Ryan Transportation, Inc. v. M & G ASSOCIATES
Decision Date | 04 November 2003 |
Docket Number | (SC 16923). |
Citation | 832 A.2d 1180,266 Conn. 520 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | RYAN TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. M AND G ASSOCIATES ET AL. |
Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Vertefeuille, Js. W. Anthony Stevens, Jr., with whom was Louis W. Flynn, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).
Joel M. Fain, with whom, on the brief, was Mary J. Ambrogio, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).
Jack G. Steigelfest, with whom, on the brief, were Constance L. Epstein and James F. Sullivan, for the appellee (defendant Auto Lock Unlimited, Inc.).
The plaintiff, Ryan Transportation, Inc., commenced this action against its commercial cotenant, the defendant, Auto Lock Unlimited, Inc. (Auto Lock), and its landlord, the named defendant, M and G Associates (M & G),1 seeking damages for losses sustained as a result of a fire, set by an unknown arsonist, that destroyed a building that Auto Lock and the plaintiff occupied. The plaintiff alleged in its complaint that both Auto Lock and M & G knew of an earlier, unsuccessful attempt to set the building on fire and negligently failed to notify the plaintiff about it. The trial court, Beach, J., granted Auto Lock's motion for summary judgment, concluding that, as a matter of law, Auto Lock did not have a duty to protect the plaintiff from the actions of third parties. Thereafter, the claim against M & G was tried to a jury before the court, Rittenband, J. The jury returned a verdict in favor of M & G, and the court rendered judgment for Auto Lock and M & G, from which the plaintiff appealed.
On appeal,2 the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly: (1) granted Auto Lock's motion for summary judgment because Auto Lock had a duty to notify the plaintiff of the prior arson attempt; and (2) permitted M & G to introduce certain documentary evidence to impeach the plaintiff's key witness. We conclude that the trial court properly granted Auto Lock's motion for summary judgment because we agree that Auto Lock had no duty to notify the plaintiff of the prior arson attempt. We also conclude that the record is inadequate for our review of the plaintiff's claim of evidentiary impropriety. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In April, 1997, both the plaintiff and Auto Lock occupied commercial space in a building owned by M & G. On April 15, 1997, Auto Lock employees noticed soot marks located near an overhead door to the building. Auto Lock notified the police and M & G but did not notify the plaintiff. The following day, an unknown arsonist set fire to the building, destroying the building and the property of the plaintiff that was stored therein.
The plaintiff brought this action against Auto Lock and M & G, among others, seeking damages for losses that it had sustained as a result of that fire. With respect to M & G, the plaintiff alleged that M & G was negligent in failing to: (1) inform the plaintiff of the prior arson attempt; (2) properly safeguard the building; (3) install and maintain outdoor security lighting; (4) provide adequate security; and (5) request an increased police presence upon learning of the prior arson attempt. With respect to Auto Lock, the plaintiff alleged that Auto Lock negligently had: (1) failed to inform the plaintiff of the prior arson attempt; (2) failed to "post" adequate security; (3) failed to secure its own building; and (4) stored motor vehicles in the building.
Auto Lock filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming, inter alia, that it had no duty to protect the plaintiff from the acts of the unknown arsonist. The court granted the motion, concluding that no special relationship existed between Auto Lock and the arsonist or between Auto Lock and the plaintiff that would give rise to any such duty.3
M & G denied the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint and asserted two special defenses. In its first special defense, M & G alleged that the plaintiff's own negligence was the proximate cause of any damages that the plaintiff may have sustained as a result of the fire. In its second special defense, M & G alleged that a provision in the lease absolved M & G of liability for any losses due to fire. The plaintiff denied the allegations of both special defenses.4
The plaintiff and M & G proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, Steven Dearborn, the plaintiff's president and primary witness, testified that, from 1990 to approximately 1996, the plaintiff had been involved in proceedings under chapter 11 of the federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. Following this testimony, M & G sought to impeach Dearborn with the final decree that formally closed the plaintiff's chapter 11 proceeding on May 26, 1998.5 The court allowed M & G to introduce the decree into evidence over the plaintiff's objection.6 Thereafter, the plaintiff elicited further testimony from Dearborn in which he explained the discrepancy between his recollection of the date of the closing of the chapter 11 proceeding and the date of the final decree. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of M & G. The plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict on the basis of the allegedly improper admission of the decree. The trial court denied the motion and rendered judgment for Auto Lock and M & G. This appeal followed.
The plaintiff first contends that the trial court improperly granted Auto Lock's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Auto Lock had no duty to notify the plaintiff of the prior arson attempt. We disagree.
"Our review of a trial court's decision to grant [a] motion for summary judgment is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424, 450, 820 A.2d 258 (2003). (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
"The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) LePage v. Horne, 262 Conn. 116, 123, 809 A.2d 505 (2002). "Duty is a legal conclusion about relationships between individuals, made after the fact, and [is] imperative to a negligence cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Laflamme v. Dallessio, 261 Conn. 247, 251, 802 A.2d 63 (2002). Thus, "[t]here can be no actionable negligence ... unless there exists a cognizable duty of care." Waters v. Autuori, 236 Conn. 820, 826, 676 A.2d 357 (1996). "[T]he test for the existence of a legal duty of care entails (1) a determination of whether an ordinary person in the defendant's position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result, and (2) a determination, on the basis of a public policy analysis, of whether the defendant's responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 250, 765 A.2d 505 (2001).
With respect to the second inquiry, namely, the policy analysis, there generally is no duty that obligates one party to aid or to protect another party. See 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 314, p. 116 (1965). One exception to this general rule arises when a definite relationship between the parties is of such a character that public policy justifies the imposition of a duty to aid or to protect another. See W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed. 1984) § 56, pp. 373-74; see also 2 Restatement (Second), supra, §§ 314A, 315, pp. 118, 122. In delineating more precisely the parameters of this limited exception to the general rule, this court has concluded that, "[in the absence of] a special relationship of custody or control, there is no duty to protect a third person from the conduct of another." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fraser v. United States, 236 Conn. 625, 632, 674 A.2d 811 (1996). For any such relationship, 7 Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 483 (D.C. Cir.1970). The plaintiff asserts that cotenants have a special relationship that gives rise to a duty to protect because cotenants depend on each other for their common safety and security. In support of this assertion, the plaintiff analogizes the relationship between cotenants to the relationship between landlord and tenant. This analogy fails. Although courts have held that, under certain circumstances, landlords may have a duty to take affirmative action to protect tenants and their guests from the criminal conduct of third parties, this duty generally is limited to areas of the leasehold over which the landlord has exclusive control or to situations in which the landlord has the exclusive ability to prevent the unlawful conduct. See, e.g., id., 478-80, 483 ( ); Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condominiums Homeowners Assn., Inc., 189 Ariz. 206, 207, 211, 941 P.2d 218 (1997) (...
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