Ryan v. Board

• Decision Date: 06 February 2009
• Docket Number: No. 1-07-1601.,1-07-1601.
• Citation: 902 N.E.2d 1136
• Parties: George H. RYAN, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the GENERAL ASSEMBLY RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Kurt M. Granberg, James Clayborne, Don Harmon, Richard T. Bradley, William Brady, Lee Daniels, Phillip Collins, in Their Official Capacities, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

902 N.E.2d 1136

George H. RYAN, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the GENERAL ASSEMBLY RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Kurt M. Granberg, James Clayborne, Don Harmon, Richard T. Bradley, William Brady, Lee Daniels, Phillip Collins, in Their Official Capacities, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1-07-1601.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division.

February 6, 2009.

James R. Thompson, Raymond W. Mitchell, Kyle P. DeJong and Lustin L. Leinenweber, Winston & Strawn, LLP, Chicago, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Atty. General; Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General; and Jan E.

Hughes, Asst. Atty. General, for Defendants-Appellees.

Justice McBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, George H. Ryan, Sr., brought this administrative review action following defendants', the Board of Trustees of the General Assembly Retirement System (the Board), termination of Ryan's pension benefits in accordance with section 2-156 of the Illinois Pension Code (Pension Code) (40 ILCS 5/2-156 (West 2006)). The Board held that Ryan forfeited his pension earned through his service as a member of the General Assembly, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State and Governor, following felony convictions based on his conduct during his service to the State. The trial court affirmed the Board's decision on administrative review.

Ryan appeals, arguing that section 2-156 of the Pension Code limits forfeiture to the period of service in such office as is connected to a felony conviction and partial forfeiture satisfies the rationale underlying the statute.

The parties do not dispute the facts in this case.

In 1966, Ryan was appointed to the Kankakee County Board of Supervisors. Ryan was subsequently elected to and served on the Kankakee Country Board of Supervisors from 1966 to 1972, including a two-year period as chairman. While serving on the Kankakee County Board of Supervisors, Ryan contributed to the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (IMRF).

In November 1972, Ryan was elected as a representative to the General Assembly. He was reelected and served until 1982. While in the General Assembly, Ryan was selected as the Minority Leader and Speaker of the House. When Ryan was elected to the General Assembly, he became a member of the General Assembly Retirement System (the System). Ryan requested to transfer his credits earned in the IMRF into the System.

In November 1982, Ryan was elected Lieutenant Governor alongside Governor James R. Thompson. Ryan won reelection in 1986. Subsequently, in 1990, Ryan was elected the Secretary of State and he served two terms in this position. In November 1998, Ryan was elected Governor and served from January 1999 until January 2003.

Ryan continued to participate in the System while serving as Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State and Governor. In December 2002, Ryan applied for his retirement annuity to begin in January 2003.

In December 2003, a federal grand jury indicted Ryan on felony charges for racketeering, conspiracy, mail fraud, making false statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and income tax violations. These charges were premised on conduct that arose out of and in connection with Ryan's service as Secretary of State and Governor. In April 2006, a jury found Ryan guilty on all counts. The district court dismissed two of the counts after finding insufficient evidence to support the claims and entered judgment on the remaining counts. Ryan was sentenced to 78 months in prison.

Following Ryan's felony convictions, the acting executive secretary of the Illinois State Retirement Systems notified Ryan that all of his pension benefits were being suspended pursuant to section 2-156 of the Pension Code. Section 2-156 provides: "None of the benefits herein provided for shall be paid to any person who is convicted of any felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with his or her service as a member." 40 ILCS 5/2-156 (West 2006). Ryan was also informed that this suspension included all of his insurance coverage for him and his wife. The suspension was retroactive to the date of Ryan's sentencing.

Ryan sought review of the suspension of his pension benefits before the Board. Ryan argued that the benefits earned as county board supervisor, member of the General Assembly, and Lieutenant Governor were not subject to forfeiture. The Board disagreed and ratified the acting executive secretary's decision to completely terminate Ryan's retirement annuity. Subsequently, Ryan sought administrative review in the trial court. The trial court affirmed the termination of Ryan's retirement benefits.

This appeal followed.

On appeal, Ryan argues that the plain language of section 2-156 limits forfeiture to those benefits earned through service in the specific office connected to the felony convictions. Ryan does not dispute the termination of his benefits earned while serving as Secretary of State and Governor, but contends that there is no nexus between his service as a member of the General Assembly and Lieutenant Governor and his felony convictions. The Board maintains that all of Ryan's benefits were subject to forfeiture pursuant to section 2-156 in light of his felony convictions arising out of his service to the State of Illinois as a member of the System. Therefore, the question on appeal is whether the pension forfeiture provision disqualifies a member of the General Assembly Retirement System from receiving all of his or her pension benefits if convicted of a felony "relating to or arising out of or in connection with his or her service as a member." 40 ILCS 5/2-156 (West 2006).

When a party appeals the circuit court's decision on a complaint for administrative review, the appellate court's role is to review the administrative decision rather than the circuit court's decision. Siwek v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 324 Ill. App.3d 820, 824, 258 Ill.Dec. 392, 756 N.E.2d 374 (2001). Although a reviewing court may not reverse findings of fact made by an administrative agency unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, an issue of statutory construction raises a question of law subject to de novo review. Siwek, 324 Ill.App.3d at 824, 258 Ill.Dec. 392, 756 N.E.2d 374. While the interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration is generally given deference, such deference is not binding and, if erroneous, will be rejected. Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 216 Ill.2d 590, 595, 297 Ill.Dec. 425, 837 N.E.2d 876 (2005).

The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Taddeo, 216 Ill.2d at 595, 297 Ill.Dec. 425, 837 N.E.2d 876. "Legislative intent is best derived from the language of the statute itself, which, if unambiguous, should be enforced as written." Taddeo, 216 Ill.2d at 595, 297 Ill.Dec. 425, 837 N.E.2d 876. "Under the doctrine of in pari materia, two statutes dealing with the same subject will be considered with reference to each other, `so that they may be given harmonious effect.'" Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 218 Ill.2d 175, 185, 300 Ill.Dec. 15, 843 N.E.2d 273 (2006), quoting Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill.2d 414, 422, 269 Ill.Dec. 452, 781 N.E.2d 249 (2002). "This doctrine is also applicable to different sections of the same statute and is consonant with one of our fundamental rules of statutory construction — `to view all of the provisions of a statute as a whole.'" Collinsville Community, 218 Ill.2d at 185-86, 300 Ill.Dec. 15, 843 N.E.2d 273, quoting Land, 202 Ill.2d at 422, 269 Ill.Dec. 452, 781 N.E.2d 249. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the entire act, its nature, its object, and the consequences resulting from different constructions. Shields v. Judges' Retirement System, 204 Ill.2d 488, 494, 274 Ill.Dec. 424, 791 N.E.2d 516 (2003). "[A]ll words and phrases must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute and must not be construed in isolation." Brucker v. Mercola, 227 Ill.2d 502, 514, 319 Ill.Dec. 543, 886 N.E.2d 306 (2007). "Each word, clause and sentence of the statute, if possible, must be given reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous." Brucker, 227 Ill.2d at 514, 319 Ill.Dec. 543, 886 N.E.2d 306. "In determining the General Assembly's intent, we may properly consider not only the language of the statute, but also the purpose and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the goals to be achieved." Brucker, 227 Ill.2d at 514, 319 Ill.Dec. 543, 886 N.E.2d 306. The language of pension statutes must also be liberally construed in favor of the rights of the pensioner. Shields, 204 Ill.2d at 494, 274 Ill.Dec. 424, 791 N.E.2d 516.

The facts of this case raise an issue of first impression. While other felony forfeiture statutes have been interpreted by the courts, none has considered the statutory language present in section 2-156.

Section 2-156 of the Pension Code provides:

"None of the benefits herein provided for shall be paid to any person who is convicted of any felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with his or her service as a member." 40 ILCS 5/2-156 (West 2006).

The term "member" is defined under section 2-105 as follows:

"`Member': Members of the General Assembly of this State * * * and any person serving as Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Comptroller, or Attorney General for the period of service in such office." 40 ILCS 5/2-105 (West 2006).

The crux of Ryan's argument hinges on the phrase "period of service in such office" from the Pension Code's definition of "member." In his view, this phrase "expresses a legislative intent to narrow the scope of the term `Member' and to limit the forfeiture provision to the period of service in...