Rutledge v. State
| Decision Date | 26 December 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 18A05–1302–CR–70.,18A05–1302–CR–70. |
| Citation | 999 N.E.2d 472 (Table) |
| Parties | Terry Donald RUTLEDGE, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Alan K. Wilson, Muncie, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, George P. Sherman, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Terry Donald Rutledge appeals his conviction for murder. Rutledge raises three issues, which we consolidate, revise, and restate as:
We affirm.
On the morning and into the early afternoon of December 2, 2011, Rutledge was in the company of Tonia Ingram, as documented by surveillance cameras at a bus station and at Wal–Mart. That same day, between 3:29 p.m. and 5:39 p.m., a phone number ending in 2549, which is a phone number associated with Rutledge, sent several text messages to Regina Miller, a woman with whom Rutledge had a “friends with benefits” relationship, asking for help “with something asap” and noting that he “[c]ant [sic] say” what the issue was. Transcript at 222; State's Exhibit 30. At around 5 p.m., Rutledge phoned another friend, Jada Edwards, using the 2549 phone number, and he told Edwards that a “bitch-ass n––––– ... set [him] up” and that he had “just accidentally killed this bitch-ass n–––––.” Transcript at 276. He asked Edwards if she could pick him up and take him to Anderson and offered her $250 to do so. Edwards responded that she was working, could not leave her employees, and declined. Edwards thought it was “really strange” that Rutledge would offer her $250 for a ride. Id. at 279. Rutledge told Edwards that he would call somebody else, and later, when Edwards called Rutledge back to inquire whether he had secured transportation, Rutledge told her that “everything was fine.” Id . That same day, the phone number of Tina Williams sent a series of text messages to Miller's phone number in which the first message, sent at 5:15 p.m., stated “where u at this terry.” State's Exhibit 32–32A.
At around 4 a.m. on December 3, 2011, neighbors of Miller heard a loud noise and observed a red Blazer back up to the rear door of her home. A neighbor heard a tapping noise and looked out his window, and he observed a candle light and an arm making a hammering motion through a basement window of Miller's home.
At around 7:45 a.m. on December 3, 2011, a 911 dispatcher received a phone call about a body burning on Bunch Boulevard. Officers Ryan Yeager and Steve Baugh responded to the dispatch and observed what appeared to be a mannequin on fire. Upon putting out the fire, they realized that it was a dead body. The body was identified as Ingram. An autopsy revealed that the cause of Ingram's death was asphyxia
by neck compression and that she was not alive at the time her body was set on fire.
During the police investigation, police collected various items from Miller's address as well as another location, including a glove and articles of clothing with blood stains on them. Blood stains were observed in the basement of Miller's home, as well as fingernail clippings. Outside of Miller's residence, police recovered a purse containing Ingram's identification from a trash container. Also, on December 4, 2011, police searched a red Blazer located at a local wrecker service and discovered that the tire tread on the vehicle was consistent with the tread marks at the scene where Ingram's body was found. Ingram's blood was found on the front passenger door and on the back of the driver's seat. DNA testing of the glove revealed that both Rutledge's and Ingram's DNA were present. DNA testing of a t-shirt which had been recovered was found to contain both Ingram's blood as well as semen from Rutledge. The fingernail clippings matched Ingram's DNA profile. Another pair of gloves contained Rutledge's DNA on one glove and Ingram's DNA on the other.
On December 9, 2011, the State charged Rutledge with Count I, murder; and Count II, obstruction of justice as a class D felony. On November 26, 2012, the court commenced a jury trial at which evidence consistent with the foregoing was presented. During the trial, the State introduced, and the court admitted, transcripts of text messages exchanged between the 2549 phone number attributed to Rutledge and the phone number attributed to Miller. In addition, transcripts of text messages exchanged between Tina Williams's phone number and Miller's phone number were admitted into evidence. The first of the text messages sent from Williams's phone stated: “where u at this terry.” State's Exhibit 32A.
Prior to closing argument, the State tendered three jury instructions and Rutledge tendered six jury instructions. Defendant's Proposed Instruction 5 (“Instruction No. 5”) was an instruction on motive which “was obtained or is part of the California Pattern Jury Instructions....” Transcript at 817. Defense counsel explained to the court that “a major part of our defense in this case has been to show that Regina Miller is the murderer” and he “felt it was our obligation to offer further instruction on motive.” Id. at 818. The court granted in part Instruction No. 5. Defense counsel also tendered, as Defendant's Proposed Instruction 6 (“Instruction No. 6”), an instruction regarding the presumption of innocence based upon Robey v. State, 454 N.E.2d 1221 (Ind.1983). The court did not accept Instruction No. 6, noting that the tendered instruction was incomplete and that it was covered by other instructions.
On December 4, 2012, the jury found Rutledge guilty as charged. The court held a sentencing hearing on January 14, 2013, and sentenced Rutledge to sixty-two years executed on the murder conviction and three years executed on Count II to be served consecutive to Count I.1 Thus, Rutledge was sentenced to an aggregate term of sixty-five years in the Department of Correction.
The first issue is whether the court abused its discretion in instructing the jury. Generally, “[t]he purpose of an instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Overstreet v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1140, 1163 (Ind.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150, 124 S.Ct. 1145 (2004). Instruction of the jury is generally within the discretion of the trial court and is reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. at 1163–1164. When reviewing the refusal to give a proposed instruction, this court considers: (1) whether the proposed instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether the evidence supports giving the instruction; and (3) whether other instructions already given cover the substance of the proposed instruction. Driver v. State, 760 N.E.2d 611, 612 (Ind.2002). To constitute an abuse of discretion, the instruction given must be erroneous, and the instructions taken as a whole must misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury. Benefiel v. State, 716 N.E.2d 906, 914 (Ind.1999), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 830, 121 S.Ct. 83 (2000).
Before a defendant is entitled to a reversal, he or she must affirmatively show that the erroneous instruction prejudiced his substantial rights. Lee v. State, 964 N.E.2d 859, 862 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (citing Gantt v. State, 825 N.E.2d 874, 877 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) ), trans. denied, An error is to be disregarded as harmless unless it affects the substantial rights of a party. Id. (citing Oatts v. State, 899 N.E.2d 714, 727 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) ; Ind. Trial Rule 61 ). “Errors in the giving or refusing of instructions are harmless where a conviction is clearly sustained by the evidence and the jury could not properly have found otherwise .” Id. at 862–863 (quoting Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (Ind.2001) ).
Rutledge makes two distinct claims that the court abused its discretion in instructing the jury, namely: (A) by rejecting Rutledge's proposed jury instruction regarding the presumption of innocence; and (B) by presenting to the jury the first two sentences only of his proposed instruction regarding motive. We address each of Rutledge's arguments separately.
At trial, Rutledge tendered Instruction No. 6, which stated as follows:
If the evidence in this case is susceptible of two constructions and interpretations, each of which appears to you to be reasonable, and one of which points to the guilt of the accused, and the other to his innocence, it is your duty, under the law, to adopt that interpretation which is consistent with the accused's innocence and reject that which points to his guilt.
Appellant's Appendix at 294. The court refused to give Instruction No. 6, noting that the tendered instruction was incomplete and that it was covered by other instructions.
Rutledge argues that the trial court failed to comply with the Indiana Supreme Court's opinion in Robey when it refused to give the tendered instruction. Rutledge argues that Instruction No. 6 should have been read to the jury because it was a correct statement of the law, was supported by the evidence presented, and was not covered by the other instructions. Specifically, Rutledge argues that there was ample evidence in the record suggesting that Miller killed Ingram and not Rutledge and that accordingly the second prong of the test was met. He argues regarding the first prong that “the tendered instruction reads almost identically to the instruction in Robey, although the Robey instruction contains a second but probably unnecessary paragraph.” Appellant's Brief at 14. He also maintains that the language of Instruction No. 6 was not addressed by the court's final jury instructions, highlighting that the instructions did not address “the situation in which the Jury in this case...
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