Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 23 September 1975
• Docket Number: Nos. 74-1939-74-1941,s. 74-1939-74-1941
• Citation: 523 F.2d 306
• Parties: 90 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2497, 77 Lab.Cas. P 11,087 William RUZICKA, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Cross-Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees, and Cross-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 306

523 F.2d 306

90 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2497, 77 Lab.Cas. P 11,087

William RUZICKA, Plaintiff-Appellant, and Cross-Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, et al Defendants-Appellees, and Cross-Appellants.

Nos. 74-1939-74-1941.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued June 16, 1975.

Decided Sept. 23, 1975.

Robert J. Dinges, Glotta, Adelman, Dinges, Taylor, Davis & Middleton, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff-appellant.

Jordan Rossen, John A. Fillion, J. R. Wheatley, Detroit, Mich., for defendants-appellees.

Before WEICK, CELEBREZZE and McCREE, Circuit Judges.

CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge.

We consider an appeal and two cross-appeals from a District Court's judgment that Appellee Unions did not breach their duty of fair representation towards Appellant, a former employee of Appellee General Motors Corporation (GM). Appellant asks that this conclusion be reversed and that his action against the Unions and GM be reinstated. GM argues that alternative grounds exist for dismissing it from the case. The Unions also assert alternative grounds for dismissal and argue that their cross-claim to send Appellant's grievance to arbitration should have been granted. The arguments raise several significant issues concerning an individual employee's right to fair treatment from his Union, as well as the relationship of arbitration procedures and judicial recourse for aggrieved persons.

On March 31, 1970, Appellant William Ruzicka was discharged for being intoxicated on the job and using threatening and abusive language towards his superiors at GM's Willow Run Plant in Ypsilanti, Michigan. Appellant had worked there for nearly eleven years and had been actively involved in Union activities for much of that time.

Appellant initiated the grievance process under National Agreement between GM and the United Auto Workers by filing a timely grievance protesting his discharge. He did not dispute the essential facts of intoxication and abusive language, but argued that discharge was an "unduly harsh" penalty which was inconsistent with past decisions of umpires interpreting the National Agreement. The Company completed the second step of the grievance process by filing an answer under Paragraph 77 of the National Agreement. The Union began the third step by filing a "notice of unadjusted grievance." To invoke arbitration, the Union was required by Paragraph 37 to file a "statement of unadjusted grievance" simultaneously with GM. The District Court found that Local 166 never filed such a statement, although it had sought and received two time extensions to do so. After the due date for the statement had passed, GM disclaimed further obligation under the National Agreement.

Appellant immediately pursued his intra-Union remedies under Article 31 of the UAW Constitution. Appellant argued that Charles Panter, a Local 166 official, had willfully failed to perform his duty in failing to file the required statement. A trial before a Local 166 Committee resulted in a finding that Panter had been negligent but not guilty of willful inaction. Appeals to higher levels failed.

Appellant also filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board, which investigated but dismissed them.

Appellant instituted further intra-Union action against Local 166 for wrongful processing of his grievance, but this action was unsuccessful at the Local level. An appeal to higher levels was stayed pending resolution of a policy grievance that Panter's successor at Local 166 had filed. The policy grievance, which requested GM's consideration of Appellant's grievance despite the procedural problem, was withdrawn by Local 166 on April 24, 1971.

Rather than appeal the adverse decision on Local 166's processing of the grievance to the UAW's International Executive Board, Appellant filed a complaint in federal court on June 3, 1971. He alleged that Panter's personal "hostility" towards him had caused Panter not to file the statement of unadjusted grievance. He asserted that both the Local and International Unions had thus given him unfair representation, and he alleged that GM's discharge was wrongful and that GM had conspired to discharge him because of his Union activities.

The Unions filed a cross-claim against GM, seeking that the dispute be ordered to arbitration. After denying various pretrial motions, the District Court conducted a hearing limited to the question of unfair representation. It concluded that there was no unfair representation because Panter had merely "neglected" to file the required statement. The Court reasoned, "Mere hostility between the plaintiff and the union official is insufficient to show a breach (of the duty of fair representation under 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970)); the plaintiff must show that the hostility tainted the official's conduct." Since "there was no showing in the case that hostility tainted Panter's processing of the grievance," Appellant's complaint was dismissed, along with the Unions' cross-claim.

We will first consider the question of unfair representation, for if the District Court's conclusion was correct, the action against both the Unions and GM must fail. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). If the District Court erred, there remain for consideration the Unions' and GM's arguments that alternative grounds exist for dismissal. Finally, we must address the Unions' contention that their cross-claim to have Appellant's grievance ordered to arbitration was wrongfully dismissed.

Proof of unfair representation by a Union depends on a showing that "a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 87 S.Ct. 903, 916, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). A review of Appellant's complaint and the facts developed at trial convince us that Appellant did not prove that officials of Appellee International Union had acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith. In Hines v. Local 377, 506 F.2d 1153, 1157 (6th Cir. 1974), Cert. granted and limited to other ground, 421 U.S. 928, 95 S.Ct. 1654, 44 L.Ed.2d 85 (1975), we stated:

There was no claim that the local union was acting for or at the direction of the International, and appellant Hines, when asked on deposition what steps the International failed to take in investigating the company's charge replied: "I don't know of any steps that they should or should not have taken." Since there was no genuine issue as to a material fact about the conduct of the International Union, the grant of summary judgment was proper.

The Hines reasoning applies here, and we affirm the District Court's finding of no unfair representation by the International Union. We turn now to consideration of the liability, if any, of Local 166.

As discussed above, the District Court concluded that Local 166 had not unfairly represented Appellant because Agent Panter had merely "neglected" to file the required Statement of Unadjusted Grievance and had not acted in bad faith. Appellee Local urges that this conclusion be upheld, asserting that bad faith is an essential element of any claim of unfair representation.

We do not find the duty of fair representation so limited. In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967), the Supreme Court held that union actions which are "arbitrary, discriminatory, Or in bad faith" (emphasis added) could establish a breach of the duty of fair representation. As we held in St. Clair v. Local 515, 422 F.2d 128, 130 (6th Cir. 1969),

The phrase "fair representation" is something of a term of art, and the standards by which we are bound have not been set down explicitly in a code. However, the Supreme Court has spoken clearly enough to guide us here. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). The Court there held that the duty of fair representation does not require a union to exhaust every theoretically available procedure simply on the demand of a union member. 386 U.S. at 192 (87 S.Ct. 903). . . . However, the ignoring or the perfunctory processing of a grievance may violate the duty of fair representation. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 194, 87 S.Ct. at 903.

We agree with the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the three-pronged standard established in Vaca for determining whether a union has unfairly represented one of its members:

A union must conform its behavior to each of these three separate standards. First, it must treat all factions and segments of its membership without hostility or discrimination. Next, the broad discretion of the union in asserting the rights of its individual members must be exercised in complete good faith and honesty. Finally, the union must avoid arbitrary conduct. Each of these requirements represents a distinct and separate obligation, the breach of which may constitute the basis for civil action.

Griffin v. International Union of United Automobile Workers, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1974). See also De Arroyo v. Sindicato De Trabaiadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 452 F.2d 281 (1st Cir.) Cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877, 91 S.Ct. 117, 27 L.Ed.2d 114 (1970). ¹

We believe that the District Court misread Vaca when it held that "bad faith" must be read into the separate and independent standards of "arbitrary" or "discriminatory" treatment. Union action which is arbitrary or discriminatory need not be motivated by bad faith to amount to unfair representation.

In the instant case Local 166 officials discussed Appellant's grievance among themselves and with GM personnel, but inexplicably neglected to take Appellant's grievance to the third stage of processing by not filing a Statement of Unadjusted Grievance with the appropriate GM official. Having sought and been granted two extensions of time to file the Statement and at no time having decided that Appellant's claim was without merit, the Local allowed the final deadline to pass without filing...