Russell v. State

• Decision Date: 30 June 1931
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 882.
• Citation: 24 Ala.App. 496,137 So. 460
• Parties: RUSSELL v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals

137 So. 460

24 Ala.App. 496

RUSSELL v. STATE.

6 Div. 882.

Court of Appeals of Alabama

June 30, 1931

Rehearing Granted Aug. 4, 1931.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 6, 1931.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; J. Russell McElroy Judge.

George W. Russell was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he appeals.

Reversed and cause remanded on rehearing.

Certiorari denied by Supreme Court in Russell v. State, 137 So 462.

Taylor & Higgins and Chas. W. Greer, all of Birmingham, for appellant.

Thos. E. Knight, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Jas. L Screws, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

RICE J.

Appellant, tried under an indictment charging murder in the first degree, was convicted of the offense of murder in the second degree, and his punishment fixed at imprisonment in the penitentiary for the term of ten years. Testimony for the state tended to show that appellant, who was not presently living with his wife, Rose Russell, appeared at her home near one midnight, and demanded an interview with her; that Rose, talking through a closed screen door, refused any further interview at that time than such as she was having, and closed the wooden front door in the face of appellant; that he thereupon cut the screen in the screen door, smashed the glass in the wooden door, and proceeded to shoot down and kill, without cause, one Alfred Howard Turner, said Rose's companion, and, inferentially, the reason for her denying entrance to appellant, though her stated reason was that appellant was "drinking," etc.

Appellant rested his defense upon an "alibi," and offered testimony tending to show that he was not present at the time and place of the shooting of Turner, the deceased; knew nothing about it; had nothing to do with it, etc.

We have given careful study to the entire record, including the bill of exceptions, but are persuaded that the only questions meriting any mention by us are among those treated in the elaborate briefs-two of them-filed here on behalf of appellant, by his careful and painstaking counsel.

Appellant's written, requested charges 10, 17, and 19 were properly refused because the substance of each of them was given to the jury in other charges. Code 1923, § 9509.

His written, requested charges 8, 21, 22, and 32 were each properly refused because not based upon a consideration of all the evidence in the case. Hadley v. State, 23 Ala. App. 382, 125 So. 899; Rikard v. State, 209 Ala. 480, 96 So. 412.

Appellant's written, requested charges 9, 28, and 30 were each properly refused because authorizing an "acquittal" upon the doubt, etc., of a single juror. Hudson v. State, 217 Ala. 479, 116 So. 800.

His written, requested charge 15 was properly refused. It states an incorrect proposition of law. McGrew v. State, 21 Ala. App. 266, 107 So. 328.

We, of course, are not to be understood as saying that there are, or are not, other objections to any one of appellant's written, requested, and refused charges hereinabove discussed than the specific one pointed out by us.

The issues, few in number, made by the evidence, were manifestly for the jury to decide. Hence the general affirmative charges, to find in appellant's favor, which he requested, were refused without error.

Deceased, Turner, was grievously wounded by a pistol shot at approximately midnight Saturday night. He died late on the following Monday. At about 2 o'clock Sunday morning he stated to his brother that he was "feeling very bad." He said: "Well, I don't think there is any chance for me because I am paralyzed from my hip down."

Testimony by the brother, above, was admitted, over appellant's objection, as to the statement-"dying statement"-made by the deceased immediately following his language we have quoted. In admitting this testimony, we hold the court did not err.

The language used by the said Turner, later deceased, and the circumstances surrounding him at the time, are not distinguishable, in principle, from those present in the case of McQueen v. State, 94 Ala. 50, 10 So. 433, which the Supreme Court held a proper predicate for the admission in evidence of testimony as to a "dying statement." So we follow. Code 1923, § 7318. And see Sanders v. State, 2 Ala. App. 13, 56 So. 69, and McMillan v. State, 16 Ala. App. 148, 75 So. 824.

There was no error in refusing to allow the questions to Rose Russell, on her cross-examination, as to whether or not she had been convicted in the federal court of "violating the liquor law." Such violations did not involve moral turpitude, and testimony concerning them was not admissible. Code 1923, § 7722; Ex parte Marshall (Marshall v. State), 207 Ala. 566, 93 So. 471, 25 A. L. R. 338.

A considerable measure of discretion must necessarily be, and is, reposed in the trial judge, as to the limits within which the cross-examination of witnesses-including defendants, when they take the stand to testify in their own behalves-may proceed. Fondren v. State, 204 Ala. 451, 86 So. 71. In the case here we discover no abuse of this discretion nor erroneous ruling in that regard.

There appears to us no occasion, in the light of the record before us, to apply here, as we are urged, the rule announced in Birmingham Baptist Hospital, Inc., v. Blackwell, 221 Ala. 225, 128 So. 389, 390, to wit: "New trial will be granted if counsel, disregarding court's rulings, persists in attempting to get incompetent evidence before jury to prejudice of unsuccessful party."

Omitting for the moment, any other phases of the conduct of the solicitor in repeating, in different forms, questions to which appellant's objections had been sustained,...