Rust v. Grammer
| Decision Date | 02 November 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-2023,87-2023 |
| Citation | 858 F.2d 411 |
| Parties | John RUST, Donald M. Hurley, Jeffrey Benzel, C. Michael Anderson, Appellants, v. Gary GRAMMER, Individually and as Warden of Nebraska State Penitentiary; Harold W. Clarke, Individually and as Associate Warden of Custody; Angelo Vinci, Individually and as Adjustment Center Lieutenant, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Kenneth C. Stephan, Lincoln, Neb., for appellants.
Linda L. Willard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lincoln, Neb., for appellees.
Before ARNOLD and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges, and TIMBERS, * Senior Circuit Judge.
John Rust, Donald M. Hurley, Jeffrey Benzel, and C. Michael Anderson appeal from a district court 1 judgment in favor of Nebraska State Penitentiary officials (prison officials) in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. We affirm.
On May 22, 1985, Warden Gary Grammer ordered a lockdown of the maximum security cells in the Nebraska State Penitentiary's adjustment center to regain control of a progressively disruptive situation. For several months, inmates had been setting fires and throwing food, urine, and feces into the gallery and onto the guards. All of the inmates except those in cells A-1 to A-5, who were housed in the adjustment center for nondisciplinary reasons, were subject to the lockdown.
Prison officials conducted a shakedown of the cells, in which all personal items were removed from the cells and inventoried. Three homemade knives were found. Each inmate was allowed to retain bedding and one prison jumpsuit. Benzel was not issued a jumpsuit and was clothed only in a pair of boxer shorts throughout the nine-day lockdown. The inmates were served two cold sandwiches three times a day and had only tap water from their cells to drink. These dietary restrictions allegedly caused the inmates to lose weight and suffer from stomach cramps, constipation, weakness, nausea, and chills. Additionally, exercise in the yard, showers, laundry service, and visiting privileges were cancelled.
Appellants challenged the application of these restrictions to them because they had not participated in the disturbances. They alleged that the lockdown violated their state-created liberty interests protected by the fourteenth amendment and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The district court ruled that neither a due process nor an eighth amendment violation had occurred.
Although prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage, a liberty interest subject to the protection of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment arises when a state enacts laws or promulgates regulations that contain language requiring that prison officials "must" or "shall" employ certain procedures and specifies that the particular sanction or benefit involved in a given case not be imposed or granted absent certain substantive predicates. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72, 103 S.Ct. 864, 871, 74 L.Ed.2d 615 (1983); Clark v. Brewer, 776 F.2d 226, 230 (8th Cir.1985). Appellants contend that a Nebraska statute and a prison regulation create a liberty interest to be free from the deprivations that occurred during the lockdown.
Neb.Rev.Stat. Sec. 83-4,114 provides in pertinent part:
There shall be no corporal punishment or disciplinary restrictions on diet. Disciplinary restrictions on clothing, bedding, mail, visitations, use of toilets, washbowls, or scheduled showers shall be imposed only for abuse of such privilege or facility. * * * This provision shall not apply to segregation or isolation of persons for purposes of institutional control.
Similarly, Nebraska Department of Correctional Services Rule 6(10)(b) provides in relevant part that "[r]estrictions on clothing, bedding, mail, visitations, use of toilets, wash bowls, or scheduled showers shall be imposed only for abuse of such privileges or facilities."
The district court ruled that the statute and the regulation quoted above were inapplicable because the restrictions imposed during the lockdown were not "disciplinary" in nature, but "were for the purpose of forcing immediate compliance with prison rules in order to maintain institutional safety and security." Mem. Op. at 6. The court reasoned that all discussion of discipline in the rules concerns infractions by specifically identified inmates who are charged with an offense and face possible punishment after notice and a hearing. Similarly, the statute addresses infractions of rules that result in the filing of a disciplinary report on an individual inmate's misbehavior. In contrast, the lockdown was imposed as a security measure to resolve a disturbance posing risks to the safety of inmates and prison staff. Because the district court determined that the rule and the statute were inapplicable, it did not address whether they created a liberty interest.
Appellants argue that the district court's narrow definition of the term "discipline" is contrary to accepted principles of statutory construction and to the evidence in this case. In support of their position that the lockdown was disciplinary in nature, appellants point out that the restrictions were not imposed on the inmates in the first five cells, who were housed in the adjustment center for nondisciplinary reasons. Appellants also contend that because none of them participated in any of the disturbances, the deprivations exceeded what was necessary for institutional control.
After reviewing the district court's well-reasoned analysis, we hold that it correctly determined that the lockdown was imposed as a security measure rather than as a disciplinary measure, and we agree that the statute and the rule that the inmates contend created a liberty interest are inapplicable. See Jones v. Mabry, 723 F.2d 590, 594 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228, 104 S.Ct. 2683, 81 L.Ed.2d 878 (1984). Prison officials...
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