Ryan v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.

• Decision Date: 22 June 1911
• Citation: 189 F. 253
• Parties: RYAN v. PHILADELPHIA & READING COAL & IRON CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

189 F. 253

RYAN v. PHILADELPHIA & READING COAL & IRON CO.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. New York.

June 22, 1911

George S. Scofield and W. H. K. Davey, for plaintiff.

Armstrong & Brown, for defendant.

CHATFIELD District Judge.

A perfectly proper settlement of this action was consummated as the trial was about to be started. The plaintiff's attorney and his counsel had conducted the case ably, and the defendant was relieved by the settlement from a possibly large recovery, if the plaintiff could establish its legal liability under the statutes of the state where the accident occurred. A further payment for witnesses' fees (agreed upon by the parties as to amount) was also made. Both the plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney are entitled to be repaid their actual disbursements out of that sum, and the balance, if any, would go into the general fund for the settlement of the case. The infant plaintiff will arrive at his majority within a very short time. He has no general guardian, and the money cannot be paid over unless a guardian be appointed, and bond given, or unless the payment be delayed until the infant arrives at the age of 21. But no difficulty arises on this score. The sole question is whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to a 50 per cent compensation, upon the basis of a contingent fee, for his services in the case, no written retainer or contract having been signed until after the case had been substantially settled and the lack of such a contract noticed.

The amount paid plaintiff's counsel was entirely proper, and his services seem to have been valuable, but the question of his payment is a matter between him and the attorney for the plaintiff, and is of use to the court only as a guide to the value of the services rendered by the attorney for the plaintiff in the entire action.

This court is bound to hold that a guardian ad litem, being an officer of the court, even though appointed in the state court before removal of the action, cannot enter into a contract with any attorney who is necessarily an officer of the court, which shall bind the ward of the court, unless that agreement meet with the court's approval.

The guardian ad litem is not a party who is independent, in the ordinary sense. He is rather a party capable of entering into legal relations, who thus supplies the lack of capacity on the part of the infant.

But the very fact that he is appointed to represent a ward of the court, and that his appointment is...