Ryan v. Gold Cross Services, Inc.

• Citation: 903 P.2d 423
• Decision Date: 20 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. 940289,940289
• Parties: Sara RYAN, as guardian ad litem of S.S., a minor, Plaintiff, v. GOLD CROSS SERVICES, INC., dba Gold Cross Ambulance, and William J. Slusher, Defendants. GOLD CROSS SERVICES, INC., dba Gold Cross Ambulance, and William J. Slusher, Third-Party Plaintiffs and Petitioners, v. Suzanne O. SMITH, Third-Party Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 423

903 P.2d 423

Sara RYAN, as guardian ad litem of S.S., a minor, Plaintiff, v. GOLD CROSS SERVICES, INC., dba Gold Cross Ambulance, and William J. Slusher, Defendants.

GOLD CROSS SERVICES, INC., dba Gold Cross Ambulance, and William J. Slusher, Third-Party Plaintiffs and Petitioners, v. Suzanne O. SMITH, Third-Party Defendant and Respondent.

No. 940289.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Sept. 20, 1995.

Craig G. Adamson and Eric P. Lee, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Gary B. Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for petitioners.

Stuart L. Poelman, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

DURHAM, Justice:

We granted an interlocutory appeal from a Third District Court ruling upholding the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-186 and denying defendants' motion to admit at trial evidence of plaintiff's nonuse of an available safety belt. Gold Cross Services, Inc., dba Gold Cross Ambulance, and William J. Slusher (collectively "Gold Cross") argue that the statute acts as a rule of evidence and is therefore a legislative intrusion on the rule-making powers reserved to the Supreme Court under the Utah Constitution. In addition, Gold Cross asserts that the statute acts to create an unreasonable classification of tort defendants in violation of the uniform operation of laws provision contained in the Utah Constitution. We reject these arguments and affirm the trial court.

On November 24, 1991, S.S. was a passenger in an automobile driven by her mother, respondent Suzanne O. Smith, traveling south on 700 East in Salt Lake City, Utah. At the same time, petitioner William J. Slusher was driving north on 700 East in an ambulance owned by petitioner Gold Cross Services, Inc. As Suzanne Smith began a left turn in an intersection, the ambulance collided with the side of her car. Following the accident, S.S. was found outside her vehicle. The parties dispute whether S.S. was wearing a seat belt at the time of the collision. Both S.S. and her mother testified that S.S. was wearing her seat belt at the time of the collision. In contrast, Gold Cross's accident reconstruction experts concluded that S.S. was not wearing her seat belt at the time of the accident and that S.S.'s failure to wear the available seat belt caused her to be ejected through the passenger door, which opened on impact. A Gold Cross expert also concluded that as a result of the ejection from the vehicle, S.S. suffered multiple skull fractures and other injuries that would not likely have occurred had she been restrained and remained in the vehicle.

In June 1992, S.S. filed a complaint through a guardian ad litem against Gold Cross. In February 1994, Gold Cross filed a motion in limine for a determination that Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-186 is unconstitutional and for a ruling that evidence of S.S.'s nonuse of an available seat belt could be admitted at trial. ¹ Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion in limine for a ruling that seat belt evidence be excluded from trial. The trial court held the statute to be constitutional, granted plaintiff's motion, denied defendants' motion, and encouraged an immediate interlocutory appeal. Gold Cross petitions for resolution prior to trial on the merits.

Because the issue of constitutionality presents a question of law, "we review the trial court's ruling for correctness and accord it no particular deference." Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988). We further note that when reviewing statutes for constitutionality, a statute is presumed constitutional, and "we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993).

Gold Cross contends that section 41-6-186 acts as an evidentiary rule and therefore constitutes an encroachment by the legislature on the judicial function of creating rules of evidence and procedure, see Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4, as well as on the judicial function of supervising civil litigation, see Utah Const. art. V, § 1. Article VIII, section 4 expressly grants the Utah Supreme Court the power to adopt rules of procedure and evidence and reserves to the legislature the right to amend such rules by a two-thirds majority of both houses. Gold Cross argues that when article VIII, section 4 was adopted in 1985, no rule-making authority over substantive issues was preserved for the legislature.

Prior to the adoption of section 4, the legislature's rule-making power was based on a substantive/procedural distinction. See Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n Management Comm. v. Gibbons Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535, 539 (Utah 1983). Under this approach, "the legislature enacted laws affecting the substantive rights of litigants and the supreme court created procedural rules for the adjudication of those rights." Kent R. Hart, Court Rulemaking in Utah Following the 1985 Revision of the Utah Constitution, 1992 Utah L.Rev. 153, 153; see also Brickyard, 668 P.2d at 539. It is Gold Cross's contention that adoption of article VIII, section 4 affirmatively revoked the legislature's substantive rule-making power because the constitution failed to expressly preserve it. Since the adoption of section 4, argues Gold Cross, the legislature has only the authority to amend, not to enact, rules of evidence.

We decline to address this contention directly because we disagree with Gold Cross's characterization of section 41-6-186 as a "rule of evidence or procedure." ² Instead, we find that section 41-6-186 sets out a substantive principle of law which lies squarely within the legislature's power.

The legislature may regulate, as a matter of public policy and substantive law, the scope of legal definitions of negligence. See Brickyard, 668 P.2d at 539 (recognizing legislature's power to adopt statutes of substantive "principles 'which fix and declare the primary rights of individuals as respects their persons and their property' " (quoting Avila S. Condominium Assoc. v. Kappa Corp., 347 So.2d 599, 608 (Fla.1977))). Section 41-6-186 represents a pronouncement of legislative policy around negligence and public safety. Although section 41-6-186 contains language which at first glance appears to be a rule of evidence, i.e., evidence of seat belt use "may not be introduced as evidence," the statute's operative provisions announce a substantive principle: "The failure to wear a seat belt does not constitute contributory or comparative negligence...."

Once the statute is conceptualized as a statement of substantive negligence law, the language regarding admissibility is mere surplusage. Because the statute decrees that nonuse of seat belts is not negligent, evidence thereof is inadmissible under our general relevance rules, regardless of the language in the statute that expressly excludes such evidence. See Utah R.Evid. 401, 402. Accordingly, we find that enactment of section 41-6-186 lies within the legislature's function of regulating the substantive legal definitions of negligence and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine in article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution.

We note that a majority of jurisdictions, by legislation as in Utah or by judicial decision, mandate that failure to use seat belts may not be used as evidence of a plaintiff's contributory negligence. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187, 1208-09 (1986); see also Clarkson v. Wright, 108 Ill.2d 129, 90 Ill.Dec. 950, 952, 483 N.E.2d 268, 270 (1985) (finding that majority of states have rejected seat belt defense). The policy reasons for rejecting the seat belt defense are summarized in Swajian v. General Motors Corp., 559 A.2d 1041 (R.I.1989). The court in that case emphasized the substantive public policy questions underlying the seat belt issue:

We recognize the safety-belt defense for what it is worth--a manifestation of public policy.... Such a determination [that non-use of seat belts is negligent conduct], if desirable, is properly left to the legislature.

Id. at 1047. The Utah legislature has made a policy choice regarding legal principles of negligence; it has not enacted an evidentiary rule.

We next consider Gold Cross's contention that section 41-6-186 violates the uniform operation of laws provision in article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution. The essence of the uniform operation of laws principle is that "legislative classifications resulting in differing treatment for different persons must be based on actual differences that are reasonably related to the legitimate purposes of the legislation." Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 752 P.2d at 887 (citing Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984)). The test we apply in determining compliance with the uniform operation of laws provision is "whether the classification is reasonable, whether the objectives of the legislative action are legitimate, and whether there is a reasonable relationship between the classification and the legislative purposes." Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted).

Gold Cross asks the court to apply a so-called "strict scrutiny" standard because the statute "acts substantively to deprive a defendant of his right to be liable only to the extent of his negligence and permits a plaintiff to receive a larger damage award than would be available under regular tort standards." Gold Cross submits in the alternative that even if the court applies the so-called "rational basis" standard, the statute does not pass constitutional review because the statutory classification has no rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose.

Before addressing these arguments directly, we point out that Gold Cross's use of the strict scrutiny and rational basis terminology to frame its arguments is unhelpful. Such language comes from federal equal protection analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment and is not readily transposed to the balancing test we apply under the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah...