Ryan v. Brunswick Corp.

• Decision Date: 28 January 1997
• Docket Number: Docket No. 102762,No. 14,14
• Citation: Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 557 N.W.2d 541, 454 Mich. 20 (Mich. 1997)
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,862 Mary E. RYAN, Independent Personal Representative of the Estate of Stephen Ryan, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRUNSWICK CORPORATION; Bayliner Marine Corporation; Carl Stirns Marine; and Blue Fin Marina, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees. Calendar
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 541

557 N.W.2d 541

454 Mich. 20, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,862

Mary E. RYAN, Independent Personal Representative of the Estate of Stephen Ryan, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRUNSWICK CORPORATION; Bayliner Marine Corporation; Carl Stirns Marine; and Blue Fin Marina, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 102762.

Calendar No. 14.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Nov. 14, 1996.

Decided Jan. 28, 1997.

[454 Mich. 21] Conybeare Law Office, P.C. by John C. Johnson, St. Joseph, for plaintiff-appellant.

Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. by Mark H. Verwys, Grand Rapids, Smith, Haughey, Rice & Roegge, P.C. by Patrick F. Geary, Grand Rapids, and Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., of counsel by Daniel J. Connolly and Mark J. Carpenter, Minneapolis, MN, for defendants-appellees.

OPINION

BOYLE, Justice.

I

In this case we consider whether provisions of the Federal Boat Safety Act (FBSA), 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311, preclude claims of negligence arising from the failure to design, manufacture, or equip a recreational motorboat with a propeller guard and the failure to warn others of the dangers associated with the unguarded propeller. We hold that plaintiff's claims are preempted by the actions of the National Boating Safety Advisory Council and the concomitant acceptance by the United States Coast Guard of the recommendation that it "should take no regulatory action to require propeller guards" ¹ that were made under the authority of the Federal Boat Safety Act.

II

Plaintiff-appellant's husband, Stephen J. Ryan, died on September 23, 1989, from injuries he received when he was struck by the propeller of a motorboat while he was swimming. Plaintiff brought this wrongful death action against Bayliner Marine Corporation, Mercury Marine, Division of Brunswick Corporation, Brunswick Corporation, Carl Stirns Marine, and Blue Fin Marina. ² Motions for partial summary disposition were granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) and 2.116(C)(8) on behalf of defendants Bayliner Marine Corporation, Mercury Marine, Brunswick Corporation, and Blue Fin Marina. ³

Following the grant of the motions for partial summary disposition, a stipulation by the parties and an order of dismissal with prejudice of all claims not covered by the court's order was entered. ⁴ The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of partial summary disposition, agreeing that the claims were preempted. ⁵ Because neither Blue Fin Marina nor Carl Stirns Marine have participated in the appellate proceedings, the primary defendant in this appeal is Brunswick Corporation.

III

The purpose of the FBSA is to promote boating safety. To this end, the act provides a coordinated national boating safety program that unites the federal government and states in an effort to compel manufacturers to provide safer boats and boating equipment to the public. Achievement of this objective is encouraged by requiring that manufacturers comply with safety standards promulgated by the Secretary of Transportation. S. Rep. No. 92-248, 1971 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News (85 Stat. 213) 1333. Incentives to state participation are provided through federal grant-in-aid payments to states that have, or that develop, an accepted boat safety program.

Congress grants the Secretary of Transportation exclusive authority to establish national safety standards for recreational vessels and associated equipment. 46 U.S.C. § 4302(a)(1). To facilitate this duty, the secretary has the option to delegate regulatory functions to a designated agency that then operates under its supervision. 46 U.S.C. § 4303(a). The United States Coast Guard has been designated as that agency. Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp., 49 F.3d 430, 431 (C.A.8, 1995), cert den --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 182, 133 L.Ed.2d 120 (1995).

Pursuant to the act, the secretary must consult with the National Boating Safety Advisory Council (NBSAC) concerning the need for regulation in a given area and the extent to which proposed regulations will contribute to recreational boating safety. 46 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(4). ⁶ In accordance with the act NBSAC was consulted, and, in 1988, at the request of the Coast Guard, a subcommittee was appointed for the purpose of reviewing and analyzing data involving recreational boating accidents where persons in the water were struck by boat propellers. The subcommittee was commissioned to consider the feasibility of mechanical guards in preventing boat propeller injuries. ⁷

After a year-long study and public hearings, the subcommittee reached the unanimous conclusion that the "U.S. Coast Guard should take no regulatory action to require propeller guards." Report of the Propeller Guard Subcommittee at 24 (November 7, 1989). The subcommittee resolved that "[t]he development and use of devices such as 'propeller guards' can ... be counter-productive and can create new hazards of equal or greater consequence." Id. at 23. Of the possible negative effects, propeller guards were found to have the potential to "decrease an operator's ability to maintain control over the boat at 'normal' speeds, increase the probability of striking a body in the water, and create a possibility of causing greater injury to those struck." Mowery v. Mercury Marine, Div. of Brunswick Corp., 773 F.Supp. 1012, 1016 (N.D.Ohio, 1991) (emphasis in the original). The subcommittee's recommendation that regulatory action to require propeller guards not be taken was accepted by both the NBSAC and the United States Coast Guard.

IV

In this case we are faced with the issue of determining whether plaintiff's common-law products liability claims ⁸ are preempted under the Federal Boat Safety Act. We hold that they are.

The doctrine of federal preemption has its origin in the Supremacy Clause of article VI, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution, which declares that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land...." Where the principles of federal preemption apply, state courts are deprived of subject matter jurisdiction. Congressional intent is the cornerstone of preemption analysis. People v. Hegedus 432 Mich. 598, 607, 443 N.W.2d 127 (1989). ⁹

Federal provisions that invalidate state law must be narrowly tailored to support a presumption against preemption of state law. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2250, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996). ¹⁰ State police powers are not to be superseded unless that is the clear and unequivocal intent of Congress. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992). This is especially true where state regulation of matters relating to health and safety are involved. Hillsborough Co. v. Automated Medical Labs. Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2376, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985).

Of fundamental importance to the resolution of this issue is the premise that the plain meaning of a statute must be given effect unless there is reason to believe that Congress intended a more restrictive reading. CSX Transportation Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). The viewing court seeks the intent of Congress from text and the " 'structure and purpose of the statute as a whole' ... [including] the way in which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law." Medtronic, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2251.

Federal preemption is either express or implied. If express, the intent of Congress to preempt state law must be clearly stated in the statute's language or impliedly contained in the statute's structure and purpose. Cipollone, supra at 516, 112 S.Ct. at 2617. In the absence of express preemption, implied preemption may exist in the form of conflict or field preemption. Conflict preemption acts to preempt state law to the extent that it is in direct conflict with federal law or with the purposes and objectives of Congress. Field preemption acts to preempt state law where federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field that it is reasonable to infer that Congress did not intend for states to supplement it. Cipollone, supra at 516, 112 S.Ct. at 2617. However, as seven members of the Cipollone Court agreed, when "Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a 'reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority' ... 'there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions' of the legislation." Id. at 517, 112 S.Ct. at 2618, quoting California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282, 107 S.Ct. 683, 690, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). ¹¹

V

To resolve the issue of federal preemption before us we examine two provisions of the Federal Boat Safety Act, the federal preemption provision of § 4306, and the saving clause provision of subsection 4311(g). The federal preemption provision reads in relevant part:

[A] State ... may not establish, continue in effect, or enforce a law or regulation establishing a recreational vessel or associated equipment performance or other safety standard or imposing a requirement for associated equipment ... that is not identical to a regulation prescribed under section 4302 of this title. [46 U.S.C. § 4306.]

The saving clause provides:

Compliance with this chapter or standards, regulations, or orders prescribed under this chapter does not relieve a person from liability at common law or under State law. [46 U.S.C. § 4311(g).]

Plaintiff submits that the use of the term "law or regulation" in § 4306 of the statute is ambiguous and therefore incapable of preempting state common-law causes of action. We disagree, noting that " '[t]he obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.' " Cipollone, supra at 521, 112 S.Ct. at 2620, citing San...