Ryan v. Connor

Decision Date30 December 1986
Docket NumberNo. 85-344,85-344
Citation28 OBR 462,503 N.E.2d 1379,28 Ohio St.3d 406
Parties, 28 O.B.R. 462 RYAN, Appellee, v. CONNOR, Admr., Appellant.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. A physical injury occasioned solely by mental or emotional stress, received in the course of, and arising out of, an injured employee's employment, is compensable under R.C. 4123.01(C). (Szymanski v. Halle's [1980], 63 Ohio St.2d 195, 407 N.E.2d 502 , and Toth v. Standard Oil Co. [1953], 160 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E.2d 81 , overruled.)

2. In order for an injury occasioned solely by mental or emotional stress to be compensable, the claimant must show that the injury resulted from greater emotional strain or tension than that to which all workers are occasionally subjected.

On the morning of October 21, 1981, officials of the defendant J.B. Foote Foundry Co. ("Foote") held a meeting with Russell O. Ryan, who had been employed with Foote for over forty-five years. Russell Ryan attended the meeting allegedly believing that it had been called for the purpose of discussing a job promotion; however, upon commencement of the meeting, Russell was informed that Foote management wanted him to take an early retirement. After some discussion regarding the terms of the retirement proposal, Russell asked if he had a choice in the matter, but the Foote officials in attendance declined to discuss the question because they "felt" that Russell "would accept the proposal."

After the meeting, Russell went home and informed his wife, plaintiff-appellee, Lily L. Ryan, of the retirement proposal. Russell then called one of the Foote officials with whom he had met in the morning and set up another meeting for the afternoon so that he and his wife could further discuss the retirement proposal with company officials. At the afternoon meeting, Lily asked if her husband had a choice in the matter, but the Foote officials again refused to discuss the question; and, when Lily stated that she could not understand why her husband was being retired immediately, one of the company officials responded by noting that Russell would be on extended vacation until December 31, 1981 and would not be officially retired until that time. During the remainder of the afternoon meeting, Russell and Lily both effectively expressed that Russell did not want to retire, and Lily stated that her husband was not satisfied with the retirement proposal; however, the proposal was neither rejected nor accepted by Russell during or after the meeting.

Following the afternoon meeting, the Ryans returned to their home. At that time, Russell allegedly was "under great stress, ashen and gray in color, upset and agitated and subject to physical shaking and trembling." Russell was "unable to sleep" during the night of October 21 and early morning of October 22, and he "was still upset, agitated and under stress on October 22." That morning, the Ryans went to the local social security office, apparently to obtain information regarding Russell's eligibility for social security benefits. Later, during the afternoon of October 22, Russell decided to trim some of the trees around his home and, while trimming the trees with the assistance of one Tommy Keyes, Russell experienced chest pains. Shortly thereafter, Russell suffered a myocardial infarction (heart attack) and died.

On April 14, 1982, Lily filed a claim for workers' compensation death benefits asserting that her husband's death had resulted from a work-related "injury" as that term is defined in R.C. 4123.01(C). A district hearing officer denied the claim on August 3, 1982. The hearing officer's order was affirmed by the regional board of review on November 15, 1982; and, on January 14, 1983, the Industrial Commission refused further appeal.

The plaintiff appealed from the decision of the board of review to the Court of Common Pleas of Knox County. On July 24, 1984, the common pleas court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellant, Administrator of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation. In finding that the plaintiff's husband had not sustained "an 'injury' during the course of and arising out of his employment," the court relied upon Szymanski v. Halle's (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 195, 407 N.E.2d 502 , which held that "[d]isabilities occasioned solely by emotional stress without contemporaneous physical injury or physical trauma are not compensable injuries within the meaning of R.C. 4123.01(C)." Id. at syllabus.

On December 28, 1984, the court of appeals reversed the common pleas court. The appellate court, noting that causes of action "sounding in emotional distress" have recently been recognized by this court in Paugh v. Hanks (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759, and Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109, held that "an injury originating in emotional stress and mental strain is as compensable an injury as a fracture or laceration taking place on the factory floor."

The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Connor & Koltak Co., L.P.A., and Ronald J. Koltak, Columbus, for appellee.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., Janet E. Jackson and Richard C. Slavin, Columbus, for appellant.

SWEENEY, Justice.

The only issue presented by the instant case is whether physical injuries occasioned solely by emotional stress are compensable under the Ohio Workers' Compensation Act. Previously, in Toth v. Stan Oil Co. (1953), 160 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E.2d 81 , and Szymanski v. Halle's, supra, this court determined that physical disabilities caused solely by mental or emotional stress were not "injuries" within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, not compensable. In reaching this conclusion, the court effectively limited the payment of workers' compensation benefits to employees whose physical injuries resulted from a physical impact or trauma. As noted by Professor Arthur Larson, however, "[t]his * * * [was] a judicial limitation, since the statute defines injury as including any injury received in the course of and [arising] out of the employment. * * * " (Emphasis added.) 1B Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation (1986) 7-591, fn. 39, Section 42.21(a).

Subsequent to the Szymanski decision, this court had occasion to review the effect of another "judicial limitation" upon the statutory definition of "injury" that is set forth in R.C. 4123.01(C). In Village v. General Motors Corp. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 129, at 132, 472 N.E.2d 1079, we recognized that, "under R.C. 4123.01(C), any injury received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment is compensable [emphasis sic ]," and we held that, in light of the plain language of the statute, 1 this court could no longer limit the payment of workers' compensation benefits for "injuries" only to those employees whose injuries were "the result of a sudden mishap occurring at a particular time and place * * *," id. at 131, as previously had been done in Bowman v. National Graphics Corp. (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 222, 378 N.E.2d 1056 .

Today, we again refer to the plain language of R.C. 4123.01(C) and apply the statutory directive that the Workers' Compensation Act "be liberally construed in favor of employees and the dependents of deceased employees," R.C. 4123.95, and we find no reasonable basis for continuing to judicially limit the payment of workers' compensation only to those employees whose physical injuries resulted from "contemporaneous physical injury or physical trauma." In the past, by enforcing this limitation and thereby precluding compensation to employees who have suffered a distinct physical injury as the result of a mental impact or stimulus, the Ohio courts have stood alone. As revealed by Professor Larson's review of the case law, the courts of other jurisdictions "uniformly find compensability" when job-related mental stress results in physical injury to an employee. 1B Larson, supra, at 7-586, Section 42.21(a).

In view of this overwhelming weight of authority from the other jurisdictions that have recognized the compensability of stress-related injuries--without adversely affecting the stability of their respective workers' compensation systems--and in light of medical advances that have confirmed the direct link between mental stress and physical disabilities, it makes little sense to continue to impose a limitation on compensation that is not expressly set forth in Ohio's Workers' Compensation Act. We therefore hold that a physical injury occasioned solely by mental or emotional stress, received in the course of, and arising out of, an injured employee's employment, is compensable under R.C. 4123.01(C).

In reaching our conclusion and joining the mainstream of American jurisprudence on this issue, we are cognizant that the courts of other jurisdictions generally have not treated claims for stress-related injuries in the same fashion as claims for physical-contact injuries (i.e., those resulting from physical impact or trauma). In that the causation of a physical-contact injury usually is more readily discernible than that of a stress-related injury, there is a reasonable basis for making this distinction. This does not mean that stress-related injuries are any less real or devastating to injured workers and their families or that claims for stress-related injuries should be given less credence, but it demands that recovery for stress-related injuries be linked to certain factors that may not be applicable to physical-contact injuries.

Because stress is experienced by every person in everyday life, it is necessary to define what kind of mental or emotional stress is legally sufficient to give rise to a compensable injury. 2 Much stress occurring in the course of, and arising out of, employment, is simply a result of the demands of functioning in our society, and participating in the work force, in and of itself, is a stressful activity. In order for a...

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