Rust v. Missouri Dental Board

• Decision Date: 22 August 1941
• Docket Number: 37048
• Citation: Rust v. Missouri Dental Board, 348 Mo. 616, 155 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. 1941)
• Parties: In the Matter of A. J. Rust, Appellant, v. Missouri Dental Board
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

155 S.W.2d 80

348 Mo. 616

In the Matter of A. J. Rust, Appellant, v. Missouri Dental Board

No. 37048

Supreme Court of Missouri

August 22, 1941

Rehearing Denied October 25 1941.

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. Harry F Russell, Judge.

Affirmed.

Joe E. Burris for appellant.

(1) The court erred in holding that appellant was guilty of unprofessional conduct in the practice of the profession of dentistry and in revoking appellant's license and certificate of registration to practice dentistry in Missouri, and in sustaining specifications 1, 2, 4 and 7 of the complaint because the portions of Section 13566 (Laws 1937, p. 486) setting forth the offenses purported to be covered by specifications 1, 2, 4 and 7 of the complaint to-wit: "Advertising, directly or indirectly, prices for professional services; advertising, directly or indirectly by means of large display, glaring light sign, or containing as a part thereof the representation of a tooth, teeth bridgework or any portion of the human head; employing or making use of, directly or indirectly, advertising solicitors or free publicity press agents;" are void and in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 30, Article II, of the Constitution of Missouri, in that they are so general, vague, indefinite and uncertain as to prevent persons from knowing the meaning thereof and the inhibitions thereby intended and in that they fail to set a comprehensive standard or rule or criterion of innocence or guilt and therefore delegate to the Missouri Dental Board and to the courts the task and liberty of fixing, setting and making a standard or rule or criterion of innocence or guilt. (a) A license or right to practice the profession of dentistry is a valuable right which cannot be taken away without due process of law. State ex rel. Spriggs v. Robinson, 253 Mo. 271, 161 S.W. 1169; State ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 304 Mo. 607, 264 S.W. 678; Chenoweth v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 141 P. 132. (b) Section 13566 (Laws 1937, p. 486) insofar as it authorizes the revocation of licenses and the right to practice the profession of dentistry, is a penal law and as such is subject to the rule of strict construction. Sec. 13566, Laws 1937, p. 486; State ex rel. Spriggs v. Robinson, 253 Mo. 271, 161 S.W. 1169; State ex rel. Wolfe v. Mo. Dental Board, 282 Mo. 292, 221 S.W. 70; State ex rel. Johnson v. Clark, 288 Mo. 659, 232 S.W. 1031; Abrams v. Jones, 207 P. 724. (c) Section 13566 (Laws 1937, p. 486) under which the court pretended to act is a quasi-criminal statute and the provisions thereof, on which the court pretended to act, are so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to make them void and violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 30, Article II of the Constitution of Missouri. Sec. 13566, Laws 1937, p. 486; Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Sec. 13577, Laws 1937, p. 491; Ex parte Taft, 284 Mo. 531, 225 S.W. 457; C. & N.W. Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 280 F. 387; General Construction Co. v. Commissioners, 269 U.S. 385; Glendale Coal Co. v. Douglas, 137 N.E. 615; United States v. Capitol Traction Co., 34 App. D. C. 592. (2) The court erred in holding that appellant was guilty of unprofessional conduct in the practice of the profession of dentistry and in revoking appellant's license and certificate of registration to practice dentistry in Missouri and in sustaining specifications 1, 2, 4 and 7 of the complaint because specifications 1, 2, 4 and 7 of the complaint are so general, vague, indefinite and uncertain that they fail to state facts apprising appellant of the cause and nature of the accusation against him and therefore relegate him to conjecture and speculation to determine what evidence he would be called upon to meet at the trial, thus violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 30, Article II of the Constitution of Missouri, and because specifications 1, 2, 4 and 7 of the complaint fail to state facts sufficient to show the commission of an offense against the law or to give the Missouri Dental Board and the court jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof and the order revoking appellant's right to practice dentistry is therefore void. (a) Pleading in the language of the statute, as was done in this case, is not sufficient to charge an offense. Sec. 13566, Laws 1937, p. 486; State v. Asher, 216 S.W. 1013; State v. Maher, 124 S.W.2d 679. (b) The complaint under which the court issued its order or judgment revoking appellant's right to practice dentistry is so general, vague, indefinite and uncertain that it fails to apprise appellant of the cause and nature of the accusation against him and therefore deprives him of the due process of law. State ex rel. Inscho v. Mo. Dental Board, 339 Mo. 547, 98 S.W.2d 606; State ex rel. Lentine v. State Board of Health, 334 Mo. 220, 65 S.W.2d 943: Abrams v. Jones, 207 P. 721; Board of Medical Examiners v. Eisen, 123 P. 52; Klafter v. Board of Examiners of Architects, 259 Ill. 15, 102 N.E. 193; In re Baum, 32 Idaho 676, 186 P. 927; Kalman v. Wash, 355 Ill. 341, 129 N.E. 315; State v. Maher, 124 S.W.2d 679; State ex rel. Sbordy v. Rowlett, 170 So. 311. (c) Specifications 1, 2, 4 and 7 of the complaint fail to state facts sufficient to show any violation of law or the commission of an offense and the court was without jurisdiction to revoke appellant's right to practice dentistry. Walrath v. Crary, 222 S.W. 895; Kalman v. Walsh, 355 Ill. 341, 129 N.E. 315; Dyment v. Board of Medical Examiners, 207 P. 409. (d) The jurisdiction of the circuit court is derivative of the Missouri Dental Board and the circuit court had jurisdiction in ths case for the sole and only purpose of directing a dismissal of the complaint. Sec. 13566, Laws 1937, p. 486; Kansas City Sanitary Co. v. Laclede County, 307 Mo. 10, 269 S.W. 395. (3) The court erred in overruling appellant's motion to dismiss the complaint because said complaint wholly fails to state facts sufficient to show an offense against Section 13566, Laws 1937, and because said complaint fails to state facts giving the court jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof, and because the allegations of the complaint are so vague, indefinite and uncertain that they fail to inform appellant of the cause and nature of the accusation against him and thus deprives him of the due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 30, Article II of the Constitution of Missouri, and because the provisions of Section 13566, Laws 1937, on which this proceeding is based, to-wit: "Advertising, directly or indirectly, prices for professional services; advertising, directly or indirectly, by means of large display, glaring light sign, or containing as a part thereof the representation of a tooth, teeth, bridge work or any portion of the human head; employing or making use of, directly or indirectly, advertising solicitors or free publicity press agents;" are so general, vague, indefinite and uncertain that they fail to set a comprehensive standard, rule or criterion of innocence or guilt and are void and for the same reason are in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 30, Article II of the Constitution of Missouri. State ex rel. Spriggs v. Robinson, 253 Mo. 271, 161 S.W. 1169; State ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 304 Mo. 607, 264 S.W. 687; Chenoweth v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 141 P. 132; Sec. 13566, Laws 1937, p. 486; State ex rel. Wolfe v. Mo. Dental Board, 282 Mo. 292, 221 S.W. 70; State ex rel. Johnson v. Clark, 288 Mo. 659, 232 S.W. 1031; Abrams v. Jones, 207 P. 724; Bouvier's Law Dictionary; Sec. 13577, Laws 1937, p. 491; Ex parte Taft, 284 Mo. 531, 225 S.W. 457; C. & N.W. Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 280 F. 387; General Construction Co. v. Commissioners, 269 U.S. 385; Glendale Coal Co. v. Douglas, 137 N.E. 615; United States v. Capitol Traction Co., 34 App. D. C. 592; State v. Asher, 216 S.W. 1013; State v. Maher, 124 S.W.2d 679; State ex rel. Inscho v. Mo. Dental Board, 339 Mo. 547, 98 S.W.2d 606; State ex rel. Lentine v. State Board of Health, 334 Mo. 220, 65 S.W.2d 943; Board of Medical Examiners v. Eisen, 123 P. 52; Klafter v. Board of Examiners of Architects, 259 Ill. 15, 102 N.E. 193; In re Baum, 32 Idaho 676, 186 P. 927; Kalman v. Walsh, 335 Ill. 341, 129 N.E. 315; State ex rel. Sbordy v. Rowlett, 170 So. 311; Walrath v. Crary, 222 S.W. 895; Dyment v. Board of Medical Examiners, 207 P. 409; Kansas City Sanitary Co. v. Laclede County, 307 Mo. 10, 269 S.W. 395. (4) The court erred in holding that appellant was guilty of unprofessional conduct in the practice of the profession of dentistry and in revoking appellant's license and certificate of registration to practice dentistry in Missouri and in sustaining specifications 1, 2, 4 and 7 of the complaint because the evidence offered at the trial was wholly insufficient to sustain the issues presented by said specifications of the complaint, and the evidence at the trial overwhelmingly preponderated in favor of appellant and the findings, judgment and decision of the court is against the weight of the evidence and is not supported by any substantial evidence and because the findings, decision and judgment of the court in sustaining specifications 1, 2, 4 and 7 of the complaint and in revoking appellant's license and certificate of registration to practice dentistry in Missouri under the evidence is erroneous in that it is the product of an inference based upon an inference in order to obtain a conclusion of...