Ryan v. Scanlon

• Decision Date: 15 August 1933
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: RYAN v. SCANLON.

168 A. 17

117 Conn. 428

RYAN v. SCANLON.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

August 15, 1933

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Newell Jennings, Judge.

Action by Ruth Ryan against Bartholomew J. Scanlon to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the gross negligence of the defendant, brought to the superior court and tried to the jury. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.

No error.

Lawrence A. Howard, William J. Galvin, Jr., and Cyril Coleman, all of Hartford, for appellant.

Louis M. Schatz and Joseph B. Griffin, both of Hartford, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY JJ.

BANKS Judge.

The plaintiff received personal injuries while riding as a guest in an automobile driven by the defendant. The accident happened in Massachusetts, and the substantive elements necessary to a recovery are governed by the law of that state. Slobodnjak v. Coyne, 116 Conn. 545, 165 A 681. By that law, in the absence of a claim of wanton or reckless misconduct, a guest in an automobile can recover for injuries due to its operation only upon proof that the operator was guilty of gross negligence. Manning v. Simpson, 261 Mass. 494, 495, 159 N.E. 440. The court charged the jury in the language of the Massachusetts court in Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 591, 121 N.E. 505, 506, 4 A.L.R. 1185, as follows: " Gross negligence is substantially and appreciably higher in magnitude than ordinary negligence. It is materially more want of care than constitutes simple inadvertence. It is an act or omission respecting legal duty of an aggravated character as distinguished from a mere failure to exercise ordinary care. It is very great negligence, or the absence of slight diligence, or the want of even scant care. It amounts to indifference to present legal duty and to utter forgetfulness of legal obligations so far as other persons may be affected. It is a heedless and palpable violation of legal duty respecting the rights of others. The element of culpability which characterizes all negligence is in gross negligence magnified to a high degree as compared with that present in ordinary negligence. Gross negligence is a manifestly smaller amount of watchfulness and circumspection than the circumstances require of a person of ordinary prudence." The plaintiff was the only eyewitness of the accident who testified as to the conduct of the defendant prior to and at the time of the accident. The defendant, though present in court during the trial, did not take the witness stand. The court charged the jury that, if they were satisfied of the truth of the plaintiff's story in all its details, they would be justified in finding the defendant guilty of gross negligence under the Massachusetts rule. Conceding that the court's definition of gross negligence was an accurate statement under the Massachusetts decisions, the defendant contends that the conduct of the defendant, as a matter of law, did not constitute gross negligence as so defined, and that the court erred in charging the jury that they might so find, and in denying the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict in the plaintiff's favor.

The jury might reasonably have found the following facts: On February 20, 1932, the plaintiff and Catherine Walsh were guests in a car driven by the defendant on a trip which they had planned to take from Hartford to Boston. They left Hartford about 2:30 in the afternoon and proceeded along the Stafford Springs highway. The weather was clear and the road was dry. The plaintiff and Miss Walsh sat in the back seat of the car and kept up a running conversation, in which the defendant joined from time to time. As they passed through Union and were making a sharp turn in the road, the car swerved severely. The defendant had his head down toward the running board, and the plaintiff called to him and asked what was the matter. He replied that he was all right. The plaintiff watched his driving for a few minutes, and it seemed all right, and she paid no more attention to it. The car had crossed the Massachusetts line into Sturbridge, and was near the foot of a long descending grade when it took a sudden spurt in its speed, left the traveled portion of the road, knocked down four concrete highway fence posts, ran on about 112 feet until it hit and scraped a tree, and ended up by pushing through a stone fence 43 feet from the edge of the traveled highway, making an opening in it of 10 to 15 feet. The sudden increase in the speed of the car attracted the plaintiff's attention to the defendant, and she observed that he was in a relaxed position, with his head down and his chin on his chest not far from the steering wheel. She could not see his eyes, but his lips were " pouted," and he seemed to be asleep.

If this accident was the result of the gross negligence of the defendant, it was because he was operating the car when he knew, or should have known, of the likelihood that sleep would overtake him, and that he actually did fall asleep thereby causing the accident. Counsel for the defendant concede that, if the evidence justifies these conclusions, both of which they say are essential to the plaintiff's case, the defendant could reasonably be held to be guilty of gross negligence under the Massachusetts decisions cited in their brief. Shriear v. Feigelson, 248 Mass. 432, 143 N.E. 307; Blood v. Adams, 269 Mass. 480, 169 N.E. 412. We have held that such conduct could reasonably be held to constitute reckless misconduct under our guest statute, which, if it differs from gross negligence as defined by the Massachusetts court, is of a more serious character. Potz v. Williams, 113 Conn. 278, 281, 155 A. 211; Slobodnjak v. Coyne, supra, 116 Conn. 545, 547, 165 A. 681. The contention of the defendant is that, upon the evidence produced by the plaintiff, which was substantially uncontradicted, the jury could not reasonably reach the conclusion either that the defendant was aware, or should have been aware, that sleep was likely to overtake him, or that he actually did fall asleep. If the jury believed the evidence of the plaintiff, as they apparently did, they could reasonably reach the conclusion that the defendant had fallen asleep at the time that the car suddenly increased its speed and ran off the road. Her description of his relaxed position with his head bent forward over the steering wheel was that of a person overcome by drowsiness. It was within the province of the jury to find that she was correct in her conclusion that he had fallen asleep, which would account for his attitude, and for his complete failure to exercise any control over the car.

The evidence as to whether the defendant realized, or ought to have realized, the likelihood of sleep overtaking him, is meager, being practically confined to the testimony of the plaintiff that, when the car swerved sharply as they were rounding a curve in Union, the defendant had his head down and that, when she spoke to him, he sat up and said he was all right, and that it was " quite a few minutes after that" that they had the accident. Attention is called to the fact that in Blood v. Adams, supra, in which the facts were somewhat similar, the defendant admitted that he was sleepy and must have fallen asleep just before the accident. Here it appears that the defendant was present at the trial but did not...