Ryan v. Manhattan Big Four Mining Co.

Decision Date30 December 1914
Docket Number2096.
Citation145 P. 907,38 Nev. 92
PartiesRYAN v. MANHATTAN BIG FOUR MINING CO.
CourtNevada Supreme Court

Appeal from District Court, Nye County.

Action by John Ryan against the Manhattan Big Four Mining Company. From a judgment for plaintiff and an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

John Ryan, the respondent in this case, a miner of some 8 or 10 years' experience, entered the employ of the appellant corporation as a miner in their property at Manhattan, Nye county, Nev., on or about the 1st day of June, 1912. The nature of his employment was that of sinking a vertical shaft, and in that line of work he was a coworker with one James Cushing and one John Pace. Cushing was acting in the capacity of "pusher" or "jigger boss," a term used in mining parlance to designate one who is engaged for the purpose of encouraging, or hastening, the men. The shaft in which the respondent, Ryan, was employed had attained a depth of approximately 500 feet on the 13th day of June, 1912, the day on which respondent was injured. During all of the time that respondent was engaged in the employ of the appellant company the means of lowering and raising the employés, of whom respondent was one, from the surface to the bottom of the shaft, was a bucket and crosshead at the end of a cable, lowered and raised by means of a gasoline hoist. For the purpose of signaling the hoisting engineer on the surface, a bell cord extended from the surface, or gallows frame on the surface, to the bottom of the shaft. This bell cord was a three-quarter or seven-eighth inch rope.

On the 13th day of June the respondent and his coworkers went on shift at the usual hour, and, pursuant to their duties drilled and charged a round of holes, seven in number. For the purpose of setting off the shots, hot irons were lowered from the blacksmith shop to "spit" the fuse. In order to get access to the 14 lines of fuse running to the respective holes, a signal was given, and the bucket, which had rested on the floor of the shaft, was raised a little off the floor and held there by the engineer, awaiting further signal. After the fuses were "spit," the respondent, Ryan, and his coworkers, Pace and Cushing mounted the rim of the bucket in their customary way, and one of them, Cushing, gave the signal to hoist. After they had ascended a distance of from 15 to 20 feet, Ryan and Pace were thrown from the bucket. Pace prevented himself from falling to the bottom of the shaft by grabbing the timbers on the sides of the shaft. Respondent, Ryan, however, was thrown to the bottom of the shaft, where 14 lines of ignited fuse connecting with the seven charged holes, were burning. He succeeded, however, in climbing to the second set of timbers and there protected himself from the explosion which followed. As a result of the fall, the respondent was more or less severely injured, receiving, among other things, a broken collar bone. After the explosion the bucket was again lowered by Cushing, who had ascended to the 400-foot level and Ryan and Pace were picked up and taken to the surface. The respondent, Ryan, received medical and surgical treatment for the injuries sustained. The testimony of plaintiff himself is to the effect that since sustaining the injuries he has been unable to perform his usual line of avocation, and has been unable to perform work incidental to his usual avocation, by reason of the ill health caused directly and indirectly by the injuries sustained in falling to the bottom of appellant's shaft.

The trial of this case before a jury in the court below resulted in a verdict and judgment for the sum of $2,500 in favor of the respondent. From the judgment, and from the order denying a motion for a new trial, appeal is taken.

H. R. Cooke, of Tonopah, for appellant.

P. M. Bowler, of Tonopah, for respondent.

McCARRAN, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The evidence presented by the record in this case as to the manner in which the accident was caused out of which respondent sustained his injuries is conflicting. It was the contention of respondent in the court below, and the case was tried solely upon the theory, that the accident which resulted in the injury of respondent was brought about by reason of the unstapled bell cord, swinging in the shaft, coming in contact with and in some manner becoming entangled with the men, Pace and Ryan, while they were ascending on the rim of the bucket, the contention being that entanglement with the bell cord caused Pace and Ryan to be thrown from the rim of the bucket, the position and theory of the respondent being that the accident was brought about by the willful negligence of the appellant company in failing to comply with the provisions of section 6799, Revised Laws of Nevada, which is as follows:

"It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, company or companies, corporation or corporations, to sink or work through any vertical shaft, at a greater depth than three hundred and fifty feet, unless the said shaft shall be provided with an iron-bonneted safety cage, to be used in the lowering and hoisting of the employés of such person or persons, company or companies, corporation or corporations. The safety apparatus shall be securely fastened to the cage and shall be of sufficient strength to hold the cage loaded at any depth to which the shaft may be sunk. In any shaft less than three hundred and fifty feet deep where no safety cage is used and where crosshead or crossheads are used, platforms for employés, to ride upon in lowering and hoisting said employés shall be placed above said crosshead or crossheads. Any person or persons, company or companies, corporation or corporations or the managing agent of any person or persons, company or companies, corporation or corporations, violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in the sum of five hundred dollars, or imprisoned
in the county jail for a term of six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment."

The evidence in this case discloses that an iron-bonneted safety cage was somewhere about the workings of the mine, but not in use at any time during the period in which the respondent, Ryan, was an employé of the appellant company. It is the contention of appellant that, inasmuch as this safety cage was on the premises, although not used for the purpose of lowering and hoisting the employés while so engaged in sinking the shaft, the appellant company had sufficiently complied with the law, nevertheless.

It is unnecessary for us to comment on the absence of evidence in the record as to the condition of this safety cage, which appears to have been on the premises. It may or it may not have been in working order; there is nothing in the record that would explain its condition in this respect. But, aside from this phase of the question, which plays no part in the case, it is our judgment that the contention of appellant with reference to this phase is untenable.

A statute is not susceptible of interpretation such as that which appellant would seek to put upon it. Clearly, by the terms of the statute it is made unlawful to sink or work through any vertical shaft at a greater depth than 350 feet, unless in the lowering and hoisting of employés, in conducting such work or such sinking, the shaft be provided with an iron-bonneted safety cage.

It is unnecessary for us to dwell upon the fact that a bucket and crosshead such as that which was used in the vertical shaft of appellant on the date on which respondent was injured is not such an appliance as that which is contemplated by section 6799.

Section 4222, Revised Laws--being section 25 of an act entitled "An act creating the office of inspector of mines; fixing his duties and powers," etc.--is as follows:

"The cage or cages in all shafts over 350 feet in depth shall be provided with sheet iron or steel casing, not less than 1/8 inch thick, or with a netting composed of wire not less than 1/8 inch in diameter and with doors made of the same material as the side casing, either hung on hinges or working in slides. These doors shall extend at least four feet above the bottom of the cage and must be closed when lowering or hoisting men, except timbermen riding on the cage to attend to timbers that are being lowered or hoisted; provided, that when such cage is used for sinking only, it need not be equipped with such doors as are hereinbefore provided for. Every cage must have overhead bars of such arrangement as to give every man on the cage an easy and secure handhold.

Reviewing this provision in conjunction with section 6799, a complete description of that which is in the latter section termed "an iron-bonneted safety cage" is given; and in section 4222 special provision is made for the unusual necessities attendant upon the sinking of shafts such as that which was being accomplished on the property of appellant company when this accident occurred. In other words, the statute provides that, when such cage is used for sinking only, it need not be equipped with such doors as are otherwise required. This special provision was undoubtedly enacted by the Legislature with a view to meeting the conditions which are ever attendant where the work of sinking is being carried on. The mere having upon the premises such an apparatus as that which is contemplated by section 6799 does not meet the requirements of the law, where the master in hoisting or lowering employés working through a vertical shaft, makes no use of the appliance; and the mere fact that the employés failed to demand such an appliance to be used in lowering or hoisting them through the shaft where it had attained a depth greater than 350 feet does not...

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7 cases
  • Southern Pac. Co. v. Watkins
    • United States
    • Nevada Supreme Court
    • 7 December 1967
    ...statute as the basis for common-law negligence has been upheld in this state, as well as in many others. In Ryan v. Manhattan Big Four Mining Co., 38 Nev. 92, 145 P. 907 (1914), this court stated that it 'has been held, as a general proposition, that whenever an act is enjoined or prohibite......
  • Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc.
    • United States
    • Nevada Supreme Court
    • 18 February 1969
    ...of a penal statute is negligence per se. Southern Pacific Co. v. Watkins, 83 Nev. 471, 435 P.2d 498 (1967); Ryan v. Manhattan Big Four Mining Co., 38 Nev. 92, 145 P. 907 (1914). We decline to so rule in this case since to do so would subvert the apparent legislative intention. The statute b......
  • McLeod v. Miller & Lux
    • United States
    • Nevada Supreme Court
    • 11 December 1915
    ... ... affected the waters of Four Tree slough, the channel ... complained of ...          There ... witnesses are cognizant. Ryan v. Manhattan Big Four Min ... Co., 38 Nev. 92, 145 P. 907. Learning or ... Manhattan ... Big Four Mining Co., supra ...          Mr ... Rogers, in his work on Expert ... ...
  • Trent v. Clark County Juvenile Court Services, 6761
    • United States
    • Nevada Supreme Court
    • 7 November 1972
    ...misdemeanor (Clark County Code Sec. 14.64.080 and NRS 484.735 (now NRS 484.251) as well as negligence per se (Ryan v. Manhattan Big Four Mining Co., 38 Nev. 92, 145 P. 907 (1914).'This contributory negligence of the decedent, although not a complete defense to a charge of involuntary mansla......
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