Rutherford v. Best
| Decision Date | 11 September 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 459-79,459-79 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | Hugh RUTHERFORD, a minor child, by his mother and next friend, Mary Ann Rutherford v. Robert and Shelly BEST. |
Peter H. Carter of Mahady, Dunne, Hershenson & Scott, Norwich, for petitioner.
Keyser, Crowley, Banse & Kenlan, Inc., Rutland, for respondents.
Before BARNEY, C. J., DALEY, LARROW and HILL, JJ., and SMITH, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned.
This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for habeas corpus. The petition was brought by Mary Ann Rutherford, on behalf of her minor child, Hugh Rutherford, to challenge the constitutional validity of 14 V.S.A. § 2645(2). That statute provides:
On the application of a minor, his relative or friend, the probate court may appoint a guardian of such minor in the following cases:
(2) When the minor has a parent living and such minor is the owner of real or personal estate, or when the parent is under guardianship or shown to be incompetent or unsuitable to have the custody of the person of the minor.
Petitioner raises two constitutional arguments, both rooted in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. First, she claims the standard of unsuitability contained in the statute is so vague that it fails to "delineate the type of conduct which will result in the forfeiture of custody of one's natural child." Second, petitioner claims that the statute "is totally lacking in procedural ... safeguards."
This dispute had its genesis in an application filed pursuant to 14 V.S.A. § 2645(2) by Robert and Shelly Best, uncle and aunt of the minor child. Alleging as their only ground that Mary Ann Rutherford was "unsuitable to have the custody and control of (Hugh)," the Bests sought to have themselves appointed guardians. Thirteen days after the Bests filed their application, Mary Ann Rutherford filed an application pursuant to 14 V.S.A. § 2645(3) 1 requesting that her friend, Barbara Bowen, be appointed guardian for Hugh. This latter petition was filed ostensibly because Mary Ann Rutherford was contemplating enlisting in the armed services, the regulations of which prohibited an enlistee from having the care and custody of a minor child during basic training. The Hartford District Probate Court heard both applications together, and granted, without giving any reasons, the Bests' application. Custody and guardianship of Hugh Rutherford was then transferred to the Bests.
Apparently abandoning her plans to enlist in the armed forces, Mary Ann Rutherford petitioned the Hartford District Probate Court pursuant to the provisions of 14 V.S.A. §§ 3003-3004 for removal of the guardians. A hearing on this petition was held on February 1, 1979, before another judge, who summarily denied the petition citing as his reason the prior unrecorded testimony at the first hearing. No appeal was taken from either order.
On February 22, 1979, Mary Ann Rutherford filed a habeas corpus petition in the Windsor Superior Court to regain the custody of her child. Her arguments in that court were the same as those she presently raises in this Court. The superior court, finding that the case of Bioni v. Haselton, 99 Vt. 453, 134 A. 606 (1926), provided specific guidelines for determining suitability under 14 V.S.A. § 2645(2), and that there were no procedural shortcomings, denied the petition. This appeal followed.
Initially, it should be noted that habeas corpus is an appropriate proceeding to determine petitioner's contentions. While it is true that habeas corpus generally is not available as a substitute for appeal or to correct errors of law, see, e. g., In re Dobson, 125 Vt. 165, 212 A.2d 620 (1965); In re Rickert, 124 Vt. 232, 203 A.2d 602 (1964), an exception to this rule is recognized where there has been a deprivation of fundamental or constitutional rights, see, e. g., In re Newton, 125 Vt. 453, 218 A.2d 394 (1966); In re Squires, 114 Vt. 285, 44 A.2d 133 (1945); In re Hook, 95 Vt. 497, 115 A. 730 (1922). Petitioner's due process claims fall within this exception.
It is a basic principle of due process that a legislative enactment is invalid if it imposes a burden on the exercise of a person's liberty for failure to conform his conduct to a standard that is "so vague and indefinite that no one could know what it (is)." A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233, 238-39, 45 S.Ct. 295, 296-297, 69 L.Ed. 589 (1925). See also In re Proceedings Concerning a Neglected Child, 130 Vt. 525, 296 A.2d 250 (1972). "Implicit in this constitutional safeguard is the premise that the law must be one that carries an understandable meaning with legal standards that courts must enforce." Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403, 86 S.Ct. 518, 521, 15 L.Ed.2d 447 (1966). The important values served by this safeguard were discussed at length in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972), and generally include fair warning of prohibited conduct, protection against impermissible delegation of basic policy matters, and protection against the inhibition of the exercise of constitutional rights. See Alsager v. District Court, 406 F.Supp. 10, 17-21 (D.Iowa 1975).
That petitioner has a liberty interest protected by the due process clause is without question. It has been held in a long line of cases in both this Court and the United States Supreme Court that "the freedom of children and parents to relate to one another in the context of the family, free of governmental interference, is a basic liberty long established in our constitutional law." In re N.H., 135 Vt. 230, 236, 373 A.2d 851, 856 (1977). See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); In re J. & J.W., 134 Vt. 480, 365 A.2d 521 (1976) (Larrow, J., concurring).
In determining whether the statutory standard of unsuitability is so vague as to offend due process, we are mindful of the rule that vague legislative standards may be saved if the needed specificity has been supplied by this Court. See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, 408 U.S. at 111, 92 S.Ct. 2300. We believe that such a saving interpretation was rendered by this Court in Bioni v. Haselton, supra. In that case, the Court had the opportunity to interpret the statutory predecessor to 14 V.S.A. § 2645. While the suitability provision of that statute was not directly in issue, the Court, in what can only be termed extensive and considered dicta, provided a narrowing interpretation of the circumstances under which the guardianship of a child could be taken from his natural parents. The opinion in Bioni proceeded from the premise that a parent has a fundamental right to the custody and control of his child. This interest, it was said, would not be defeated by another "unless circumstances of weight and importance connected with the welfare of the child exist to overbear such parental right." 99 Vt. at 458, 134 A. at 607. The parental right would "not be regarded as controlling when to do so would imperil the child's safety, morals, health, or happiness." Id. Leaving aside the inherently subjective terms morals and happiness, we believe that the standards safety and health, read in pari materia with the related subject area governed by the juvenile procedure statutes, 33 V.S.A. §§ 631-667, see Champlain Valley Exposition, Inc. v. Village of Essex Junction, 131 Vt. 449, 454, 309 A.2d 25, 28 (1973), require that there be a showing that the child has been abandoned or abused by the parent, or that the child is without proper parental care or subsistence, education, medical, or other care necessary for his well-being, see 33 V.S.A. § 632(a)(12)(A) & (B), before a parent's rights can be defeated. Factors that the Bioni Court believed had an important bearing on this determination were "the character, conditions, habits,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Boisvert v. Harrington, No. 99-523.
... ... Finding that a transfer of custody was "in the best interest of the child," the court granted the petition. In 1996, mother was incarcerated for two months. Since that time, the boy has resided ... See Rutherford v. Best, 139 Vt. 56, 63, 421 A.2d 1303, 1307 (1980) (when probate proceeding is used to separate parent and child, "fundamental fairness requires ... ...
-
S.B.L., In re
... ... it found "extraordinary circumstances." Based on its findings that the father was the primary caretaker, was fit and that it would be in the best interests of S.B.L. to award custody to the father, the court determined that no extraordinary circumstances existed that would warrant an award of ... We have carefully construed these exceptions to parental control because of the important parental interests[150 Vt. 301] involved. In Rutherford v. Best, 139 Vt. 56, 61, 421 A.2d 1303, 1306 (1980), we interpreted the parental unsuitability exception as requiring a showing that "the child has ... ...
-
Boisvert v. Harrington
... ... Finding that a transfer of custody was "in the best interest of the child," the court granted the petition. In 1996, mother was incarcerated for two months. Since that time, the boy has resided ... See Rutherford v. Best, 139 Vt. 56, 63, 421 A.2d 1303, 1307 (1980) (when probate proceeding is used to separate parent and child, "fundamental fairness requires ... ...
-
Damone v. Damone, 99-203.
...States Constitution.") (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); Rutherford v. Best, 139 Vt. 56, 60, 421 A.2d 1303, 1306 (1980)). However, plaintiff is correct that defendant did not adhere to the requirement of entering a formal objection, as set......