Ryan v. Dionne

• Decision Date: 27 September 1968
• Docket Number: No. 31899,31899
• Citation: 248 A.2d 583,28 Conn.Supp. 35
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Edward M. RYAN v. Juliette DIONNE.

Page 583

248 A.2d 583

28 Conn.Supp. 35

Edward M. RYAN v. Juliette DIONNE.

No. 31899.

Superior Court of Connecticut, New Haven County at Waterbury.

Sept. 27, 1968.

James M. S. Ullman, Meriden, for plaintiff.

Fitzgerald & Fitzgerald, Waterbury, for defendant.

MEYERS, Judge.

For some time prior to and on and after May 23, 1967, the plaintiff was, and even now is, in the employ of the ciry of Waterbury as its collector of delinquent taxes. During that time, the defendant has been an employee of this municipality as its tax collector. The plaintiff has instituted this action against the defendant, seeking damages for alleged defamation. The amended complaint sets out, inter alia, that the defendant, '(o)n * * * May 23, 1967 * * * falsely and maliciously spoke and published false, scandalous, and malicious words as follows: 'We don't need to learn how to collect taxes * * *. What we need is competent help * * *. Something must be done to have a competent individual do this work * * *. Citizens owing small amounts of back taxes have received a series of demand notices, while others owing larger amounts have been completely ignored * * *. I'm trying to do a job * * * but I've said over and over again the Delinquent Tax Collector should have some kind of a system * * *. It's a disgrace to have such a man in our office * * * and the integrity of our entire office is reflected by his actions * * *. Which of you would hire this man? * * *"

In the allegations of her answer, the defendant has included that 'the plaintiff, as Delinquent Tax Collector of the City of Waterbury, was and is a public official * * * and that any such statements made by the defendant were made in good faith without malice and under an honest belief that they were true.' The defendant has moved for summary judgment, averring that 'there is no genuine issue that the defendant uttered the words attributed to her * * * with 'actual malice."

Decision must therefore be made as to whether there is demonstrated not just a scintilla of issue, a formal issue, but a real point, matter or question which sufficiently presents a genuine and triable issue. It must be determined if a trial is justified. This is to be accomplished by an examination of the facts presented by way of supporting affidavits and such other permissible and available documentation as has here been furnished. It is to be kept in mind that the function of this court, however, is not to try any issue of fact but only to conclude whether or not there exists a genuine issue as to a material fact. Rathkopf v. Pearson, 148 Conn. 260, 263, 170 A.2d 135.

It is parenthetically observed that, although the purpose of summary judgment procedure is to prevent vexation and delay, to aid the machinery of justice, to promote the expeditious disposition of cases and to avoid unnecessary trials, all such preferential handling of the business of the court may not occur unless and until a finding of the absence of a genuine issue as to a material fact can properly be made. A motion for summary judgment calls for penetration of the pleadings involved and the supporting proof as offered.

To the office of collector of delinquent taxes are attached a right and a duty both created and conferred by operation of law. The holding of this office under civil service is not short-lived nor sporadic nor incidental. During his tenure, the incumbent of that office has the duty and correlative power to perform certain defined and continuous functions in the public interest. Both parties having pleaded the plaintiff's official status as collector of delinquent taxes of the city of Waterbury, it is clear that, at the time of the making by the defendant of the statements alleged, the plaintiff was a public official within the rule of Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597, and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686; see 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 134; comment, 'Defamation of the Public Official,' 61 Nw.U.L.Rev. 614.

There is established a distinct and straightforward, albeit rigid, test which the plaintiff must meet. 'The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 279, 84 S.Ct. 726. It is of interest also to note that in Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra, 383 U.S. 86, 86 S.Ct. 676, Justice Brennan summarizes the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan decision in the following manner: 'Society has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation. But in cases like the present, there is tension between this interest and the values nurtured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The thrust of New York Times is that when interests in public discussion are particularly strong, as they were in that case, the Constitution limits the protections afforded by the law of defamation.'

Under our rules of practice, summary judgment should enter if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Stephenson, Conn.Civ.Proc. § 131c (Sup.1966). Under the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan rule the defendant's state of mind, the existence of actual malice, is the sine qua non of an action for defamation brought by a public official. Therefore, we must examine the affidavits and other evidence submitted in support and in contention of the instant motion to see whether there exists a genuine and triable issue as to this essential fact.

In support of her motion for summary judgment, the defendant has offered evidence in three areas. She has filed an affidavit in which is asserted both her belief in the truth of the stated utterances and the reasonableness of that belief. She has submitted extracts from testimony given before the aldermanic subcommittee on delinquent taxes. The defendant also has presented for examination certain portions of the records of the collector of...