RUST CONST. CO., INC. v. Martin

• Decision Date: 03 January 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-0428C(5).,91-0428C(5).
• Citation: 779 F. Supp. 1030
• Parties: RUST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., Jerry Rust, and Sandra Rust, Plaintiffs, v. Lynn MARTIN, Secretary of Labor, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

779 F. Supp. 1030

RUST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., Jerry Rust, and Sandra Rust, Plaintiffs, v. Lynn MARTIN, Secretary of Labor, Defendant.

No. 91-0428C(5).

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, E.D.

January 3, 1992.

Susman, Schermer, Rimmel & Shifrin, Ross A. Friedman, St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiffs.

Wesley D. Wedemeyer, Asst. U.S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., Gerald Krizan, Executive Secretary, Wage Appeals Bd., Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C., for defendant.

LIMBAUGH, District Judge.

MEMORANDUM

This lawsuit, brought pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., seeks review and reversal of a 1987 decision by the Wage Appeals Board (WAB) of the United States Department of Labor. The WAB's decision reversed an earlier decision by a Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) not to debar the plaintiffs from future government contracts. The WAB instead debarred the plaintiffs from federal contracts for one year effective June 26, 1990. Although the plaintiffs concede the violations, have paid the back wages owed, and the debarment period has expired, they seek de novo review by this Court of the WAB's debarment decision and to have the debarment expunged from their record. Plaintiffs' filed a motion for summary judgment on June 4, 1991. On August 19, 1991 the defendant filed her response to the plaintiff's summary judgment motion and filed her own summary judgment motion. As of this date, plaintiffs have not responded to the defendant's summary judgment motion.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), a district court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 488, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962). In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of any inferences that can logically be drawn from those facts. Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844, 846 (8th Cir.1983). The court is required to resolve all conflicts of evidence in favor of the non-moving party. Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chem. Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 210 (8th Cir.1976).

A review of the parties' pleadings and the official administrative record reveals that the facts of this case are undisputed. What appears to be in dispute is whether or not the plaintiffs should have been debarred. The plaintiffs contend that the WAB improperly reversed the decision of the ALJ, and seek a de novo review by this Court of the WAB's decision. The defendant contends that the WAB was well within its rights to reverse the ALJ and impose a one-year debarment upon the plaintiffs. The Secretary opines that the correct standard of review by this Court is whether or not the WAB's decision was arbitrary or capricious in that it lacked a rational basis in fact or law.

The plaintiffs' assert that the recent case of Miree Construction Corp. v. Dole, 930 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir.1991) mandates that this Court conduct a de novo review of the WAB's decision. They believe that under Miree the agency is entitled to significant deference only if its decision reflects validity and consistency based upon the agency's prior rulings. The plaintiffs contend that under this standard of review, this Court must reverse the WAB because they believe the decision of the WAB "stands in sharp contrast to prior decisions which interpret "willfull" violations of the Davis-Bacon related acts."

The Court has reviewed the Miree case and finds it inapplicable to the case at hand. Furthermore, even if Miree were controlling, the Court finds that the WAB's decision in the present matter was consistent with prior and subsequent decisions in similar situations.

The Court finds the appropriate standard of review for the WAB's debarment ruling is the Administrative Procedure Act's arbitrary or capricious standard. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See also, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-414, 91 S.Ct. 814, 822-23, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). This standard of review is extremely...