Rutledge v. Rutledge

• Decision Date: 13 November 1912
• Citation: 85 A. 661,118 Md. 552
• Parties: RUTLEDGE v. RUTLEDGE et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

85 A. 661

118 Md. 552

RUTLEDGE v. RUTLEDGE et al.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

November 13, 1912

Appeal from Circuit Court, Harford County, in Equity; Wm. H. Harlan Judge.

Petition by Julia W. Rutledge against John R. Rutledge and another. From a decree for defendants, petitioner appeals. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, PEARCE, BURKE, THOMAS PATTISON, and STOCKBRIDGE, JJ.

John S Young, of Bel Air, for appellant. Philip H. Close and S. A. Williams, both of Bel Air, for appellees.

BOYD C.J.

On the 1st day of March, 1910, Monica Ann Rutledge was, by an inquisition of a jury, found to be of unsound mind and a lunatic, and not capable of the management of her property and estate. On the 12th of that month the inquisition was confirmed by the circuit court for Harford county, and Dr. Charles A. Rutledge and John R. Rutledge were appointed a committee of her estate. On the 6th of April, 1910, a report was filed by the committee which recited that in pursuance of leave granted by the court under the order passed on that day they reported a sale to the Susquehanna Pole Line Company of Harford County for the sum of $1,200 of a parcel of land 100 feet wide, extending through the lands of Monica Ann Rutledge, and which is therein particularly described. What is called an order of the court was simply an indorsement on the report of sale of, "Leave granted to file this report," which was signed by Judge Van Bibber on April 6, 1910. After the publication of an order nisi, the sale was ratified and confirmed on May 7, 1910. In May, 1911, Julia W. Rutledge filed a petition stating that Monica Ann Rutledge had departed this life leaving a last will and testament by which she devised all of her real estate to the petitioner, and alleging that the committee had in their hands $1,200, being the proceeds of the sale of real estate, which she was entitled to as devisee under the will. An order was passed directing the committee to pay to her the said $1,200, unless cause to the contrary was shown. The docket entries show that each of the committee filed an answer. They are not in the record, but a copy of the one of John R. Rutledge was by consent of counsel left with us. In it he admits that the committee have in their hands the $1,200, out of which certain expenses attending the sale should be paid, but denies that the proceeds of the real estate passed under the devise in the will, and alleges that, by the ratification of the sale, the proceeds of said real estate were converted into personal property, and should pass under the will as such. The court passed a decree dismissing the petition, and declaring that the money in the hands of the committee arising from said sale was personal estate from the ratification of the sale, and decreeing that the committee account with the executor of the will for the same after deducting therefrom such costs, expenses, fees, or allowances as may have been theretofore or may thereafter be allowed by the court, and the case was referred to the auditor. From that decree this appeal is taken.

In order that we can properly determine the questions involved, it will be necessary to consider the provisions of our Code in reference to the sales of a lunatic's property. What is now section 114 of article 16 of the Code gives the courts of equity of this state large powers in superintending and directing "the affairs of persons non compotes mentis, both as to the care of their persons, and the management of their estates." But while the language of that section is broad, and was intended to confer large powers on courts of equity, subsequent sections of that article prescribe what is necessary to be done before the property of such persons can be sold or disposed of. By section 115 the court is authorized, on the application of a creditor, to decree a sale of the real or personal estate of a non compos mentis, or such part thereof as may be necessary, to pay the claim of the creditor, if the court is satisfied of the justice of the claim, and that there is no other means of paying it. It will be observed that that is done on the application of a creditor of the lunatic, and "as the lunatic himself cannot, after inquisition found, contract a debt, the claims of creditors must exist before the inquisition, or may consist of liens or incumbrances on his property. In cases where the creditor seeks to collect his debt, or enforce his lien, an adversary proceeding, such as is prescribed in section 83 (now 118), of the Code, is the proper one." Estate of Dorney, Lunatic, 59 Md. 67.

There was no such proceeding instituted for the sale of this property, and therefore, even if we could assume from the meager information furnished by the record that John R Rutledge and Charles A. Rutledge had claims against the lunatic, it cannot be said that the sale was made for the purpose of paying debts due by her. There was not even an application filed by them, or either of them, as creditors for the sale of any part of her estate, and nothing was done to satisfy the court of the justice of the claim, and that there was no other means of paying the same. It is manifest, therefore, that this sale was not authorized on the ground that the lunatic owed debts, and when it is remembered that the inquisition was ratified on the 12th day of March, and the sale reported on the 6th day of April, 1910, it would be difficult to find anything in the record to sustain the suggestion made at the argument that the claim of John R. Rutledge was for such support of the lunatic as would justify a sale of property worth twelve hundred dollars at the instance of the committee, for, if John R. Rutledge's claim be conceded or established, it would be as a creditor against the lunatic, and not for her support or expenses incurred by the trustee, after she was adjudged a lunatic, which are what section 121 refers to. Section 116 authorizes the court to order or decree the sale of any real, leasehold, or personal property to which the lunatic may be entitled, on the application of a guardian, committee, or trustee of the property of a person non compos mentis for the purpose of investing the proceeds as therein directed, and section 117 confers power on the court, upon application of the guardian, committee, or trustee, to order or decree the real or leasehold property of the lunatic to be leased, or to order or decree the surrender of any lease of the estate or the property of such a person to be accepted, and the same to be demised anew. But section 118 distinctly provides that in all applications by a guardian, committee, or trustee of the property of a person non compos mentis to sell any of the real, leasehold, or personal property of such person, or to demise any of the real or leasehold property, or accept the surrender of a lease thereof, "the court shall, before passing an order or decree, have proof taken as in other chancery cases as to the value, quantity and condition of the property, and after considering all the circumstances, if the court shall deem it to the interest and advantage of such person non compos mentis, it may order or decree a sale, lease or surrender of a lease of the whole or any part of the said property on such terms and conditions as the court may prescribe." Then section 119 provides that "no sale, lease or surrender of a lease of the property, real or personal, of a person non compos mentis, shall be valid unless the same shall be reported to and confirmed by the court." It is not contended that the provisions of section 118 were complied with, but, on the contrary, the committee simply filed a report of sale, with the indorsement thereon as above stated. There was no application for authority to sell filed by the committee, and the report does not show the object of the sale. It may readily be inferred that the purchaser was buying the strip of land for the purpose of using it in connection with other property in constructing its line of wires, and, although there is no evidence in the record, we can perhaps assume that the committee and the lower court believed that a large price was being obtained for it. It is claimed, however, that the court can assume or infer that...