Rutherford v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 29 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 16-CV-9778 (KMK),16-CV-9778 (KMK) |
| Parties | PETER RUTHERFORD and ANA RUTHERFORD, individually and as parents and natural guardians on behalf of P.R., and P.R. individually, Plaintiffs, v. FLORIDA UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, DIANE MUNRO, JAN JEHRING, LISA TIGER, JEAN MARIE PAVLIK, each in her official capacity, RYAN WALL, in his official and individual capacity, KERRY BOYLAN, in her official and individual capacity, ORANGE-ULSTER BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, KERRI STROKA, DEBBIE BRUNJES, PATRICIA BAUER, and SUSAN ISAACSON, each in her official capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Angel A. Castro, III, Esq.
A.A. Castro Complex Litigation Appeals & Negotiation PLLC
New York, NY
Mark C. Rushfield, Esq.
Shaw, Perelson, May & Lambert, LLP
Counsel for Defendants Florida Union Free School District, Diane Munro, Jan Jehring, Lisa Tiger, Jean Marie Pavlik, Ryan Wall, and Kerry Boylan
Caroline B. Lineen, Esq.
Lewis R. Silverman, Esq.
Stephen P. Illions, Esq.
Silverman and Associates
Counsel for Defendants Orange-Ulster Board of Cooperative Educational Services, Kerri Stroka, Debbie Brunjes, Patricia Bauer, and Susan Isaacson KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:
Plaintiffs Peter Rutherford ("Mr. Rutherford") and Ana Rutherford ("Mrs. Rutherford") ("Plaintiff Parents"), individually and as parents and natural guardians of P.R., their minor son, and P.R. individually (collectively "Plaintiffs"), bring this Action against the Florida Union Free School District ("District"), former District Superintendent Diane Munro ("Munro"), District Superintendent Jan Jehring ("Jehring"), District Assistant Superintendent Lisa Tiger ("Tiger"), and District School Psychologist and Chairperson of the Committee on Special Education ("CSE") Subcommittee Jean Marie Pavlik ("Pavlik"), each in her official capacity, and District General and Physical Education Teacher, and Bus Duty Escort, Ryan Wall ("Wall"), in his official and individual capacity, and District Certified Special Education Teacher Kerry Boylan ("Boylan"), in her official and individual capacity (collectively "District Defendants"); and Orange-Ulster Board of Cooperative Educational Services ("O-U BOCES"), O-U BOCES Director of Special Education & Alternative Programs Kerri Stroka ("Stroka"), and Warwick Valley Satellite Program at Sanfordville Elementary School ("Warwick") Principal Debbie Brunjes ("Brunjes"), Certified Special Education Teacher Patricia Bauer ("Bauer"), and Licensed Clinical Social Worker and Speech Pathologist Susan Isaacson ("Isaacson"), each in her official capacity (collectively "BOCES Defendants") (all collectively "Defendants"), alleging Defendants denied P.R. a free and appropriate public education ("FAPE") for the 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16, and 2016-2017 school years, in violation of the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("Section 504"), 29 U.S.C. § 794, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132 et seq. and 12203, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the New York State Constitution,the New York State Education Law, N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 3202, 3203, and 4401 et seq., and the New York Codes, Rules, and Regulations ("N.Y.C.R.R.") §§ 100 et seq. and 200 et seq (Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") (Dkt. No. 91).)1 2 Plaintiffs also bring assault and battery, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring, training, supervision and retention, and lost earning claims under New York State law. Before the Court are Defendants' Motions To Dismiss. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motions are granted in part and denied in part.
As a threshold matter, the Court considers the proper treatment of exhibits submitted by Defendants in support of their Motions, and the absence of exhibits that Plaintiffs cite but do not attach to their SAC.
Generally, "[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted). "To go beyond the allegations in the [c]omplaint would convert the . . . motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment." Thomas v. Westchester Cty. Health Care Corp., 232 F. Supp. 2d 273, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). There are a few notable exceptions to this rule. In addition to the complaint, a court ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion "may consider . . . any written instrument attached to the complaint as an exhibit[,] or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference," as well as "matters of which judicial notice may be taken, and documents either in [the] plaintiffs' possession or of which [the] plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit." Kalyanaram v. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors at N.Y. Inst. of Tech., Inc., 742 F.3d 42, 44 n.1 (2d Cir. 2014) (citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted); Wang v. Palmisano, 157 F. Supp. 3d 306, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (same).
"[I]n adjudicating a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to [Rule] 12(b)(1), a district court may resolve disputed factual issues by reference to evidence outside the pleadings, including affidavits." JTE Enters., Inc. v. Cuomo, 2 F. Supp. 3d 333, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (alterations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting State Employees Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 2007)).
Throughout their SAC, Plaintiffs cite to numerous exhibits in support of their allegations and ask the Court to consider these exhibits as incorporated by reference. (SAC ¶¶ 154-156.) However, Plaintiffs do not attach any exhibits to their SAC. Plaintiffs did attach exhibits to previous iterations of their SAC, (see Dkt. No. 50), but the Court will not consider these exhibitson this basis because "an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original, and renders it of no legal effect," Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see New York ex rel. Khurana v. Spherion Corp., 246 F. Supp. 3d 995, 998 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (same).
Nevertheless, many of the exhibits Plaintiffs cite but fail to attach, were in fact submitted by Defendants in support of their Motions. (See Decl. of Caroline B. Lineen, Esq. ("Lineen Decl.") (Dkt. No. 106); Aff. of Mark C. Rushfield, Esq. ("Rushfield Aff.") (Dkt. No. 115); Aff. of Lisa Tiger ("Tiger Aff.") (Dkt. No. 116).) Most of the relevant exhibits are State administrative records such as the Decisions and Orders of Independent Hearing Officers ("IHO"), State Review Officers ("SRO"), and New York State Education Department ("NYSED") Office of Special Education ("OSE") Regional Associates. The Court is entitled to take judicial notice of matters of public record. See Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 1998) (); Medcalf v. Thompson Hine LLP, 84 F. Supp. 3d 313, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ; see also Hason v. Office of Prof'l Med. Conduct, 314 F. Supp. 2d 241, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (). However, in taking judicial notice of such public records, the Court does so only to establish "the fact of such litigation," not for the truth of the matters asserted in each proceeding. See Glob. Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2006) . The Court will therefore consider the relevant IHO, SRO, and OSE Decisions, as well as the records of other state administrative proceedings that Defendants submitted.
One document that the Parties cite that is not a public record is a May 26, 2015 "Release and Settlement Agreement" ("May 2015 Agreement") between Plaintiffs and the District. Plaintiffs cite to an "Exhibit R" as the Release Agreement, (SAC ¶ 83), but fail to attach the exhibit. District Defendants, however, attached the May 2015 Agreement as part of their "Exhibit A," which is actually a copy of an earlier version of Plaintiffs' SAC. (Rushfield Aff. Ex. A at 1 ("May 2015 Agreement") (Dkt. No. 115-6).)3 The Court may consider the Agreement as it is incorporated by reference. "To be incorporated by reference, the [c]omplaint must make a clear, definite[,] and substantial reference to the documents." Thomas, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 275 (citation omitted). Additionally, even if not attached or incorporated by reference, a document upon which the complaint "solely relies and which is integral to the complaint may be considered by the court in ruling on such a motion." Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation, emphasis, and quotation marks omitted). Documents are "integral" where the plaintiff had to rely on their content "in order to explain what the actual unlawful course of conduct was on which the [d]efendants embarked." Thomas, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 276; see also Munno v. Town of Orangetown, 391 F. Supp. 2d 263, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (...
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