Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n

• Decision Date: 14 June 1940
• Docket Number: No. 25171.,25171.
• Citation: 374 Ill. 151,28 N.E.2d 116
• Parties: RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, Inc., et al. v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

374 Ill. 151

28 N.E.2d 116

RAILWAY EXPRESS AGENCY, Inc., et al.

v.ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION et al.

No. 25171.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 14, 1940.

Proceeding by the Keeshin Motor Express Company, Incorporated, before the Illinois Commerce Commission, for a certificate of convenience and necessity to operate as a motor carrier of property, opposed by the Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, and others. The Illinois Commerce Commission granted a certificate of public convenience and necessity, and the Railway Express Agency, Incorporated, and others appealed to the circuit court. From a judgment of the circuit court setting aside the order of the Illinois Commerce Commission, the Illinois Commerce Commission and others appeal.

Appeal dismissed.Appeal from the Circuit Court, Winnebago County; Arthur E. Fisher, judge.

John E. Cassidy, Atty. Gen., and Floyd F. Shields, Zachary D. Ford, Jr., and Luther M. Walter, all of Chicago (Harry R. Booth, John S. Burchmore, and Nuel D. Belnap, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

John A. Dill, Joseph H. Wright, Carson L. Taylor, Weldon A. Dayton, and Nye F. Morehouse, all of Chicago (Edward C. Craig, Vernon W. Foster, Carl S. Jefferson, and William T. Faricy, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

MURPHY, Justice.

This action was started in 1930 when the Keeshin Motor Express Company, Inc., filed a petition with the Illinois Commerce Commission asking that it be granted a certificate of convenience and necessity to operate as a motor carrier of property on certain highways between certain cities all located in the northern part of the State. The Railway Express Agency, Inc., and a number of other common carriers, serving the area for which petitioner sought a certificate, were named as respondents. Evidence was heard, and on January 24, 1933, the commission entered an order denying the prayer of the petition and directed it desist from operating as a motor carrier of property. Petitioner asked for a rehearing, whereupon the order of January 24, 1933, was set aside, a rehearing granted and additional evidence heard. January 8, 1936, an order was entered granting a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing petitioner to engage as a public utility for the transportation of property for hire by means of motor trucks and trailers with the right to render pickup and delivery service between certain designated cities and villages. Petitioner was ordered to file with the commission tariff schedules of rates and charges for its service and to otherwise comply with the act.

Respondents appealed to the circuit court of Winnebago county and January 10, 1939, that court found the commission's order of January 8, 1936, to be arbitrary, unreasonable, against the manifest weight of the evidence and contrary to law, and ordered the order of the commission set aside.

Petitioner perfected an appeal to this court. The order appealed from was not suspended during the pendency of the appeal in the circuit court nor has it been suspended on this appeal.

After full consideration the conclusion has been reached that the adoption of the Illinois Truck act in 1939, and the amendment of certain sections of the Public Utilities act, have so changed the law in relation to the right to transport property on the public highways by motor carrier, that the questions presented on this appeal are no longer justiciable and that on the court's own motion the appeal should be dismissed.

Prior to the amendment of section 8 of the Public Utilities act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1939, chap. 111 2/3, sec. 8, in 1939, the commission was vested with general supervision of all public utilities subject to the limitations expressed in the act. By section 10, the term ‘public utility’ was defined to mean and include every corporate company ‘that now or hereafter: (a) May own, control, operate, or manage, within the State, directly or indirectly, for public use, any plant, equipment or property used or to be used for or in connection with the transportation of persons or property.’ The term ‘common carrier’ was defined as follows: ‘The term ‘common carrier,’ when used in this Act, includes all railroads, street railroads,express companies * * * and every corporation * * * whatsoever, owning, operating or managing any such agency for public use in the transportation of persons or property within the State.'

By an amendment effective July 21, 1939, section 10 was amended. The terms ‘public utility’ and ‘common carrier’ were redefined, each expressly exclusing trucks subject to regulation under the provisions of ‘An Act in relation to the regulation of the operations of trucks designed or used for the transportation of property,’ as enacted by the Sixty-First...