Ryan v. Bethlehem Sparrows Point Shipyard

Decision Date06 December 1951
Docket NumberNo. 6308.,6308.
Citation192 F.2d 636
PartiesRYAN v. BETHLEHEM SPARROWS POINT SHIPYARD, Inc.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Robert E. Coughlan, Jr., Baltimore, Md. (Robert G. Sheller, Joseph J. Brophy, New York City, and Lord, Whip & Coughlan, Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellant.

Norman P. Ramsey, Baltimore, Md. (Rignal W. Baldwin and Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, all of Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellee.

Before PARKER, Chief Judge, and SOPER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.

DOBIE, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff, Ryan, brought a civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, seeking damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained as the result of defendant's negligence. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint; plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the defendant's motion. Both motions were argued together. The District Judge sustained the defendant's motion. Later plaintiff moved to reargue defendant's motion and asked the District Judge to set aside his order dismissing the complaint. This last motion was denied. Plaintiff has duly appealed. We think the defendant's motion for summary judgment was improvidently granted, that the judgment of the District Court must be reversed and the case remanded to that Court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff's complaint stated: "* * * on or about March 24, 1950, the Plaintiff was lawfully and rightfully on the premises of the Defendant and had been engaged in changing a valve on a machine in the hold of a vessel which was being constructed by the Defendant, its agents, servants and employees, at Defendant's shipyard, Sparrows Point, Maryland, said vessel being known as Hull No. 4478. * * * The Plaintiff further states that he had completed his work and at about 3:30 P. M., was in the act of leaving the aforesaid vessel and while carefully and prudently using the scaffolding, planking or catwalks, which had been erected or built on said vessel by the Defendant, its agents, servants and employees, the scaffolding, planking or catwalks suddenly and without warning gave way and collapsed, causing the Plaintiff to fall a distance of about twelve (12) feet and as a result thereof to sustain serious, painful and permanent injuries * * *."

Defendant's motion to dismiss contained the following allegations: "That the plaintiff was at the time of the accident an employee of the Carrier Corporation, a sub-contractor employed by the defendant to perform certain work necessary in the construction of said vessel and as such was under the coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act of Maryland, Art. 101 Flack's Annotated Code of Maryland. That the defendant has secured compensation to its employees and their defendants in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, Art. 101, Flack's Annotated Code of Maryland, and the remedy of the plaintiff under the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive."

The defendant's motion was granted by the District Court on the basis of this allegation and the case of State to Use of Hubert v. Bejamin F. Bennett Building Co., 154 Md. 159, 140 A. 52.

It seems quite clear that defendant's motion could not have been granted solely on the allegations in plaintiff's complaint, which did not even allege that plaintiff was an employee of the Carrier Corporation or that defendant was an independent contractor in building the vessel. It was stated in plaintiff's motion to dismiss the motion, however, that he was an employee of the Carrier Corporation and this was admitted on the argument of the motions as was also the fact that defendant was constructing the vessel under contract for A. C. Tankers, Inc. We think that plaintiff for the purposes of the motion to dismiss, is bound by these admissions. U. S. Hoffman Machinery Corporation v. Richa, D.C., 78 F.Supp. 969; Kirkham v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., D.C., 78 F.Supp. 658; Frankel v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., D.C., 46 F.Supp. 242, 243, affirmed, 4 Cir., 132 F.2d 634. At the same time, plaintiff's counsel strenuously denied that Carrier Corporation was a sub-contractor of defendant so as to bring the case within the Maryland...

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2 cases
  • Donohue v. Maryland Casualty Company
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • 21 d2 Dezembro d2 1965
    ...because, under § 62, Article 101, he may be required to pay or secure compensation to that employee. Ryan v. Bethlehem Sparrows Point Shipyard, 192 F.2d 636 (4 Cir. 1951); State to Use of Hubert v. Benjamin F. Bennett Bldg. Co., 154 Md. 159, 140 A. 52 (1928); State to Use of Reynolds v. Cit......
  • Ryan v. Bethlehem Sparrows Point Shipyard, 6624.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • 12 d6 Dezembro d6 1953
    ...dismissed Ryan's complaint. On appeal, we held the motion was improvidently granted and remanded the case for further proceedings, 4 Cir., 192 F.2d 636. On remand, the motion to dismiss was again granted. This motion was argued before the District Judge on a stipulation embracing facts mate......

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