Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Prov.

• Decision Date: 08 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 2004-49-Appeal.,2004-49-Appeal.
• Parties: Mary RYAN et al. v. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF PROVIDENCE et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

941 A.2d 174

Mary RYAN et al. v. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF PROVIDENCE et al.

No. 2004-49-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

February 8, 2008.

Mary Ryan, pro se.

Thomas R. Bender, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

Justice ROBINSON for the Court.

The plaintiffs, Mary Ryan and Thomas Ryan, appeal to this Court from the motion justice's¹ entry of judgment, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, in favor of the following defendants: Most Reverend Louis E. Gelineau, Most Reverend Daniel P. Reilly, Most Reverend Kenneth A. Angell, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence (a corporation sole), and Saint Thomas Church of Manton.²

On appeal, the plaintiffs contend: (1) that the motion justice erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the instant defendants; (2) that the motion justice erred in denying plaintiffs' motion to recuse; (3) that the motion justice erred in denying plaintiffs' motion to vacate the judgment; and (4) that the motion justice erred in not holding a hearing with respect to the instant defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs' motion to recuse, and plaintiffs' motion to vacate.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the Superior Courts grant of summary judgment in favor of the instant defendants.

Facts and Travel

Beginning in October of 1978, when she was seventeen years old, Mary Ryan became involved in a sexual relationship with a Roman Catholic priest, Monsignor Louis W. Dunn.³

During their four-year relationship, Ms. Ryan engaged in consensual sexual activities with Dunn that involved digital penetration and oral sex "on an average of five times a week." See State v. Dunn, 726 A.2d 1142, 1143 (R.I.1999). There is testimony by Ms. Ryan to the effect that she was induced into performing those sexual acts in part because of her love for Dunn and in part because of her belief that "each and every act was an act of God"; she also testified as to her conviction that, as a priest, Dunn possessed the power of God and thus was to be feared and obeyed.⁴

The sexual relationship continued for four years, until Ms. Ryan was twenty-one years old; the relationship abruptly ended on June 7, 1982, when Dunn forcibly had intercourse with Ms. Ryan against her will. See Dunn, 726 A.2d at 1144.

Ms. Ryan did not reveal to anyone the June 1982 sexual assault or any other aspect of her sexual relationship with Dunn until 1986. In 1986, Ms. Ryan, speaking only in general terms, informed a friend of hers, Gene Pistacchio,⁵ that she had had a sexual relationship with Dunn. That was Ms. Ryan's only disclosure about the subject until December of 1993 (more than ten years after the relationship with Dunn had ended and at a point in time when she was thirty-two years old); at that time she provided Gene Pistacchio with some specific details concerning the sexual incidents that had occurred between herself and Dunn. During this same period, Ms. Ryan became convinced that Dunn was a "fraud" when she learned that he had been sexually involved with other women, and she informed her husband that she "had realized that [Dunn] had abused" her. Ms. Ryan testified that she had remained silent for so long a time about her relationship with Dunn because she feared what Dunn could do to her in view of her belief that he possessed the power of God.

It was not until 1994 that Ms. Ryan began telling a number of other people, including her husband and several of the nonperpetrator defendants,⁶ about the sexual assault that had occurred on June 7, 1982.⁷

Regrettably, Dunn was one of several Rhode Island priests who engaged in inappropriate and lamentable sexual abuse of certain individuals. As a result of those several occurrences, thirty-eight civil actions, including the instant case,⁸ were filed by or on behalf of persons who allegedly were victims of that sexual abuse; named as defendants were twelve clerics alleged to be perpetrators and also various nonperpetrator defendants, such as those named in this action. Eventually, all thirty-eight cases were assigned to a single justice of the Superior Court to facilitate their management.

In the course of his initial review of the case records, the third Superior Court justice assigned to said cases (whom we refer to as "the motion justice"; see footnote 1, supra) became aware of the fact that with respect to many of the cases, including this one, the pertinent statute of limitations, absent applicability of a viable tolling theory, posed a significant impediment for plaintiffs.

At that point in time, the motion justice urged all parties involved to engage in settlement and/or mediation proceedings under the aegis of Commonwealth Mediation, a Massachusetts-based firm that specializes in the process of mediation. In the Summer of 2002, after three months of mediation, all of the then-pending sexual abuse cases, except the instant case, were settled for a total amount of $13.5 million. The Ryans chose not to participate in the settlement process; rather, they chose to pursue their civil action against the instant defendants. Subsequently, their counsel moved to withdraw, and on October 8, 2002 that motion was granted.

The motion justice urged the Ryans to find another attorney, and he granted them five continuances, spanning from October 8, 2002 to March 20, 2003, in which to do so. He also instructed them to advise the court of their progress with respect to engaging new counsel. In addition, the motion justice insisted that the mediators who had been instrumental in assisting the successful resolution of the other cases (viz., representatives of Commonwealth Mediation) be present in court on October 8, 2002, so that the Ryans might have the opportunity to (1) consult with them outside of the presence of defense counsel, and (2) be apprised of their options. The discussions between the Ryans and the mediators were not successful. The Ryans were also not successful in their attempts to secure new counsel, and they elected to proceed on a pro se basis.

At about the same time, on November 19, 2002, the instant defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that the Ryans' claims were barred by the statute of limitations.⁹ In response, the Ryans filed a document entitled "Motion to Renew Motion to Compel Discovery and to Strike or Defer Hierarchical Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Statute of Limitations." In that motion, they asserted: (1) that certain "management orders" previously issued by the Superior Court precluded the instant defendants from moving for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds; and (2) that they needed to conduct further discovery in order to buttress their theory that the statute of limitations should be tolled due to what they referred to as "conspiracy" and "fraudulent concealment" on the part of the instant defendants. On April 3, 2003, the motion justice denied plaintiffs' motion, and he also ordered plaintiffs to "file appropriate pleadings in response to [the] summary judgment motion on or before May 16, 2003."

On August 26, 2003, the motion justice issued a comprehensive and scholarly rescript decision,¹⁰ in which he first ruled that the applicable statute of limitations for a civil action filed against nonperpetrators in the sexual abuse context is three years. He then went on to conclude that, because the sexual assault that was the basis for the instant civil action occurred on June 7, 1982, the last date upon which the plaintiffs could properly have commenced suit was June 7, 1985. Accordingly, the motion justice ruled that, since the plaintiffs Complaint was not filed within the applicable three-year period,¹¹ it was time-barred absent a valid tolling theory.¹² After addressing each of the plaintiffs asserted tolling theories, the motion justice further ruled that no valid tolling theory applied. Accordingly, the motion justice granted the instant defendants motion for summary judgment.

Subsequently, on September 3, 2003, the Superior Court entered final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The final judgment document explicitly states that the court is "dismissing all of the plaintiffs claims against [the instant defendants]." On September 9, 2003, plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the summary judgment; that motion was denied in an order issued on September 16. On September. 19, 2003, the Ryans appealed to this Court.

On January 20, 2004, plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court rules of Civil Procedure contending, inter alia, that the courts decision was arbitrary and capricious, that the court lacked jurisdiction, and that plaintiffs were wrongly precluded from addressing their tolling theories or conducting discovery with regard to same.

In addition, on January 26, 2004, the Ryans filed a motion to recuse the motion justice, asserting that the trial court had demonstrated: (1) "that it is prejudicial and biased toward plaintiffs because they did not enter a mediation/binding arbitration process * * * promoted by" the court; and (2) "that it [is] incapable of rendering a fair and impartial decision." On February 19, 2004, the motion justice denied the motion to vacate and the motion to recuse.

In their appeal, plaintiffs contend: (1) that the motion justice erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the instant defendants; (2) that the motion justice erred in denying plaintiffs' motion to recuse; (3) that the motion justice erred in denying plaintiffs' motion to vacate judgment; and (4) that the motion justice erred in not holding a hearing with respect to the instant defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs' motion to recuse, and plaintiffs' motion to vacate.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews a Superior Court justice's decision to grant summary...