Russell v. Williams

Citation24 Cal.Rptr. 859,58 Cal.2d 487,374 P.2d 827
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
Decision Date04 October 1962
Parties, 374 P.2d 827 Dorothy RUSSELL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. R. E. WILLIAMS, as Administrator, etc., Defendant and Respondent. L. A. 26901.

Johnson, Thorne, Speed & Bamford, Arthur L. Johnson, San Jose, and Lee Newfield, for plaintiff and appellant.

Alden Reid, San Brenardino, for defendant and respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals from an adverse judgment in her action to recover from the estate of her former husband the proceeds of a fire insurance policy. A hearing was granted by this court, after decision by the District Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, for the purpose of giving further study to the problems presented. After such study we have concluded that the opinion of the District Court of Appeal, prepared by Mr. Justice Coughlin and concurred in by Presiding Justice Griffin and by Justice Shepard, correctly treats and disposes of the issues involved, and it is therefore, with certain further comments pertinent to contentions urged, adopted as the opinion of this court. Such opinion (with appropriate deletions and additions as indicated) is as follows: 1

The issue on this appeal is whether a surviving joint tenant may recover from the estate of a deceased joint tenant the proceeds of a fire insurance policy covering improvements on their joint-tenancy property, the policy ( ) (having been) issued to and paid for by the joint tenant who now is deceased, and the loss ( ) (having occurred) prior to his death.

This case was decided upon a stipulation of facts that: Dorothy Mouser, now Dorothy Russell, the plaintiff and appellant herein, and John Mouser, now deceased, whose estate is being administered by the defendant and respondent herein, while husband and wife, owned the subject property as joint tenants; in October 1957, Mrs. Mouser separated from Mr. Mouser and went to Nevada where she obtained a divorce on November 13th of that year; the divorce decree so obtained made no provision respecting any property rights of the parties and they did not enter into any property settlement agreement; the title to the subject property continued in joint tenancy and Mr. Mouser continued to live thereon until his death on June 3, 1958; in the interim, i. e., on November 29, 1957, he obtained a policy of fire insurance covering the improvements on that property, which was issued to him as the sole insured, the premiums being paid from his separate funds; no agreement existed between Mr. and Mrs. Mouser respecting the placing of any fire insurance upon the premises nor concerning the disposition of the proceeds of any such policy, and the subject policy was issued without her knowledge; about six weeks prior to Mr. Mouser's death, the improvements in question were destroyed by fire, and thereafter the proceeds of the policy, representing the full value of the destroyed premises, were paid to the administrator of his estate.

Mrs. Mouser became the sole owner of the property and brought this action to recover the proceeds in question, alleging that the defendant estate became 'indebted to plaintiff for moneys had and received for the use and benefit of plaintiff.'

Primarily, the plaintiff's claim is based on the contention that the moneys paid by the insurance company under the subject policy constituted proceeds of the property that was destroyed and retains the character of that property. This is a false premise.

It is a principle of long standing that a policy of fire insurance does not insure the property covered thereby, but is a personal contract indemnifying the insured against loss resulting from the destruction of or damage to his interest in that property. (Alexander v. Security-First Nat. Bank (1936), 7 Cal.2d 718, 722-723(2) (62 P.2d 735); Corder v. McDougall (1932), 216 Cal. 773, 774(1) (16 P.2d 740); Davis v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (1896), 111 Cal. 409, 414-415 (43 P. 1115); Fred A. Chapin Lumber Co. v. Lumber Bargains, Inc. (1961), 189 Cal.App.2d 613, 617(2) (11 Cal.Rptr. 634); cf. Sievers v. Union Assur. Soc. of London (1912), 20 Cal.App. 250, 251 (128 P. 771); Murray v. Webster (1951), 256 Ala. 248 (54 So.2d 505, 508(3)).) This principle gives rise to the supplemental rule that, in the absence of a special contract, the proceeds of a fire insurance policy are not a substitute for the property the loss of which is the subject of indemnity. (Alexander v. Security-First Nat. Bank, supra, 7 Cal.2d 718, 722(2), 62 P.2d 735; Corder v. McDougall, supra, 216 Cal. 773, 774(1), 16 P.2d 740; Walsh v. Tadlock (9 Cir., 1939), 104 F.2d 131, 132; Montgomery v. Hart (1932), 225 Ala. 471 (144 So. 101, 102(1)); Langford v. Searcy College (1094), 73 Ark. 211 (83 S.W. 944, 946); Ketcham v. Ketcham (1915), 269 I11. 584 (109 N.E. 1025, 1027 (2)); Crook v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1935), 175 S.C. 42 (178 S.E. 254, 257(3)); Steinmeyer v. Steinmeyer (1092), 64 S.C. 413 (42 S.E. 184, 186, 59 A.L.R. 319); Graham v. American Fire Ins. Co. (1897), 48 S.C. 195 (26 S.E. 323, 332, 59 Am.St.Rep. 707).) In Spalding v. Miller (1898), 103 Ky. 405 (45 S.W. 462, 464) the court said, with respect to the payments made under such a policy: 'The sum paid 'is in no proper or just sense the proceeds of the property. '' (See also Anderson v. Quick (1912) 163 Cal. 658, 662, 126 P. 871; Benton v. Cravens, Dargan & Co. (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 637, 642-643(3), 10 Cal.Rptr. 740.) As a consequence, the plaintiff has no claim to the proceeds of the insurance paid to Mr. Mouser's estate upon the ground that they are proceeds of the joint-tenancy property of which she now is sole owner.

There are instances where, because of contractual provisions or equitable considerations, the insured holds the proceeds of a fire insurance policy in trust for or otherwise subject to the claim of others who have an interest in the property covered by the subject policy. (Alexander v. Security-First Nat. Bank (1936), supra, 7 Cal.2d 718, 726(7), 62 P.2d 735; Hawes v. Lathrop (1869), 38 Cal. 493 (497-498); Fred A. Chapin Lumber Co. v. Lumber Bargains, Inc. (1961), supra, 189 Cal.App.2d 613, 617(3), 11 Cal.Rptr. 634; Rogge v. Menard County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. (D.C. 1960), 184 F.Supp. 289, 295; Crook v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1935), supra, (S.C.) 178 S.E. 254, 258(4); Gibbes Machinery Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. (1922), 119 S.C. 1 (111 S.E. 805, 21 A.L.R. 1460).) However, unless the insured has an obligation to insure, or equitable considerations are present, the proceeds of a policy issued to and paid for by the named insured on his separate insurable interest are not subject to the claims of others who also have an interest in the property covered by the policy. (Alexander v. Security-First Nat. Bank (1936), supra, 7 Cal.2d 718, 726(7-8), 62 P.2d 735; Corder v. McDougall (1932), supra, 216 Cal. 773, 16 P.2d 740; Board of Education v. Winding Gulf Collieries (4 Cir., 1945), 152 F.2d 382, 384(2); Montgomery v. Hart (1932), supra, 225 Ala. 471 (144 So. 101, 102(1)); Farmers' Mut. Fire & Lightning Ins. Co. v. Crowley (1945), 354 Mo. 649 (190 S.W.2d 250, 252 (2-3)); Underwood v. Fortune (1928) (Mo.App.) 9 S.W.2d 845, 846 (1).)

There is no obligation upon the part of one cotenant to insure the other cotenant against loss of the latter's interest in their jointly owned property. (Oglesby v. Hollister (1888), 76 Cal. 136, 140 (18 P. 146, 9 Am.St.Rep. 177); Murray v. Webster (1951) supra, 256 Ala. 248 (54 So.2d 505, 508(3)); Bell v. Barefield (1929), 219 Ala. 319 (122 So. 318, 319(2)); cf. In re Cochran's Real Estate (1949), 31 Del. Ch. 545 (66 A.2d 497, 500(13); Schilbach v. Schilbach (1937), 171 Md. 405 (189 A. 432, 434).) As to this matter there is no distinction between the various types of cotenancy. Analogously it has been held that there is no duty upon a life tenant to insure for the benefit of the remaindermen. (Corder v. McDougall (1932), supra, 216 Cal. 773, 775, 16 P.2d 740; Harrison v. Pepper (1896) 166 Mass. 288 (44 N.E. 222, 33 L.R.A. 239); Geddes v. Congdon (1928), 262 Mass. 294 (159 N.E. 915, 916 (2)); Farmers' Mut. Fire & Lightning Ins. Co. v. Crowley (1945), supra, (Mo.) 190 S.W.2d 250, 253 (5).) Cases to the contrary from other jurisdictions, which have been cited by the plaintiffs, are not controlling.

Following the rules heretofore stated, the right of one cotenant to recover the proceeds of a policy of insurance issued to another cotenant has been denied. (Bell v. Barefield (1929), supra, 219 Ala. 319 (122 So. 318, 319); Herrington v. Herrington (1929), 40 Ga.App. 652 (151 S.E. 114); Crabtree v. Maupin Seed Co. (1927) (Mo.App.) 294 S.W. 433, 435; Annely v. De Saussure (1887), 26 S.C. 497 (2 S.E. 490, 495, 4 Am.St.Rep. 725); Newsome v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. (1960), (Tex.Civ.App.) 331 S.W.2d 497; cf. Conley v. Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York (D.C.1952), 102 F.Supp. 474; Murray v. Webster (1951), supra, 256 Ala. 248 (54 So.2d 505, 508); Ritson v. Atlas Assur. Co. (1930), 272 Mass. 73 (171 N.E. 448).) The same ruling has been applied as between a life tenant and a remainderman (Corder v. McDougall (1932), supra, 216 Cal. 773, 16 P.2d 740; Board of Education v. Winding Gulf Collieries (1945), supra, 152 F.2d 382, 384(2); Harrison v. Pepper (1896), supra, 166 Mass. 288 (44 N.E. 222)); lessor and lessee (Alexander v. Security-First Nat. Bank (1936), supra, 7 Cal.2d 718, 723(3), 62 P.2d 735; mortgagor and mortgagee (see Alexander v. Security-First Nat. Bank, supra; Eagle Star & British Dominions v. Tadlock (D.C.1938), 22 F.Supp. 545, 547(6); White v. Gilman (1903), 138 Cal. 375 (377) (71 P. 436)); partners (American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Harrison (1947) (Tex.Civ.App.) 205 S.W.2d 417, 421); builder and owner (Anderson v. Quick (1912), 163 Cal. 658, 662 (126 P. 871)); and vendor and vendee (White v. Gilman, supra), subject to certain equitable considerations. (See Alexander v. Security-First Nat. Bank, supra, 7 Cal.2d 718,...

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