Russell v. Tyson Farms, Inc.

• Citation: 450 F.Supp.3d 1266
• Decision Date: 30 March 2020
• Docket Number: Case No.: 5:19-cv-1179-LCB
• Parties: Kathy RUSSELL; Tiffany Ashley; and Krystal Stasko, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TYSON FARMS, INC. d/b/a River Valley Ingredients ; Jason Spann; HydraService, Inc., and Jasper Water Works and Sewer Board, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

450 F.Supp.3d 1266

Kathy RUSSELL; Tiffany Ashley; and Krystal Stasko, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.TYSON FARMS, INC. d/b/a River Valley Ingredients ; Jason Spann; HydraService, Inc., and Jasper Water Works and Sewer Board, Inc., Defendants.

Case No.: 5:19-cv-1179-LCB

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Northeastern Division.

Signed March 30, 2020

Dennis E. Goldasich, Jr., Justin C. Owen, Goldasich & Associates LLC, Joshua M. Vick, Goldasich, Vick and Fulk, Birmingham, AL, Robert O. Bryan, Nelson Bryan & Jones, Jasper, AL, for Plaintiffs.

Angela Marie Schaefer, Scott B. Smith, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Huntsville, AL, Edward S. Sledge, IV, Kriston Laney Gifford, Zachary A. Madonia, Michael R. Pennington, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, James L. Noles, Jr., Spencer M. Taylor, Lisa Jane McCrary, Barze, Taylor, Noles, Lowther LLC, Douglas Matthew Centeno, R. Frank Springfield, Robert S. W, Given, Bryan O. Balogh, Burr & Forman LLP, James Thomas Burgess, Scott M. Roberts, Burgess Roberts LLC, Birmingham, AL, Albert Bower, Eric L. Samore, Erin A. Walsh, SmithAmundsen LLC, Chicago, IL, James C. Brakefield, Jackson Fikes Hood & Brakefield, Jasper, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LILES C. BURKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. Background

The complaint in this case was filed on July 24, 2019. By agreement of all parties, the present case was consolidated with Ashley, et al., v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 5:19-cv-1180-LCB, which was filed in this Court on the same day.¹ (Doc. 56). In the same order, this Court also stayed general discovery pending a ruling on the various motions to dismiss filed by the defendants. Before the Court is Defendant Jasper Water Works and Sewer Board's ("JWW") motion to dismiss. (Doc 9)² . The motion is fully briefed and is ripe for review. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that JWW's motion to dismiss is due to be DENIED .

A brief summary of the alleged facts is all that is necessary for the resolution of the present motion. The basis of the complaint is a wastewater spill that occurred on or about June 6, 2019, and the resulting contamination of portions of the Black Warrior River. The Plaintiffs, a proposed class, assert that they are individuals and businesses who were harmed by the spill. The Defendants are Tyson Farms, Inc., the owner of the food-processing facility at which the spill allegedly originated; Jason Spann, the manager of the plant in question; HydraService, Inc., the manufacturer of the equipment that allegedly failed and caused the spill; and JWW, a non-profit corporation that provided water to citizens of Walker County, Alabama.

The Plaintiffs have asserted various state law claims against the Defendants. According to the Plaintiffs, Tyson maintained multiple retention ponds on its property for the purpose of treating the wastewater generated by its food-processing operations. The Plaintiffs claim that a pipe, which was meant to transfer partially treated wastewater from one pond to another, failed or malfunctioned thereby causing untreated wastewater to spill into the river. Defendant HydraService is alleged to have manufactured and installed a defective pump which caused the pipe to fail. The Plaintiffs claim that JWW failed to properly notify them of the spill and failed to take proper measures to ensure their safety both before and after the spill.

II. JWW's Motion to Dismiss

In its motion to dismiss, JWW argues that the Plaintiffs' claims, all state law causes of action, are preempted by federal law. Specifically, JWW claims that the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f et seq, occupies the field of drinking-water regulation and leaves no room for regulation through state common law tort claims. JWW also contends that the Plaintiffs' claims are preempted because, it says, they conflict with the SDWA.

A. Legal Standards

JWW moves to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Generally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide " ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ). When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Brophy v. Jiangbo Pharms. Inc. , 781 F.3d 1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015). Generally, a complaint should include "enough information regarding the material elements of a cause of action to support recovery under some ‘viable legal theory.’ " Am. Fed'n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, Fla. , 637 F.3d 1178, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011), quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc. , 253 F.3d 678, 683–84 (11th Cir. 2001).

In Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , 785 F.3d 483, 485–87 (11th Cir. 2015), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court's dismissal of a case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), on preemption grounds and discussed preemption as follows:

"In pre-emption cases, the question is whether state law is pre-empted by a federal statute, or in some instances, a federal agency action."

POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca–Cola Co. , 573 U.S. 102, 134 S.Ct. 2228, 2236, 189 L.Ed.2d 141 (2014) (citingWyeth v. Levine , 555 U.S. 555, 563, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1193, 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009) ). The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides "the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. "[W]e have long recognized that state laws that conflict with federal law are without effect." Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good , 555 U.S. 70, 76, 129 S.Ct. 538, 543, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); seeBarnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson , 517 U.S. 25, 30, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 1107, 134 L.Ed.2d 237 (1996) ("[T]he Supremacy Clause requires courts to follow federal, not state, law.").

The Supreme Court has identified three circumstantial categories, where federal law preempts state law. First is express preemption, where Congress defines "explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law." English v. Gen. Electric Co. , 496 U.S. 72, 78, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2275, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990). "[W]hen Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the courts' task is an easy one." Id. at 79, 110 S.Ct. at 2275 ; seeChamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting , 563 U.S. 582, 592–95, 131 S.Ct. 1968, 1977, 179 L.Ed.2d 1031 (2011) (noting the plain wording of a federal statute "necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress' preemptive intent"); Fla. State Conference of NAACP v. Browning , 522 F.3d 1153, 1167 (11th Cir. 2008) ("Express preemption occurs when Congress manifests its intent to displace a state law using the text of a federal statute.").

Second is field preemption. English , 496 U.S. at 79, 110 S.Ct. at 2275. "[I]n the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is preempted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively." Id. , 110 S.Ct. at 2275.

Such an intent may be inferred from a "scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it," or where an Act of Congress "touches a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject."

Id. , 110 S.Ct. at 2275 (quotingRice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. , 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947) ) (alteration omitted). "Field preemption reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal standards." Arizona v. United States , 567 U.S. 387, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2502, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012).

Third is conflict preemption, which occurs when "state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law." English , 496 U.S. at 79, 110 S.Ct. at 2275. Conflict preemption exists "where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements or where state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’ " Id. , 110 S.Ct. at 2275 (quotingHines v. Davidowitz , 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941) ) (citations omitted). "[S]ince our decision in M'Culloch v. Maryland , 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), it has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is ‘without effect.’ " Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc. , 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana , 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 2128, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981) ); see Baptista v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. , 640 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 2011) (recognizing "the proper preemption test asks whether there is a significant conflict between the state and federal statutes—that is, the test for conflict preemption").

In the present case, JWW argues that the Plaintiffs' claims are subject to field preemption and conflict preemption. The Court now turns to JWW's arguments.

B. JWW's Arguments

a. The SDWA occupies the field and leaves no room for state common law claims.

JWW first argues that the Plaintiffs' claims are preempted because, it says, Congress intended to occupy the field of drinking-water regulation when it passed the SDWA. JWW contends that allowing a suit for common law tort claims would frustrate this purpose and, therefore, is preempted.

The primary case JWW relies on in support of that argument is Mattoon v. City of Pittsfield , 980 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992), in which the...