Ryan v. TCI Architects/Eng'rs/Contractors, Inc.

• Court: Indiana Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: David, Justice.
• Citation: Ryan v. TCI Architects/Eng'rs/Contractors, Inc., 72 N.E.3d 908 (Ind. 2017)
• Decision Date: 26 April 2017
• Docket Number: No. 49S02-1704-CT-253,49S02-1704-CT-253
• Parties: Michael RYAN, Appellant (Petitioner below), v. TCI ARCHITECTS/ENGINEERS/CONTRACTORS, INC. and BMH Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Craft Mechanical, Appellee (Respondent below).

72 N.E.3d 908

Michael RYAN, Appellant (Petitioner below),

v.TCI ARCHITECTS/ENGINEERS/CONTRACTORS, INC. and BMH Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Craft Mechanical, Appellee (Respondent below).

No. 49S02-1704-CT-253

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 26, 2017

Attorney for Appellant : John P. Daly, Jr., Golitko & Daly, PC, Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee : Donald G. Orzeske, Beth L. Riga, Orzeske-Blackwell, PC, Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorney for Amicus Curie, Indiana Trial Lawyers Association : Robert D. Brown, Kenneth J. Allen Law Group, LLC, Valparaiso, Indiana

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-1508-CT-1198

David, Justice.

At issue is whether a general contractor assumed a non-delegable duty of care to keep a worksite safe when it executed the contract in question. Guided by the contract's plain language and looking at the contract as a whole, we find the contract demonstrates the general contractor's intent to assume a duty of care. Thus, we: 1) reverse the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment for defendant; 2) grant the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of duty; and 3) remand for further proceedings on breach, causation, and damages.

Facts and Procedural History

This case stems from a workplace injury sustained by a subcontractor's employee. In June 2012, TCI Architects ("TCI") entered into an agreement with Gander Mountain to serve as the general contractor on a construction project. The project involved renovations to Gander Mountain's retail store in Lafayette, Indiana. TCI subsequently hired several subcontractors, including BMH Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a/ Craft Mechanical ("Craft"), to perform work on the site. Craft further sub-contracted with B.A. Romines Sheet Metal ("Romines") to carry out heating and ventilation work for the project.

The parties used various contract instruments to formalize their obligations. TCI and Gander Mountain used a "form contract" created by the Design-Build Institute of America ("DBIA") for design-build projects¹ ; specifically, they used a form called DBIA Document No. 530 1998 Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Design-Builder ("Form No. 530"). The contract also included a second form called DBIA Document No. 535, Standard Form of General Conditions of Contract Between Owner and Design-Builder ("Form No. 535"). Section 2.8 of Form No. 535 generally outlined the extent of TCI's obligations regarding safety on the site.

TCI and Craft drew up a subcontract of their own. The TCI-Craft subcontract placed the onus of ensuring employee safety on Craft. Similarly, Craft and Romines memorialized their obligations in a sub-subcontract, which called for Craft to assume toward Romines the same responsibilities that TCI assumed toward Craft. The Craft-Romines sub-subcontract also charged Romines with the responsibility of implementing safety precautions and complying with applicable laws.

On June 26, 2016, Michael Ryan, an experienced sheet metal worker and Romines employee, was working at the Gander Mountain construction site when he allegedly fell approximately 8-10 feet, sustaining serious bodily injuries. Ryan testified that, at the time he fell, he was standing on top of an 8-foot ladder, removing ductwork that hung above the second-floor decking of a building. The ladder Ryan was given was allegedly too short, and Ryan claims a Romines foreman, William Hadaway, told him it was the only one available. Hadaway, however, disputes Ryan's recollection of the incident, noting in a sworn affidavit that Romines had three ladders of various sizes on the premises—an 8-foot ladder, 10-foot ladder, and a 24-foot extension ladder. Hadaway also stated that he offered Ryan a choice of any of the three ladders, but Ryan chose the shortest one. In any case, Ryan admits he made no additional effort to contact or make complaints to either TCI or Craft.

On April 1, 2013, Ryan filed an Amended Complaint for Damages in the Marion Superior Court Civil Division No. 6 for the injuries sustained, naming TCI and Craft as defendants. Ryan claimed Craft and TCI had a duty to provide him with a safe workplace and he was injured as a result of their breach. On February 24, 2015, Ryan filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of duty, claiming that both defendants had a non-delegable contractual obligation to provide a safe work environment. TCI then filed an opposition and cross motion for summary judgment, on the issues of duty, breach, and proximate cause. Craft also filed an opposition to Ryan's motion.² After hearing argument on the various motions, the trial court denied Ryan's motion, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding TCI's duty, but then granted TCI's motion, finding that there were not any genuine issues of material fact to be submitted to a jury.

Ryan then appealed the grant of TCI's cross motion for summary judgment, again arguing that TCI assumed a non-delegable duty of care when it contracted with Gander Mountain. In a 2-1 published decision, a Court of Appeals majority affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that the contract between TCI and Gander Mountain (the "TCI Contract") did not create a duty. Ryan v. TCI Architects/Engineers/Contractors, Inc. , 55 N.E.3d 340, 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied (Aug. 2, 2016). Judge Riley dissented, opining that the language of the contract, particularly the language "assuming the responsibility of the implementation and monitoring of the safety programs," demonstrated an intent to assume a non-delegable duty of care. Id. at 347. Thus, she believed a duty was owed to Ryan and would have reversed the trial court. Id.

Ryan sought transfer, arguing the trial court's grant of summary judgment was incorrect. We scheduled oral argument without granting transfer. After having the benefit of oral argument, we now grant Ryan's Petition to Transfer, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals' opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

This Court reviews summary judgment orders de novo . Well P oint, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg h , PA , 29 N.E.3d 716, 720 (Ind.), modified on reh'g on other grounds , 38 N.E.3d 981 (Ind. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate if the designated evidence shows there is no genuine issue as to any fact material to a particular issue or claim, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In viewing the matter through the same lens as the trial court, we construe all designated evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 720-21.

Legal questions, such as contract interpretation, are well-suited for summary judgment. Id. at 721. The party appealing the trial court's summary judgment determination bears the burden of persuading us the ruling was erroneous. Mullin v. Mun. City of S. Bend , 639 N.E.2d 278, 280-81 (Ind. 1994). Nonetheless, we "carefully scrutinize[ ] the trial court's decision to assure that the party against whom summary judgment was entered was not improperly prevented from having its day in court." Id.

Discussion

The parties dispute whether, under these circumstances, a general contractor owed a duty of care to a subcontractor's employee. Specifically, Ryan argues that TCI contractually assumed a duty of care, which was breached when TCI failed to provide a reasonably safe work environment. TCI argues that it owed Ryan no such duty and summary judgment in its favor was correct. Finding that TCI was charged with a specific duty of care when it entered into a contract that demonstrated its intent to assume the duty, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment for TCI, grant Ryan's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and remand for further proceedings.

I. A general contractor ordinarily owes no duty of care to subcontractor's employee, but may assume the duty through a contract.

We begin our analysis with settled principles of tort law. Prevailing on a negligence claim requires fulfillment of three elements: 1) duty owed to plaintiff by the defendant; 2) breach of duty by allowing conduct to fall below the applicable standard of care; and 3) compensable injury proximately caused by defendant's breach of duty. Goodwin v. Yeakle's Sports Bar and Grill, Inc. , 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016). Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide. Id. at 386-87. Absent duty, there can be no negligence. Peters v. Forster , 804 N.E.2d 736, 738 (Ind. 2004). Thus, in granting TCI's motion for summary judgment on the issue of duty, Ryan was foreclosed from recovery.

As to the duty owed by a general contractor, the long-standing rule in Indiana is that "a principal will not be held liable for the negligence of an independent contractor." Bagley v. Insight Commc'ns Co., L.P. , 658 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ind. 1995) (citing Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Skeel , 182 Ind. 593, 597, 106 N.E. 365, 367 (1914) ; also citing City of Logansport v. Dick , 70 Ind. 65, 78 (1880) ). Therefore, a general contractor, such as TCI, will ordinarily owe no outright duty of care to a subcontractor's employees, much less so to employees of a sub-subcontractor. This means that when a subcontractor fails to provide a reasonably safe workspace, the general contractor will not incur liability for employee injury, even when such injury is proximately caused by the subcontractor negligence. The rationale behind this rule is that a general contractor has little to no control over the means and manner a subcontractor employs to complete the work. Stumpf v. Hagerman Const. Corp. , 863 N.E.2d 871, 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

However, five exceptions to our general rule exist. One such exception allows for the existence of a duty of care where a contractual obligation imposes a "specific duty" on the general contractor.³

Bagley , 658 N.E.2d at 586. "If a contract affirmatively evinces an intent to assume a duty of care, actionable...