Ruvolo v. U.S. Steel Corp.

• Decision Date: 07 January 1975
• Citation: 133 N.J.Super. 362,336 A.2d 508
• Parties: Guiseppa RUVOLO, Individually, and as Guardian Ad Litem of Onfrio Ruvolo, an infant, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION and United States Steel Supply Company, Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. SUPERMARKETS GENERAL CORPORATION, Third-Party Defendant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 362

133 N.J.Super. 362

336 A.2d 508

Guiseppa RUVOLO, Individually, and as Guardian Ad Litem of

Onfrio Ruvolo, an infant, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION and United States Steel

Supply Company, Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. SUPERMARKETS GENERAL CORPORATION, Third-Party Defendant.

Superior Court of New Jersey,

Law Division.

Jan. 7, 1975.

Shevick, Ravich, Koster & Baumgarten, Rahway, for plaintiffs (Arnold Koster, Rahway, of counsel).

Stryker, Tams & Dill, Newark, for U.S. Steel Corp. and U.S. Steel Supply Co. (Burtis W. Horner, Newark, of counsel).

McElroy, Connell, Foley & Geiser, Newark, for Supermarkets General Corp. (George J. Kenny, Newark, of counsel, Linda A. Palazzolo, Chatham, on the brief).

KENTZ, J.S.C.

Third-party defendant Supermarkets General Corporation (herein Supermarkets) has filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint of defendants United States Steel Corporation and United States Steel Supply Company (both herein U.S. Steel) on the ground that it is barred by the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15--1 et seq., due to plaintiff Ruvolo's prior recovery of workmen's compensation benefits from Supermarkets.

Plaintiff, while employed by Supermarkets, operated a steel-strapping or wirebanding machine which was manufactured and owned by U.S. Steel and leased to Supermarkets. The machine allegedly malfunctioned, a piece of wire snapped and the wire struck the plaintiff in the left eye.

On January 18, 1972 plaintiff, by his guardian Ad litem, Guiseppa Onfrio, filed a petition with the Division of Workmen's Compensation against Supermarkets and subsequently received a judgment of $15,000.

Plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint against U.S. Steel alleging, among other things, strict liability plus breach of express and implied warranties.

U.S. Steel, by order of May 22, 1974, joined Supermarkets as a third-party defendant, alleging that Supermarkets was the sole cause of any negligence in that it was negligent both in the maintenance of the machine and in the failure to give proper instructions to plaintiff. U.S. Steel, as lessor of the machine, contends that Supermarkets as lessee failed to notify U.S. Steel of the existence of any malfunctions with the machine which required the lessor's expertise as provided in the lease agreement.

Based on this alleged sole negligence of Supermarkets, U.S. Steel seeks indemnification from Supermarkets to the full extent of any damages recovered by plaintiff against U.S. Steel.

Supermarkets contends that N.J.S.A. 34:15--8 of our Workmen's Compensation Act bars any indemnification claim against them by the third-party plaintiffs.

N.J.S.A. 34:15--8 states:

Such agreement shall be a surrender by the parties thereto of their rights to any other method, form or amount of compensation or determination thereof than as provided in this article and an acceptance of all the provisions of this article, and shall bind the employee himself and for compensation for his death shall bind his personal representatives, his widow and next of kin, as well as the employer, and those conducting his business during bankruptcy or insolvency.

If an injury or death is compensable under this article, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person injured or killed, except for intentional wrong.

N.J.S.A. 34:15--8 provides that when an employee has elected to accept the benefits of the Compensation Act, the employer shall pay compensation to the employee for his personal injuries. Such an election by the employee then creates certain rights and limitations, including a prohibition of lawsuits by the employee against the employer.

N.J.S.A. 34:15--8 effectively bars a suit by plaintiff against Supermarkets by way of direct tort action. Farren v. N.J. Turnpike Auth., 31 N.J.Super. 356, 106 A.2d 752 (App.Div.1954). Similar, U.S. Steel cannot herein implead Supermarkets on a tort theory. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. v. Waldroup, 38 N.J.Super. 419, 436, 119 A.2d 172 (App.Div.1955). Waldroup holds (at 437, 119 A.2d 172), that a defendant in a tort action brought by an employee may not join the employer as a third-party defendant in order to seek contribution from him as a joint tortfeasor.

Therefore, if there is no tort liability on the part of Supermarkets to plaintiff, then U.S. Steel's claim for indemnification likewise cannot rest upon Supermarkets' liability to plaintiff, but must rest either upon an express contract or an implied obligation imposed by law in view of the relationship of the parties.

U.S. Steel admits that no express indemnification clause exists in the lease agreement, but urges that the relationship of lessor-lessee imposed upon Supermarkets a duty to safely operate the machine as well as provide proper supervision and instruction to those employees operating the machine.

The Waldroup decision provides a discussion and delineation of the two concepts of joint tortfeasor contribution versus indemnification:

It will be noted that plaintiff's statement of claim sought recovery either for the entire $3000, which, if allowed, would be by way of indemnity, or such part thereof as might be recoverable if it were found that plaintiff and defendant were joint tortfeasors, which, if allowed, would be by way of contribution. There is, of course, a fundamental difference between indemnity and contribution. The right of indemnity rests upon a difference between the primary and the secondary liability of two persons each of whom is made responsible by law to an injured party. It is a right which enures to a person who, without active fault on his own part, has been compelled, by reason of some legal obligation to pay damages occasioned by the initial negligence of another, and for which he himself is only secondarily liable. The difference between primary and secondary liability is not based on a difference in degrees...