Russellville Flower Craft, Inc. v. Searcy

• Decision Date: 01 June 1984
• Citation: 452 So.2d 478
• Parties: RUSSELLVILLE FLOWER CRAFT, INC. v. Olen SEARCY. 82-1188.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 478

452 So.2d 478

RUSSELLVILLE FLOWER CRAFT, INC. v. Olen SEARCY.

82-1188.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 1, 1984.

William M. Bouldin of Guin, Bouldin & Alexander, Russellville, for appellant.

Eddie Beason of Fine & Associates, Russellville, for appellee.

EMBRY, Justice.

Appellant-defendant, Russellville Flower Craft, Inc. (Flower Craft), was found by a jury to be liable to appellee-plaintiff, Olen Searcy, for breach of a written contract for the lease of motor vehicles. Damages to Searcy were assessed by the jury and judgment was entered by the trial court in accordance with the jury's verdict. Flower Craft appeals from that judgment.

Facts

Olen Searcy began, in approximately 1954, to lease trucks to Flower Craft for the transportation of artificial flowers and floral supplies to various locations. During the period between 1954 and 1971, the parties operated pursuant to an oral contract. The parties first entered into a written contract in 1971. In October of 1973, Searcy and Flower Craft entered into a written agreement that Searcy provide for Flower Craft the use of six (6) vehicles. Payment to Searcy was to be made according to the mileage. The contract guaranteed mileage of 325,000 at a rate of twenty-six cents per mile with some provisions for fluctuations in fuel prices.

Flower Craft terminated the lease in October of 1974 when 281,076 miles had been logged on the trucks and paid for by Flower Craft. Searcy sued to recover monies he contended were due him under the guaranteed mileage clause.

At trial, the central dispute between the parties was whether the 1973 contract between Searcy and Flower Craft provided the trucks were to be used exclusively by Flower Craft. Flower Craft contended Searcy had breached their agreement by "backhauling," the practice of loading the trucks with goods belonging to other merchants for the return trips. Searcy contended the contract was not exclusive and allowed for this practice.

I

The first, and primary, issue raised by Flower Craft on appeal is whether the trial court erred by admitting extrinsic evidence to aid in the interpretation of the 1973 written contract.

It is axiomatic that rulings as to the admissibility of evidence rest largely within the discretion of the trial court. Such rulings will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a gross abuse of discretion. Dorcal, Inc. v. Xerox, 398 So.2d 665 (Ala.1981). We conclude that there was, in this case, no such abuse of discretion by the trial court.

While the trial court made no express finding that the contract was ambiguous, it, over objection by Flower Craft, allowed evidence regarding prior and subsequent contracts to be admitted to clarify the issue of exclusivity. In cases where there is no express finding by the trial court on a necessary matter, this court will presume such a finding was made if supported by the evidence. Matter of Estate of Amason, 369 So.2d 786 (Ala.1979); White v. White, 350 So.2d 326 (Ala.1977). The record reveals that, at least as to the practice of "backhauling," the 1973 contract was ambiguous.

The record further reveals that extrinsic evidence was admitted for a limited purpose and the jury was adequately instructed that that evidence was to be considered in order to determine the intention of the parties in entering into the 1973 contract, and only for that limited purpose. For instance, the jury was instructed as follows regarding their proper consideration of the 1971 contract offered by the plaintiff as evidence:

"There were 2 other contracts that were offered in evidence, and I want to instruct you that the case is based upon Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, that contract. There are 2 other contracts. There's Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, and Plaintiff's Exhibit 5. Ladies and gentlemen, I want to tell you that Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 was limited. That is, the contract dated January 1, 1971, and it is admitted into evidence for a very limited purpose. You are to consider that in the light of what was the dealings between the parties, what was there gives you some information concerning their background and their common in dealing with one another, but it is not what the lawsuit is based on. It is Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 that the lawsuit arises over, and so you are only to consider Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 for that limited purpose."

A more involved instruction was given the jury regarding the proper consideration of other extrinsic evidence admitted by the trial court:

"Ladies and gentlemen, there is here an issue concerning the interpretation of the contract, or what does it mean, or what do certain provisions of the contract mean. What did the parties intend when they entered into this contract? Obviously, the contract speaks for itself and is in evidence. Ladies and gentlemen, the intent of the parties to a contract is determined by considering the relationship of the parties and what they said and what they did in all the surrounding circumstances. You will consider the nature of the contract, facts and circumstances leading up to the execution and attending the execution of the contract. The relation and condition of the party. The nature and condition of the subject matter, and the apparent purpose for making the contract. From a careful consideration of all of these matters,...