Ryan v. Ramsey

• Decision Date: 01 August 1996
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. H-95-5264.
• Citation: 936 F. Supp. 417
• Parties: Patrick Matthew RYAN, Plaintiff, v. Gayle RAMSEY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

936 F. Supp. 417

Patrick Matthew RYAN, Plaintiff, v. Gayle RAMSEY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. H-95-5264.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas.

August 1, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Shimon Kaplan, East Texas Legal Services, Beaumont, TX, for Plaintiff.

Andrew P. McCormick, McCormick & McNeel, Houston, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CRONE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (# 9). Having considered the motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the defendants' motion should be denied.

I. Background

Plaintiff Patrick M. Ryan ("Ryan"), a resident of Houston, Texas, has Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"). Being unable to work because of his illness, Ryan began receiving disability benefits from the Social Security Administration in January 1995. Ryan had been living in the same apartment since 1987; however, in July 1995, he started looking for a new place to live.

Ryan learned that there was a vacancy at the Oasis Apartments. The Oasis Apartments are owned by Defendants Gayle Ramsey ("Ramsey"), James Sell, and Brenda Sell. Ryan contacted Ramsey, who also acted as the rental agent for the Oasis Apartments, to inquire about renting an apartment. On July 9, 1995, Ramsey showed Ryan a one-bedroom apartment and informed him that the monthly rent for the apartment was $315.00. Ryan told Ramsey that he was receiving Social Security disability benefits.

After being shown the apartment, Ryan decided to rent it and filled out a rental application form. In the "Personal Information" section of the application, Ryan identified his present and previous addresses, including the names of previous landlords and the monthly rent he paid at each location. Ryan also noted that his rent at his present address was $275.00 per month and that he had paid $240.00 per month for rent at his previous address. In the "Employment Information" section of the application, Ryan identified himself as retired, and beside a query of "Other income from" Ryan wrote "Social Security Disability." In the "Credit References" area of the application, Ryan filled in "NA" following a question of "Bank/ Branch (Checking)," and in response to a query of "Bank/Branch (Savings)," Ryan wrote "First Interstate Bank — Shepherd Square" and provided a telephone number. Ryan left blank two other lines on the application which asked for additional credit references. After filling out the form, Ramsey allegedly told Ryan that she would get back to him within the next two days.

Ryan, however, did not hear from Ramsey within two days. On July 11, 1995, Ryan telephoned Ramsey and left a message on her answering machine. Ramsey returned Ryan's telephone call on July 14, 1995, and, according to Ryan, stated that she had not been able to call him because she had been busy with other things. Ryan also alleges that Ramsey told him that he did not have to worry about his application competing with other potential tenants, because he was the only person to whom she had shown the apartment. Yet, on July 15, 1995, Ramsey left a message on Ryan's answering machine informing him that the apartment would not be rented to him. According to Ramsey, she rejected Ryan's application for financial reasons.

Ryan initiated this action on November 13, 1995, alleging that the defendants had violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 et seq. ("FHA"), by refusing to rent the apartment to him because of his handicap.

II. Analysis

A. Standard for Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants may move to dismiss based on the plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, such a motion is to be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided by Rule 56. Id. In this case, the defendants have attached two affidavits to their motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff has attached a copy of the housing discrimination complaint he filed with the Department of Housing and Urban Development to his brief in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss. These matters outside the pleadings have not been excluded by the court. In addition, both parties have requested that the defendants' motion be treated as one for summary judgment. Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss will be analyzed under the summary judgment standard.

B. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56(c) provides that "summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for his motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, which he believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Williams v. Adams, 836 F.2d 958, 960 (5th Cir.1988). Once a proper motion has been made, the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514-15; Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 825, 113 S.Ct. 82, 121 L.Ed.2d 46 (1992). The controverted evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, and all reasonable doubts must be resolved against the moving party. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 n. 5, 111 S.Ct. 401, 402-03 n. 5, 112 L.Ed.2d 349 (1990); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513-14; Judwin Properties, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 973 F.2d 432, 435 (5th Cir. 1992). Summary judgment is mandated if the non-movant fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case on which he bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. "In such situation, there can be no `genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

C. Fair Housing Act

Ryan alleges that the defendants violated the FHA by refusing to rent an apartment to him because of his handicap. In evaluating FHA claims, courts employ the same method of analysis as utilized in Title VII employment discrimination cases. See Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir.1984) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)); Secretary, HUD on Behalf of Herron v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 870 (11th Cir.1990) (citing Pollitt v. Bramel, 669 F.Supp. 172, 175 (S.D.Ohio 1987)); Williams v. 5300 Columbia Pike Corp., 891 F.Supp. 1169, 1178 (E.D.Va.1995); Jiminez v. Southridge Co-op, Section I, Inc., 626 F.Supp. 732, 734 (E.D.N.Y.1985).

The 1988 Amendments to the FHA, which became effective March 12, 1989, expanded the FHA to prohibit discrimination in housing based upon a handicap and to allow private litigants the right to challenge allegedly discriminatory housing practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a); Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 808 F.Supp. 120, 129 (N.D.N.Y.1992); A.F.A.P.S. v. Regulations & Permits Admin., 740 F.Supp. 95, 102 (D.P.R.1990). Included among the FHA's prohibitions is discrimination on the basis of a physical or mental handicap. Id. Section 3604 makes it unlawful:

to discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of —

(A) that buyer or renter;

(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available; or

(C) any person associated with that buyer or renter.

42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1); Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 530 (5th Cir.1996); Robinson v. City of Friendswood, 890 F.Supp. 616, 619 n. 1 (S.D.Tex. 1995); Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc., 808 F.Supp. at 129; A.F.A.P.S., 740 F.Supp. at 102.

"There is little question that persons terminally ill with AIDS are considered `handicapped' within the meaning of the Fair Housing Act." A.F.A.P.S., 740 F.Supp. at 103; see Support Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc., 808 F.Supp. at 129-30. Indeed, the legislative history of the 1988 amendments to the FHA reveals that Congress intended to include AIDS sufferers within the class of protected persons:

The Fair Housing Act, ..., as amended, is a clear pronouncement of a rational commitment to end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the American mainstream. It repudiates the use of stereotypes and ignorance, and mandates that persons with handicaps be considered as individuals. Generalized perceptions about disabilities and unfounded speculations about threats to safety are specifically rejected as grounds to justify exclusion.

* * * * * *

People with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and people who test positive for the AIDS virus have been evicted because of an erroneous belief that they pose a health risk to others.

All of these groups have experienced discrimination because of prejudice and aversion — because they make non-handicapped people uncomfortable

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