Russell v. Salve Regina College

• Decision Date: 11 July 1991
• Docket Number: 89-1597,Nos. 89-1564,s. 89-1564
• Citation: 938 F.2d 315
• Parties: 68 Ed. Law Rep. 982 Sharon L. RUSSELL, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. SALVE REGINA COLLEGE, Defendant, Appellant. Sharon L. RUSSELL, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SALVE REGINA COLLEGE, et al., Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 315

938 F.2d 315

68 Ed. Law Rep. 982

Sharon L. RUSSELL, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. SALVE REGINA COLLEGE, Defendant, Appellant.

Sharon L. RUSSELL, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SALVE REGINA COLLEGE, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

Nos. 89-1564, 89-1597.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Submitted June 6, 1991.

Decided July 11, 1991.

Steven E. Snow and Partridge, Snow & Hahn, on brief, Providence, R.I., for Salve Regina College, et als.

Edward T. Hogan and Hogan & Hogan, on brief, East Providence, R.I., for Sharon L. Russell.

Before TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, and TIMBERS, ^* and BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judges.

TIMBERS, Circuit Judge:

On March 20, 1991, the Supreme Court entered judgment, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991), reversing our opinion and judgment dated November 20, 1990, 890 F.2d 484, and remanding the case to us for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court opinion.

In our previous opinion, we affirmed the judgment of the district court and held, "[i]n view of the customary appellate deference accorded to interpretations of state law made by federal judges of that state," that the "district court's determination that the Rhode Island Supreme Court would apply standard contract principles" to the contract at issue between a college and a nursing student "was not reversible error." Id. at 489.

The Supreme Court directed us to review the question of Rhode Island contract law de novo, holding that:

"The obligation of responsible appellate review and the principles of a cooperative judicial federalism ... require that courts of appeals review the state-law determinations of district courts de novo. The Court of Appeals in this case therefore erred in deferring to the local expertise of the District Court."

111 S.Ct. at 1225.

We conclude, having now reviewed the district court's analysis de novo, that the district court correctly held that the Rhode Island Supreme Court would have applied the doctrine of substantial performance to the contract at issue in this case.

For the reasons which follow, therefore, our previous judgment affirming the judgment of the district court is reinstated and our previous opinion is reinstated as modified.

I.

We shall summarize only those facts and prior proceedings believed necessary to an understanding of the issues raised on this remand from the Supreme Court.

Salve Regina College ("Salve Regina" or the "College") admitted Sharon Russell under an early admissions plan. In her application, Russell stated her weight to be 280 pounds. From the outset, she made it clear that her goal was admission to the College's Nursing Program. She was accepted into that program in 1983, the start of her sophomore year.

In the fall of 1984, the start of Russell's junior year, the College began pressuring her to lose weight. The College tried to get Russell to sign a "contract" stating that she would attend Weight Watchers, a weight-loss program, and to prove it by submitting an attendance record. Russell offered to try to attend weekly but refused to sign a written promise. She apparently did attend Weight Watchers regularly but did not lose significant weight. One of her clinical instructors gave her a failing grade in the first semester of her junior year for reasons which the jury found were related to her weight rather than her performance.

According to the rules of the Nursing Program, failure in a clinical course generally resulted in expulsion from the program. School officials, however, offered Russell a deal whereby she would sign a weight-loss "contract" similar to the one she had rejected earlier, but with the additional provision that she must lose at least two pounds per week to remain in good standing at the College. The "contract" provided that the penalty for failure to comply would be immediate withdrawal from the program. Confronting the choice of signing the contract or being expelled, Russell signed the contract.

Russell apparently complied with the terms of the weight-loss agreement during the second semester of her junior year by attending Weight Watchers weekly and submitting proof of attendance, but she failed to lose two pounds per week. She nevertheless was allowed to complete her junior year.

During the following summer, however, Russell apparently did not maintain satisfactory contact with College officials regarding her weight-loss efforts, nor did she lose any additional weight. She was asked to withdraw "voluntarily" from the Nursing Program prior to her senior year and did so. She transferred to a nursing program at another school and, because of that school's two-year residency requirement, was compelled to repeat her junior year. Russell completed her college education successfully in 1987 and is now a registered nurse.

Soon after her departure from Salve Regina, she commenced the instant action. The district court judge originally assigned to the case granted summary judgment to the College on five counts of Russell's original complaint. Trial proceeded on the remaining counts. The district court then entered a directed verdict for the College on Russell's invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, but allowed her breach of contract claim to go to the jury. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Russell on the contract claim which is the only one involved on this remand.

In its original appeal to this court, the College did not dispute that a student-college relationship is essentially a contractual one. Rather, it challenged the district court's jury charge regarding the terms of the contract and the duties of the parties.

The district court, in its jury charge, had boiled the agreement between the parties down to one in which Russell was required to abide by disciplinary rules, pay tuition and maintain good academic standards, and the College was required to provide her with an education until graduation. The court also informed the jury that the agreement was modified by the weight-loss contract the parties signed during Russell's junior year. The jury was told that if Russell "substantially performed" her side of the bargain, the College's actions constituted a breach. The district court held that the Rhode Island Supreme Court would apply the substantial performance standard to the contract in question.

The jury found that Salve Regina had breached its contract with Russell by expelling her. The court entered judgment on the verdict, denying the College's motions for judgment n.o.v. and for a new trial. The court also denied Salve Regina's motion for remittitur of the damages of

$30,513.40 plus interest, a total of $43,903.45, that the jury had awarded Russell.

On its initial appeal to this court, Salve Regina challenged the court's application of the substantial performance doctrine to the contract between Russell and the College. We affirmed, deferring to the district court's contract analysis.

On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, the College asserted that we had erred in deferring to the district court's determination of state law. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that "a court of appeals should review de novo a district court's determination of state law." 111 S.Ct. at 1221. It is that review to which we now turn.

II.

(A)

The doctrine of substantial performance "is one that has played a part in the enforcement of contracts and in the statement of contract law." 3A Corbin, Corbin on Contracts Sec. 700, at 308 (1960). "When a contract has been made for an agreed exchange of two performances, one of which is to be rendered first, the rendition of one substantially in full is a constructive condition precedent to the duty of the other party to render his part of the exchange." Id. at 309.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court specifically has applied this doctrine in the construction contract context. DiMario v. Heeks, 116 R.I. 44, 351 A.2d 837 (R.I.1976). In that case, quoting Corbin, supra, at Sec. 704, the court explained that ...