Ruth v. State

Decision Date01 June 2000
Docket NumberNo. 259,259
PartiesJames E. RUTH, III. v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Michael R. Malloy, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellant.

Steven L. Holcomb, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Baltimore and M. Kenneth Long, Jr., State's Atty. for Washington County, Hagerstown, on the brief), for Appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and KENNEY and PAUL E. ALPERT (Ret'd, specially assigned), JJ. KENNEY, Judge.

Appellant, James E. Ruth, III, and co-defendant Christopher L. Brown were tried by a jury in the Circuit Court for Washington County for crimes relating to the theft of a vehicle. Both appellant and Mr. Brown were represented by the same attorney at trial. Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit theft of property valued at more than $300 and subsequently sentenced to fifteen years of imprisonment.1 Mr. Brown was convicted of conspiracy to commit theft of property valued at more than $300, four counts of theft of property valued at less than $300, and malicious destruction of property.2

Appellant asks two questions on appeal:

I. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain his conviction for conspiracy to commit theft of property valued at more than $300?

II. Did the trial court err in denying his motion for a new trial claiming 1) ineffective assistance of counsel, and 2) juror misconduct?

Finding no error, we shall affirm the judgments of the trial court.

FACTS

Sometime during the late evening of September 15, 1997, and the early morning of September 16, 1997, Julie and Tom Easterday's 1996 red Jeep Cherokee was stolen from their home in Hagerstown, Maryland. The couple bought the Jeep new in 1996 and paid approximately $22,000 for it. The Jeep was found the next day on cement blocks in a corn field near Hagerstown, stripped of its rims, tires, and radio. Missing from inside the Jeep were, among other things, two baby strollers and a crib.

Jeannie Stangle, who was eighteen years old at the time of trial, was the State's principal witness. She testified that on the night of September 15 and the early morning hours of September 16, she was "hanging out" with appellant, who was her friend. At some point, they drove to Christopher Brown's home and picked up Mr. Brown and Eric Seal. The four decided to drive around in appellant's Chevy Blazer. Because appellant was drunk, he asked Ms. Stangle to drive.

Ms. Stangle testified that, as she drove, the three men started talking about stealing a Jeep Cherokee. Appellant asked her to drive down a side street where they spotted a red Jeep Cherokee parked in the driveway of a house. She stopped the car and Mr. Brown and Mr. Seal exited the car with socks on their hands. About ten minutes later, Mr. Brown and Mr. Seal "[c]ame screaming around the corner with the Cherokee." Appellant directed her to drive behind the Jeep.

Ms. Stangle testified that over the next several hours she followed the Jeep to various locations. At one point, the Jeep stopped in a field. Appellant exited his car and walked over to the Jeep. Appellant took a stroller from the Jeep and threw it in a creek. While appellant took another stroller and portable crib from the Jeep and put it in the trunk of his car, Mr. Brown and Mr. Seal attempted to remove the stereo from the Jeep. Appellant then returned to his Blazer and Mr. Brown and Mr. Seal to the Jeep. They then drove to a tree nursery, retrieved some cement blocks, and put the Jeep on the blocks in a field. When the Jeep was up on the blocks, appellant and Mr. Brown removed the rims and tires from the Jeep. The three men then piled into the Blazer and left the area.

Five weeks after the theft of the Jeep, Ms. Stangle telephoned the Washington County Sheriff's Department and told the police about the theft. On December 9, a police investigator went to Mr. Seal's house and removed a stereo from his stepmother's car. Although the stereo's serial number and manufacturer number had been destroyed, the stereo was the same model as that taken from the Easterday's Jeep. Mr. Seal's stepmother testified that Chris Brown installed the stereo and had told her that he had bought the stereo at a flea market.

The essence of the defense was that Ms. Stangle was not a credible witness. Joseph Feizer, a friend of appellant's, testified that, about eight months after the Jeep was stolen, Ms. Stangle told him that she was trying to get both appellant and Mr. Brown in trouble. She explained to Mr. Feizer that she was mad at appellant and Mr. Brown because appellant told Mr. Brown that she had a venereal disease and Mr. Brown "wouldn't talk to her after that." Mr. Feizer testified that, in his opinion, Ms. Stangle was not a truthful person. Felicia Ann Sheridan testified that she and Ms. Stangle were friends. Ms. Sheridan testified that, about seven months after the Jeep was stolen, Ms. Stangle told her that she was mad at appellant for telling Mr. Brown that she had a venereal disease. Ms. Sheridan testified that Ms. Stangle told her that she was "going to set [appellant] and his two other friends up."

DISCUSSION
I.

Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for conspiracy to commit theft of property valued at $300 or more because Ms. Stangle's testimony was not credible. Appellant has failed to preserve this argument for our review.

Maryland Rule 4-324(a) provides, "A defendant may move for judgment of acquittal ... at the close of the evidence offered by the State and in a jury trial, at the close of all the evidence." A failure to move for judgment of acquittal at both the end of the State's case and, after presenting evidence, the end of the defense's case, results in a failure to preserve the issue for appellate review. Ennis v. State, 306 Md. 579, 583-87, 510 A.2d 573 (1986) (holding that although defendant moved for judgment of acquittal at the end of the State's case, he failed to move for judgment of acquittal after presenting his defense; thus, he failed to preserve his argument for appellate review); Dumornay v. State, 106 Md.App. 361, 375, 664 A.2d 469 (1995) (defendant failed to move for judgment of acquittal at close of all the evidence; therefore, the issue of sufficiency of the evidence was not properly before the appellate court); Briggs v. State, 90 Md.App. 60, 66, 599 A.2d 1221 (1992)

(failure to renew motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the defendant's case waives claim of legal insufficiency).

Here, appellant moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case, but appellant did not renew his motion after he presented his defense. Accordingly, by failing to move for judgment of acquittal after presenting his defense, appellant has failed to preserve his sufficiency argument for our review.

Even if he had preserved his argument for our review, we would find it without merit. Appellant's argument that Ms. Stangle was not a credible witness goes to the weight of the evidence, rather than its sufficiency. See Binnie v. State, 321 Md. 572, 580, 583 A.2d 1037 (1991)

. The jury was free to believe her testimony, believe only parts of her testimony, or disbelieve all of her testimony. See Muir v. State, 64 Md.App. 648, 654, 498 A.2d 666 (1985),

aff'd,

308 Md. 208, 517 A.2d 1105 (1986).

II.

Appellant also argues that the lower court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. The basis of appellant's motion was twofold: 1) that his attorney was inadequate because his attorney represented both appellant and his co-defendant, Mr. Brown, and 2) juror misconduct. Neither claim has merit.

Within ten days of a verdict, a defendant may file a motion for a new trial and "the court, in the interest of justice, may order a new trial." Maryland Rule 4-331(a). A trial court has wide latitude in considering a motion for a new trial and may consider many factors, including the weighing of evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Argyrou v. State, 349 Md. 587, 599-600, 709 A.2d 1194 (1998). As the Court of Appeals stated:

[T]he breadth of the trial court's discretion to grant or deny a new trial is not fixed or immutable; it will expand and contract depending upon the nature of the factors being considered, and the extent to which its exercise depends upon the opportunity the trial judge had to feel the pulse of the trial, and to rely on his or her own impression in determining the questions of fairness and justice.

Argyrou, 349 Md. at 600, 709 A.2d 1194. See Wiggins v. State, 324 Md. 551, 570, 597 A.2d 1359 (1991),

cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1007, 112 S.Ct. 1765, 118 L.Ed.2d 427 (1992).

Ordinarily, a trial judge's granting or refusing to grant a new trial is not reviewable by this Court except under the most extraordinary or compelling of circumstances. Marks v. State, 84 Md.App. 269, 290, 578 A.2d 828 (1990), cert. denied, 321 Md. 502, 583 A.2d 275 (1991).

This is true even though the trial judge's decision is based on mistake or erroneous conclusions of law or fact. Our adherence to this rule is unwavering and we do not find any extraordinary or compelling circumstances in the present case which would permit a review. In fact, this Court in its long history, has never found such circumstances to exist.

Love v. State, 95 Md.App. 420, 426, 621 A.2d 910, cert. denied, 331 Md. 480, 628 A.2d 1067 (1993). Recently, this Court has questioned whether a trial court's actual exercise of discretion in denying a motion for new trial is reviewable at all. See Isley v. State, 129 Md.App. 611, 743 A.2d 772 (2000)

. Assuming for the purposes of this opinion that it is, we find no error in the trial court's decision.

A.

Appellant argues that he was inadequately represented by Mr. Hannigan, his trial counsel, because Mr. Hannigan's "simultaneous representation of both [appellant] and [his co-def...

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • Smith v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • August 28, 2014
    ...29 A.3d 635 (2011), cert. denied,424 Md. 293, 35 A.3d 489 (2012), from the appellant's own jury tampering, see Ruth v. State, 133 Md.App. 358, 370–74, 757 A.2d 152 (2000); Allen v. State, 89 Md.App. 25, 43–45, 597 A.2d 489 (1991), or testimony the appellant had elicited on cross-examination......
  • Owens v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 7, 2006
    ...when it is the trier of facts"). And, a witness's credibility goes to the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. Ruth v. State, 133 Md.App. 358, 365, 757 A.2d 152, cert. denied, 361 Md. 435, 761 A.2d 933 (2000) (citation omitted); see also Cain v. State, 162 Md.App. 366, 379, 875 A.2d......
  • Whitney v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 9, 2004
    ...the impairment in the number of Whitney's peremptory strikes that may have resulted from her ineffectiveness. See Ruth v. State, 133 Md.App. 358, 365-66, 757 A.2d 152, cert. denied, 361 Md. 435, 761 A.2d 933 (2000). The denial of this motion may be reviewed on direct appeal. Merritt v. Stat......
  • Whiting v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • December 23, 2004
    ...in return for their testimony. Appellant's assertion goes to the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. See Ruth v. State, 133 Md.App. 358, 365, 757 A.2d 152 (2000). The jury was free to accept all, part, or none of their testimony. See Ruth, 133 Md.App. at 365, 757 A.2d 152. In rejec......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT