Ryan v. Grapevine-Colleyville Indep. Sch. Dist.
| Docket Number | 4:21-cv-1075-p |
| Decision Date | 13 March 2023 |
| Parties | Mitchell Ryan, Plaintiff, v. Grapevine-Colleyville Independent School District et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
The First Amendment prohibits laws “abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. In this case Plaintiff Mitchell Ryan contends that Grapevine County Independent School District's (“GCISD”) old and new school board meeting policies violate the First Amendment. As to the August 2021 Policy (“Old Policy”), Ryan argues that the Policy violates the First Amendment both facially and as applied after he tried to speak during the public comment period of an August 2021 school board meeting. As to the October 2021 Policy (“New Policy”), Ryan argues that the Policy also violates the First Amendment on its face.
Throughout the summer and fall of 2021, the “culture war” opened a new front-GCISD school board meetings.[2] Parents and residents turned out in record numbers to participate in the meetings. ECF No. 46 at 4.
Each board meeting allots 30 minutes for public comment. ECF No. 49 at 8. Those who seek to speak during this time must submit a Speaker Request Form to speak during the public comment period. ECF No. 46 at 2. Speakers then have between one and three minutes to address the board. ECF No. 49 at 8-9. The Board Operating Procedures are the official policy governing the public comment period and are voted on and adopted by the board each year. ECF No. 54 at 6-7. The relevant portion of these procedures in August 2021 provided:
We request that persons speaking in open forum . . . refrain from raising complaints against such individuals [employees] or personally identifying them in any way in their remarks unless pursuant to the District's grievance policies . . . Public comment on such matters will not be allowed unless pursuant to those policies.
ECF No. 46, App'x at 217. GCISD also sets Board Meeting Decorum Protocols (“Protocols”) that explain the expectations for speakers at board meetings. ECF No. 54 at 7. But these Protocols are “guideline[s]” rather than official policy. ECF No. 34 at 28.
Plaintiff Mitchell Ryan-a local resident with no children in GCISD-attended a GCISD board meeting in August 2021. ECF No. 46 at 3. Ryan submitted a Speaker Request Form and was thus allowed to speak during the public comment period. Id. at 1. In his speech, Ryan sarcastically criticized Principal James Whitfield for Facebook photos of him and his wife. Id. at 4. Defendant Jorge Rodriguez-the presiding officer and school board president-gaveled Ryan for these comments. Id. But Ryan ignored Rodriguez and continued to criticize Principal Whitfield. Id. Rodriguez then informed Ryan that he could not mention employee names or raise employee complaints during the meeting. Id. at 5. Ryan then tried to change the subject, but his time expired. Id.
As a result of the August meeting, Ryan sued GCISD and President Rodriguez, contending that the Old Policy violated the First Amendment on its face and as applied to him. ECF No. 1. Shortly after, Ryan sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction against GCISD and President Rodriguez. ECF No. 3. The Court denied Ryan's request for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 17) but held a preliminary injunction hearing in October 2021. ECF No. 46 at 6. At the hearing, GCISD informed the Court that it would be updating its Policies at the upcoming October board meeting. ECF No. 34 at 19-20. The Court then deferred ruling on Ryan's request for a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 33. After GCISD revised its Policy, the Court denied Ryan's request for preliminary injunction as moot. ECF No. 36.
In October 2021, GCISD revised its Board Operating Procedures.
The New Policy provides:
The Public Comment period is not intended for the presentation of allegations of employee misconduct, requests for employee discipline; lodging personal attacks; shaming; or demeaning specific named GCISD employees, or unnecessarily disclosing private information about GCISD employees or students.
ECF No. 54, App'x at 305. As a result of the policy change, Ryan filed an amended complaint-challenging both the Old Policy and New Policy. Ryan challenges the Old Policy on its face and as applied to him. But he challenges the New Policy only on its face because he has not participated in a GCISD board meeting since the New Policy took effect. ECF No. 49 at 11-13.
Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it could change the outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). And a dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant but need not comb through the record in search of evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. See Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003).
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST amend. I. Claims under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment are analyzed in three steps. First, the Court must decide whether the First Amendment protects the type of speech at issue. Chiu v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 343-44 (5th Cir. 2001). Second, we must categorize the type of forum at issue. Id. at 344. And third, we must consider whether the speech restriction in the forum passes the applicable standard of review. Id. at 344-45.
Here, the Parties do not dispute that the First Amendment protects the speech at issue. ECF No. 46 at 9. And the Court agrees. See Watkins v. City of Arlington, 123 F.Supp.3d 856, 864 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (). The Court thus analyzes only the forum at issue and whether GCISD's policies pass the applicable standard of review of that forum.
There are three categories of forums: (1) traditional and designated public forums; (2) limited public forums; and (3) nonpublic forums. Chiu, 260 F.3d at 344-45. Because neither party contends that GCISD board meetings are a nonpublic forum, only the first two categories are at issue.
Courts divide the first category into traditional and designated public forums. “In a traditional public forum-parks, streets, sidewalks, and the like-the government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on private speech, but restrictions based on content must satisfy strict scrutiny, and those based on viewpoint are prohibited.” Minnesota Voters All. v. Mansky, 585 U.S. (2018) (slip op. at 7). Designated public forums are “spaces that have not traditionally been regarded as a public forum but which the government has intentionally opened up for that purpose.” Id.
The second category-limited public forums-provide for public expression “for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.” Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-107 (2001). Such forums are subject to a lower standard of review than traditional and designated public forums. Id.
In distinguishing between these two categories, courts focus on two factors: “(1) the government's intent with respect to the forum, and (2) the nature of the [forum] and its compatibility with the speech at issue.” Chiu, 260 F.3d at 346 (internal citations omitted). As to government intent, “the government creates a designated public forum only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.” Id. at 347 (internal citations omitted); see also Hays Cnty. Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 116 (5th Cir. 1992) ().
Ryan argues that the public comment period of GCISD's board meetings is a designated public forum because it is open to the general public to speak on any topic. ECF No. 49 at 14. Defendants counter that the public comment period is a limited public forum because GCISD policy shows no clear intent to create a designated public forum during the public comment period. ECF No. 46 at 16. To further support their argument, Defendants point to the fact that the school board can only deliberate on set agenda topics. Id. at 16.
The question of whether GCISD's board meetings are a designated public forum or a limited public forum is “inherently a factual one.” Stewart v. D.C. Armory Bd., 863 F.2d 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see Verlo v. Martinez, 820 F.3d 1113, 1144, 2016 WL 1395205, at *24 (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 2016) (); Three Expo Events, L.L.C. v. City of Dall., 182 F.Supp.3d 614, 626 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (Fitzwater, J.) (). Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the status of the forum, the Court is “unable to categorize [the forum's] status as a matter of law.” Chiu, 260 F.3d at 348.[3]
Categorizing the forum “lights the path to the correct result” in First...
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