Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 01 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-56609,93-56609
• Citation: Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1323 (9th Cir. 1995)
• Parties: , 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6821, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,708 Enrique RUVALCABA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES; Darryl Gates, Police Chief; John Schiffner; John Backus, et al., Defendants-Appellees. . Submitted *
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1323

64 F.3d 1323

64 USLW 2207, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6821,

95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,708

Enrique RUVALCABA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES; Darryl Gates, Police Chief; John Schiffner; John Backus, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 93-56609.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Submitted ^* May 1, 1995.

Decided Aug. 29, 1995.

John C. Burton, Burton & Norris, Pasadena, CA, for plaintiff-appellant.

Janet G. Bogigian, Office of the City Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before: BEEZER and TROTT, Circuit Judges, and BURNS, Senior District Judge. ^**

Opinion by Judge Beezer; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Burns

BEEZER, Circuit Judge:

In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (per curiam), the United States Supreme Court held that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment. Today, we must decide whether to extend this holding to cover all passengers in a motor vehicle.

Enrique Ruvalcaba appeals the district court's denial of his motion for a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, and his motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. He argues: (1) that police officers conducted an illegal seizure when they ordered him out of a vehicle in which he was a passenger; and (2) that the district court erred in permitting police officers to testify about their knowledge of Ruvalcaba's criminal history.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. Because we are persuaded that the Supreme Court's holding in Mimms should be extended to passengers, we affirm.

I

Los Angeles Police Officers John Backus and David Jacoby were on duty during the early morning hours of February 28, 1991 when they noticed a vehicle fail to stop at a stop sign. ¹ The officers began to follow the vehicle, and Officer Backus recognized one of the three occupants as Enrique Ruvalcaba. Officer Backus was familiar with Ruvalcaba from a variety of prior contacts. Due to this familiarity, he anticipated the possibility of danger in stopping the vehicle.

When the officers activated their flashers, the driver of the vehicle turned onto a poorly lit side street and stopped. The officers approached the vehicle cautiously and directed the three occupants to step outside and walk over to the sidewalk. The driver, who turned out to be Enrique Ruvalcaba's brother, Victor, complied with the officers' direction as did another occupant of the vehicle, Salvador Haro.

Enrique Ruvalcaba did not cooperate. Instead, he jumped out of the vehicle and began swearing at the officers. Ruvalcaba then moved toward the officers in a threatening manner. ² Officers Jacoby and Backus proceeded to subdue Ruvalcaba by using their batons. A violent struggle ensued, and Ruvalcaba suffered injuries.

Ruvalcaba filed a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against Officers Backus and Jacoby, Officer John Schiffner, the City of Los Angeles, and Police Chief Darryl F. Gates (collectively "City"), seeking money damages. The trial was bifurcated, and Ruvalcaba's suit against the individual officers proceeded to trial first. Ruvalcaba moved for judgment as a matter of law on grounds that the police officers illegally seized him when they directed that he exit the vehicle. The district court denied the motion.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers. Ruvalcaba then moved for a new trial on grounds that the district court erred in permitting Officers Backus and Jacoby to testify about their knowledge of Ruvalcaba's criminal history. The district court denied this motion as well.

II

We review de novo the district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Erickson v. Pierce County, 960 F.2d 801, 804 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 815, 121 L.Ed.2d 687 (1992). We review for abuse of discretion a district court's denial of a motion for a new trial. Larson v. Neimi, 9 F.3d 1397, 1398 (9th Cir.1993).

III

Ruvalcaba first argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment as a matter of law. He contends that the police officers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment when they, without cause, ordered him to step out of the vehicle in which he was riding as a passenger. Because this seizure was illegal as a matter of law, Ruvalcaba argues, no reasonable juror could have returned a verdict in favor of the officers.

At the outset, it is important to note what is not at issue in this case. Ruvalcaba does not contest on appeal the legality of the routine traffic stop. We therefore need not examine the reasons for which Officers Jacoby and Backus stopped the Ruvalcaba vehicle. Ruvalcaba also raises no challenge to the reasonableness of the police officers' use of force after he stepped out of the vehicle. As the jury has already done so, we need not pass judgment on those events. Finally, Ruvalcaba does not argue that the police officers conducted any unconstitutional pat-down search or frisk after he left the vehicle. The issue Ruvalcaba does raise directly is whether Officers Jacoby and Backus violated the Fourth Amendment when they ordered him to step out of the vehicle.

The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit state officials from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995). When a police officer stops an automobile and detains its occupants, that activity constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).

Not all seizures, of course, violate the Fourth Amendment, only those that are unreasonable. Vernonia, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2390; see United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1091-93 n. 1 (9th Cir.1995) ("Reasonableness, not probable cause, is undoubtedly the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment."). Reasonableness is measured by balancing the nature of the intrusion into an individual's Fourth Amendment interests against "the public interest" or "legitimate governmental interests" at stake. Vernonia, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2390; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975).

In determining the reasonableness of a police officer's order for an occupant to get out of a vehicle after a valid traffic stop, we do not write on a blank slate. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (per curiam), the Supreme Court confronted a similar case involving a police officer's traffic stop of a vehicle and its driver, the sole occupant. The Court framed the inquiry as whether "the order to get out of the car, issued after the driver was lawfully detained, was reasonable and thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 109, 98 S.Ct. at 332. To answer its question, the Court focused on "the incremental intrusion resulting from the request to get out of the car." Id.

The Court first examined the public interest. Initially, the Court made clear that the police officer had no reason to suspect "foul play" from the particular driver, "there having been nothing unusual or suspicious about his behavior." Id. Rather, the police officer's routine practice was to order all drivers out of their vehicles after traffic stops. The Court held nevertheless that the state's interest in protecting officer safety was "both legitimate and weighty" and that this interest was enhanced by the officer's practice. Id. at 110, 98 S.Ct. at 333. The Court recognized "the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile." Id.

Balanced against the state's interest, the Court weighed the intrusion into a driver's personal liberty of the order to step out of the vehicle after the vehicle had already been validly stopped for a traffic infraction. The Court concluded that the additional intrusion "can only be described as de minimis." Id. at 111, 98 S.Ct. at 333. Later, the Court found additional ways to characterize the intrusion, including "hardly ris[ing] to the level of a 'petty indignity,' " and "a mere inconvenience." Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

The Court concluded that the public interest in officer safety prevailed, holding that a police officer as a routine practice may order the driver to step out of a lawfully detained motor vehicle.

Ruvalcaba contends that his situation is distinguishable from Mimms because he was a passenger in the vehicle, whereas Mimms was the driver. Ruvalcaba argues that "passengers have done no wrong, violated no laws, and there is no basis to deprive them of their liberty." While we agree with Ruvalcaba that Mimms does not control the outcome, we believe that the reasoning behind Mimms is equally applicable to passengers in a vehicle as it is to drivers. ³

The primary basis behind the legitimate and weighty governmental interest in Mimms was the danger to police officers when confronting a driver seated in an automobile. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n. 3, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924 n. 3, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) ("According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile."); cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3480, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) ("[I]nvestigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police officers."). That danger is equally grave when a police officer confronts passengers; indeed, it may be more dangerous to have the driver outside the...