meaningful weight loss during her freshman year, Russell was considerably more successful as a student. Her work in liberal arts courses was adequate and her grades were respectable. Consequently, Russell was admitted to the nursing program, effective at the start of her sophomore year. She was given a copy of the "Nursing Handbook" (Handbook) issued by the College, and clearly understood that the Handbook set out the requirements for successful completion of the degree in nursing.

The fabric of Russell's aspirations began to unravel in the fall of 1983, when she entered her sophomore year (her first as a nursing student per se). The parties have presented an intricate (and sometimes conflicting) history of the interaction between the plaintiff and her sundry academic supervisors. It would serve no useful purpose at this juncture fully to recapitulate those events, or to attempt to reconcile every conflict. After all, the mechanism of Rule 56 does not require that there be no unresolved questions of fact; it is sufficient if there are no genuine issues remaining as to any material facts.

It suffices for the moment to say that there were myriad problems along the way: the agonizing search for uniforms and scrub gowns that would fit a woman of Russell's girth; a tendency on the part of faculty members to employ Russell in order to model hospital procedures incident to the care of obese patients; prolonged lectures and discussions about the desirability of weight loss; and so on and so forth. Indeed, the record reveals a veritable smorgasbord of verbal exchanges characterized by one side as "torment" or "humiliation" and by the other as "expressions of concern" or "forthright statements of school policy." (It takes little imagination to decipher which litigants are wont to apply which epithets to which actions.)

The court recognizes, of course, that sadism and benevolence — like beauty — often reside principally in the eye of the beholder. And, the court has neither the need nor the means to attempt to discern the subjective motives of myriad actors on the cold, fleshless record of a Rule 56 motion. For the purposes at hand, it is enough to acknowledge that an array of such incidents occurred and that, by the end of her sophomore year, Russell's size had become a matter of concern for all of the parties.

In her junior year, the plaintiff executed a contract (Contract) purporting to make her further participation in the College's nursing curriculum contingent upon an average weight loss of two pounds per week. The Contract was a singular sort of agreement. (It is reproduced in full as an appendix to this opinion.) Notwithstanding the signing of the Contract, Russell proved unable to meet the commitment, or even closely to approach it. Her body weight never fell appreciably below 300 pounds. Though the circumstances are complex, she seems to have made — and invariably to have broken — a series of promises in this regard. Predictably, an escalating level of tension began to characterize dealings between Russell and certain of the individual defendants.

The climax occurred on or about August 23, 1985. The plaintiff received a letter from the coordinator of the nursing program, defendant Chapdelaine, advising that she had been dismissed from the nursing department and from the College. Russell's education was concededly interrupted at that point (though, after a year's hiatus, she resumed her studies in nursing at another institution).

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Russell's complaint, as noted above, contains an octet of claims. Two of these supposed causes of action — Counts VI and VII — allege "federal" claims. Count VI charges the defendants with a denial of due process and an unconstitutional interference with the plaintiff's protectible liberty and property interests. Count VII alleges handicapped discrimination in derogation of 29 U.S.C. § 794.

The remaining six counts implicate state law, and the parties (who agree on little else) concur that Rhode Island law governs in this diversity case. The state law claims possess a variety of characteristics. Two of these initiatives are contract-based: Count I alleges nonperformance of an agreement to educate and Count II asserts breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Three of the remaining state law initiatives are tort-based: Counts III and VIII posit intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, respectively; and Count IV remonstrates against a perceived invasion of Russell's privacy. Count V — which seeks redress for wrongful dismissal — is a contract/tort hybrid.

It is alleged throughout that the plaintiff lost a year of prospective employment in a job which she claims to have been offered contingent upon successful completion of her nursing degree. Russell seeks compensatory damages for this delay and for the physical and emotional trauma which she purportedly suffered as a result of what she views as the callous, humiliating, and wrongful conduct of the several defendants. The plaintiff also prays for exemplary damages, counsel fees, and costs.⁴

The court will first address the impact of the...